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NOT FIT TO BE TRIED: DUE PROCESS AND MENTALLY-
INCOMPETENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
J. Thomas Sullivan* 
 
ABSTRACT: 
A mentally-impaired accused who cannot comprehend the nature of the 
proceedings or assist his counsel in presenting his defense to the criminal 
charge cannot be tried as a matter of due process of law. In Jackson v. Indi-
ana,1 the United States Supreme Court held that due process concerns also 
bar the never-ending jeopardy resulting from an inability to restore an im-
paired accused to competence for purposes of proceeding to trial. When an 
Arkansas circuit court ordered the dismissal of pending criminal charges 
against an impaired accused who could not be restored to fitness for trial, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court, in State v. Thomas, reversed the dismissal 
order, returning the defendant to a potential state of unending jeopardy.2 In 
failing to implement the Court’s directive in Jackson, the decision in Thom-
as leaves the state’s trial courts without a clear remedy for addressing the 
problems posed by mentally-impaired defendants who will never recover, 
and also leaves those defendants in the abyss of never-ending jeopardy. The 
focus of this article is the Thomas court’s failure to address the proper rem-
 
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; Adjunct Professor 
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grant provided by the UALR Bowen School of Law supported the writing of this article. 
** I want to acknowledge the retirements at the end of the 2016-17 academic year of long-
time UALR Bowen Law School Professors Frances Fendler and Coleen Barger. Professor 
Fendler edited this review while a student at UALR and taught Contracts, Business Associa-
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career, serving as an Associate Research Editor of this Review while a student at UALR and 
was actively involved in the development of Legal Writing, an increasingly important aca-
demic subject for the nation’s law schools. She has served as a founder of The Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process and has served as Developments Editor of this faculty-edited 
publication since its inception. Both will be missed. 
*** The Arkansas statutory scheme uses the word “fitness” rather than “competence,” or 
“competency,” in referencing the accused’s mental state at the time of trial. See Arkansas 
Code Ann. § 5-2-302. Lack of fitness to proceed generally (emphasis added). 
 1. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972). 
 2. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, 439 S.W.3d 690. 
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edy when the trial court finds that an impaired defendant cannot be restored 
to fitness to proceed within a reasonable period of time. 
 During its 2017 session, the Arkansas General Assembly adopted 
new procedures for conduct of mental evaluations relating to an accused’s 
fitness for trial or criminal responsibility in commission of the offense. The 
amendments bear on issues addressed in this article and are discussed brief-






 General Assembly, Regular Session, 2017, 
amending Arkansas Code Ann. §§ 5-2-301, et. seq. Mental Disease and 
Defect 
 
The Arkansas General Assembly amended the provisions of the Crimi-
nal Code that deal with mental impairment of criminal defendants during its 
2017 general session.3 The amendments focused on two aspects of previous 
law. First, Act 472 renamed the affirmative defense based on mental im-
pairment, previously titled “Lack of capacity,” by re-designating the affirm-
ative defense as “Lack of criminal responsibility,”4 eliminating any confus-
ing use of the term “capacity” in different sections and contexts in the prior 
language of the statute.5 The substantive definition of the affirmative de-
fense based on mental disease or defect remains the same as in the previous 
statute, except for an expansion of the definition of mental defect, which 
now provides in Section 5-2-301(6)(A): 
 
 3. Act 472, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017). 
 4. Id. at sec. 10, amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312, “SECTION 10. Arkansas Code 
§ 5-2-312 is amended to read as follows:” 
 
Lack of criminal responsibility — Affirmative defense. 
 
(a)(1) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution that at the time the 
defendant engaged in the conduct charged he or she lacked criminal 
responsibility. 
 
 5. For instance, the term “capacity” is used in the statute to refer to the defendant’s 
capacity to recognize reality; in the definition of “mental disease or defect in Section 5-2-
301(6)(a)(i); in the definition of the affirmative defense of “lack of criminal responsibility” in 
the amended provision of Section 5-2-301(14); had been used in Section 5-2-302(a) in refer-
ring to the accused’s lack of capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings in defining 
fitness to proceed generally; in Section 5-2-302(a) language not changed by Act 472; and in 
Section 5-2-312(a) defining the affirmative defense: “he or she lacked capacity as a result of 
mental disease or defect.” 
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(iii) Significant impairment in cognitive functioning acquired as a direct 




The Act added a definition for lack of criminal responsibility to the 
definitions section of the statute.7 Thus, the provision defining the affirma-
tive defense in the amended statute does not include a reference to the alter-
native theories of insanity recognized under Arkansas law, but incorporates 
the definition provided for lack of criminal responsibility in Section 5-2-
301(14). 
Second, Act 472 also addressed the mental evaluation conducted by 
order of the trial court when a question of the accused’s fitness to proceed to 
trial is raised, or when the defense gives notice of intent to rely on a mental 
state defense. The amendment effectively addressed the ongoing problem of 
evaluations combining the fitness for trial question (a procedural issue) with 
the question of the accused’s sanity at the time of the offense or ability to 
form the culpable mental state required for commission of the offense; the 
amendment did so by separating the two different evaluations by statute. 
Section 5-2-305, which formerly provided for the evaluation protocol,8 was 
replaced by Sections 5-2-327 and 5-2-328, setting out separate protocols for 
the fitness and “criminal responsibility” evaluations, respectively. Section 5-
2-305 had been amended in 2015 to require different exams for purposes of 
determining fitness and capacity, or insanity,9 expressly directing that the 
examinations not be combined but permitting them to be conducted at the 
same time if ordered by the court.10 
 
 6. Act 472, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at sec. 10 (Ark. 2017) (emphasis added). 
 7. The Act amended ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-301 to include a new definition in subsec-
tion (14): 
 
(14) “Lack of criminal responsibility” means that due to a mental disease or de-
fect a defendant lacked the capacity at the time of the alleged offense to either: 
 
(A) Appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct; or 
(B) Conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law. 
 8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305, repealed by Act 472 and replaced by Sections 5-2-327 
and 5-2-328. 
 9. Id. § 5-2-305(4)(a) as amended, Acts of 2015, Act 1155, §§ 1, 2, eff. July 22, 2015, 
repealed by Act 472. 
 10. Id. § 5-2-305(4)(a)(v), providing: 
 
Fitness-to-proceed and criminal responsibility examination orders may be or-
dered at the same time in accordance with subdivision (a)(1) of this section, but 
they may not be combined into one (1) uniform examination order and shall be 
tracked separately by the division. 
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Nor, did the General Assembly’s action in adopting Act 472 address 
the issues relating to the problem of impaired criminal defendants who are 
unfit for trial and cannot be restored to fitness, or competence, within a rea-
sonable period of time, the primary subject of this article. The most im-
portant point in its amendment of subchapter 3 may well lie in the clearly 
intended differentiation of the fitness and criminal responsibility evaluations 
performed by mental health professionals in the adoption of the new Sec-
tions 5-2-327 and 328, respectively, addressing apparent problems in con-
tinuing practices of Arkansas trial judges and criminal defense counsel to 
rely on single evaluations to address both questions of fitness for trial, or 
competence, and sanity at the time of the offense. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: MENTALLY IMPAIRED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
We also agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that it is not 
enough for the district judge to find that ‘the defendant (is) oriented to time 
and place and (has) some recollection of events,’ but that the ‘test must be 
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a ration-
al as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’11 
 
In April 2005, the Bolivar [Mo.] Herald-News reported on the disposi-
tion of the capital murder case pending for some thirty years in Arkansas 
against Darrell Samuel Davis: 
Davis, 56, was accused of four counts of capital murder in Van Buren 
County and one count of first-degree murder in Boone County on Dec. 
16, 1974, court records show. He had pled not guilty by reason of insani-
ty and was taken to the Arkansas State Hospital to be evaluated. A judge 
later issued a commitment order and Davis has been held at the facility 
since that time. 
Last year, a doctor informed court officials that a change in Davis’ 
treatment and medication had shown positive results and he could now 
assist his attorneys in presenting a defense at trial. Davis previously had 
appeared in court in both Van Buren and Boone counties, but he was 
scheduled to appear in both courts today, where officials had come to an 
agreement that he was insane at the time of the killings and that he 




 11. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). The Court made clear that the 
same formula for competence to stand trial applies in state proceedings in Drope v. Missouri, 
420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“A person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capaci-
ty to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, 
and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”). 
The state law formulation of this constitutional prerequisite is set forth in Section 5-2-302 of 
the Arkansas Criminal Code: 
 
(a) No person who lacks the capacity to understand a proceeding against him or 
her or to assist effectively in his or her own defense as a result of mental disease 
or defect shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense 
so long as the incapacity endures. 
 
(b) A court shall not enter a judgment of acquittal on the ground of mental dis-
ease or defect against a defendant who lacks the capacity to understand a pro-
ceeding against him or her or to assist effectively in his or her own defense as a 
result of mental disease or defect. 
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A few months earlier, in December 2004, the Harrison [Ark.] Daily 
carried a news story about Darrell Samuel Davis with the headline “Murder 
trial after 30 years?”13 The extreme circumstances of the Davis case,14 which 
involved restoration of an impaired defendant’s fitness for trial after dec-
ades, necessarily pose difficult problems for the criminal justice system. 
The recent rejection of a speedy trial violation claim by Arkansas capi-
tal defendant Rickey Dale Newman illustrates the tension inherent in the 
response of the criminal justice system to the complex causes and symptoms 
of mental impairment.15 Newman was originally convicted of capital murder 
and sentenced to death in 2002 after representing himself and asking jurors 
to impose a death sentence. He has spent the past fourteen years in various 
postures16 that finally resulted in a successful attack on his conviction and 
 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-302 (2001); Id. § 5-1-101 (1975) provides: “This act shall be known 
as the ‘Arkansas Criminal Code’”; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-2-302 (2001); Id. § 5-1-101 (1975). 
 12. James L. White, Court Commits Davis, BOLIVAR HERALD-FREE PRESS (April 18, 
2005), http://bolivarmonews.com/home/court-commits-davis/article_dd13c916-bac6-51a9-
9be9-ae6b7564adfc.html. 
 13. James L. White, Murder Trial After 30 Years?, HARRISON DAILY (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://harrisondaily.com/murder-trial-after-years/article_215c6964-d152-5313-951b-
2dffabe75558.html. Davis apparently suffered from escalating mental and emotional prob-
lems following his military discharge and return from service in the Vietnam War, which 
included the following description of his military service: 
 
Although he was assigned to the motor pool in Vietnam, he also volunteered to 
be a “tunnel rat,” crawling into tunnels with a flashlight and a pistol searching for 
people to bring out or enemy food to destroy. 
 
During his time as a tunnel rat, he participated in two searches where enemy Viet 
Cong were found. He and fellow soldiers killed 20 VC in one tunnel and 30 VC 
in another, although the VC were unarmed and didn’t fire on the U.S. soldiers, 
the report said. 
 
Id. 
 14. State v. Darrell Davis, Acquittal based on mental defect, No. 71 CR-74-52, Van 
Buren [Ark.] Circuit Court (Dec. 6, 2004). 
 15. Newman v. Cottrell, 2016 Ark. 413, 503 S.W.3d 74. 
 16. For example, Newman has asserted in letters to the trial court over the years that he 
wanted to be executed. Id., 503 S.W.3d at 77. In the most recent case before the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, however, he unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari to reverse the circuit 
court’s rejection of his motion to dismiss the charges based on violation of his speedy trial 
right under Rule 28.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides, in perti-
nent part: 
 
(b) Any defendant charged with an offense in circuit court and incarcerated in 
prison in this state pursuant to conviction of another offense shall be entitled to 
have the charge dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution if not brought to 
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sentence, causing the court to order a new trial in 2014.17 The prosecution 
has attempted multiple unsuccessful mental evaluations designed to deter-
mine whether Newman is, in fact, fit for trial; this is significantly due, at 
least in part,18 to Newman’s refusal to cooperate with forensic professionals 
engaged in his mental evaluation.19 
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled against Newman on his petition for 
writ of certiorari based on the history of his mental impairment. Having 
demonstrated his lack of fitness for trial once his conviction had been vacat-
ed, the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the prosecution based on an alleged 
speedy trial violation would logically fail because the trial court properly 
concluded that the evidence did not show that he had regained competence 
for retrial.20 His lack of fitness to be tried effectively served to toll the opera-
tion of the speedy trial rule.21 
 
trial within twelve (12) months from the time provided in Rule 28.2, excluding 
only such periods of necessary delay as are authorized in Rule 28.3; 
 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.1(b). 
 
 17. Newman v. State, 2014 Ark. 7, at 29, 2014 WL 197789, at 15. Newman’s conviction 
and sentence had been affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Newman v. State, 353 
Ark. 258, 106 S.W.3d 438 (2003). 
 18. A significant problem in the ultimate determination of Newman’s competence at the 
time of trial arose because of post-trial litigation in which he established that the Arkansas 
State Hospital psychologist who evaluated his claim of lack of fitness to proceed to trial had 
“incorrectly scored the test he administered to Newman, resulting in a higher IQ score; used 
improper tests to determine Newman’s competency; and improperly administered Newman’s 
tests.” Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539, *3, 354 S.W.3d 61, 64 (2009), citing Newman v. 
Norris, 597 F.Supp.2d 890, 895 (W.D. Ark. 2009). Based on the admissions of error by the 
evaluating psychologist, the Arkansas Supreme Court, on remand from the federal habeas 
court, re-invested jurisdiction in the state circuit court to consider Newman’s petition for writ 
of error coram nobis based on his claim that he was incompetent to proceed at the time of 
trial and other claims based on the State’s failure to disclose evidence arguably favorable to 
the defense. 2009 Ark. at *18, 354 S.W.3d at 71. On appeal from denial of relief by the cir-
cuit court, the Arkansas Supreme Court held in an unpublished opinion that Newman’s “cog-
nitive deficits and mental illnesses” had rendered him incompetent for trial and reversed his 
conviction and sentence and remanded the case for new trial. Newman v. State, 2014 Ark. 7, 
29, 2014 WL 197789, at 15. 
 19. Newman v. State, 2014 Ark. 7, at 9–12, 2014 WL 197789, at 5–7. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s opinion on its order granting Newman’s motion to reinvest jurisdiction in 
trial court to permit litigation of petition for writ of error coram nobis includes a comprehen-
sive recitation of the post-conviction litigation in the case. For a discussion of the significant 
facts in the diagnosis of Newman’s mental impairment and legal consequences, see id. at 14–
29, 2014 WL 197789, at 8–15. 
 20. Newman v. Cottrell, 2016 Ark. 413, at 5–7, 503 S.W. 3d 74, 78–79. 
 21. Id. at 8, 503 S.W.3d 74 at 79 (holding that “because, the period during when New-
man was not competent to stand trial is excludable for purposes of calculating speedy-trial,” 
he could not demonstrate a violation of the 12 month rule for bringing cases to trial); see 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.1(b), supra note 16; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.3(a) (providing that “The period 
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The Davis and Newman cases reflect problems of delay inherent in the 
criminal process attributable to issues of mental impairment that often afflict 
individuals accused of committing crimes. The primary function of the crim-
inal justice system is the determination of responsibility for the commission 
of criminal offenses and imposition of appropriate punishment, yet issues of 
mental impairment in the criminal law complicate those objectives by inter-
posing considerations that make attainment of these objectives more diffi-
cult and results often less clear. 
The question of an accused’s fitness for trial due to alleged mental im-
pairment often serves as a barrier to the process of making determinations as 
to guilt or punishment.22 Once the accused, the defense counsel,23 or the 
prosecuting attorney24 gives notice that the accused intends to rely on mental 
impairment as a defense to the charge, or that their fitness to proceed with 
trial will be challenged,25 Section 5-2-305(a) of the Arkansas Criminal Code 
requires the trial court to suspend the proceedings and order a mental evalu-
ation of the defendant.26 The revision of the mental examination process 
authorized by Section 5-2-305 now bisects the forensic examination. A find-
ing that the defendant is impaired and not fit to be tried effectively serves to 
preclude a separate forensic examination27 to assess whether the defendant 
was insane at the time of the commission of the offense charged,28 unless the 
defense expressly requests that the latter examination proceed.29 
 
of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited 
to an examination and hearing on the competency of the defendant and the period during 
which he is incompetent to stand trial. . . . “). 
 22. For instance, an extended period of impairment rendering the accused unfit to pro-
ceed to trial may delay the proceedings for such a long time that the ability of either the pros-
ecution, or the defense, to produce necessary evidence will be compromised; ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-2-310(c)(2) (Repl. 2013) (authorizing the trial court to dismiss the charge in the 
event a defendant initially found unfit for trial becomes competent if it finds “that it would be 
unjust to resume the criminal proceeding”). 
 23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-304(a) (Repl. 2013). 
 24. Id. § 5-2-305(b)(1) (Repl. 2013) (the court may also act, sua sponte).  
 25. Id. § 5-2-304(a) (Repl. 2013). 
 26. Id. § 5-2-305(a) (Repl. 2013). 
 27. Id. § 5-2-305(a)(2)(A) (providing that “[t]he fitness-to-proceed examination, and the 
criminal responsibility examination and request for an opinion on the defendant’s criminal 
responsibility, are two distinctly different examinations”); see J. W. Looney, The Arkansas 
Approach to Competency to Stand Trial: “Nailing Jelly to a Tree,” 62 ARK. L. REV. 683, 
718–19 (2009) (recommending that dual purpose examination orders, requiring evaluation of 
both mental state for fitness and sanity determinations, should not be used for numerous 
reasons). 
 28. Id. § 5-2-312 (Repl. 2013) (setting out the Arkansas lack of capacity, or insanity, 
affirmative defense). Section 52-312 has been amended by Act 472, 91st General Assembly, 
Regular Session 2017, which redesignated the affirmative defense as lack of criminal respon-
sibility, consistent with the inclusion of that designation in Section 5-2-301(14) of the 
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However, the Arkansas Criminal Code arguably contains inconsistent 
provisions relating to the authority of the circuit court to consider whether 
the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to otherwise support 
the unfit accused’s conviction on the offense charged. Section 5-2-302(b) 
expressly bars the court from proceeding with a trial that would include re-
quiring a finding of factual guilt before ordering an acquittal based on the 
accused’s mental state.30 Section 5-2-313(a) authorizes the trial court to en-
ter an acquittal based on mental state when the accused is fit, or has regained 
fitness, to proceed to trial.31 However, Subsection 313(b) authorizes the trial 
court to make a factual determination of the impaired accused’s guilt and 
order an insanity acquittal even when the accused has not asserted that de-
fense, even though he is presumably fit to make the decision with respect to 
relying on the insanity defense.32 
Problems of delay resulting from mental impairment arise in different 
stages of the criminal process. The delay may occur in the initial determina-
tion of fitness, often due to strained forensic resources available to make 
fitness determinations.33 It may also occur when the individual accused is 
found to suffer from impairment compromising their fitness to stand trial, 
when the prosecution process must give way to the need for forensic experts 
to restore the impaired accused to a state of sufficient comprehension and 
capability to be fit for trial.34 With respect to the latter, the decision of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court in State v. Thomas testifies to one particularly dif-
ficult problem posed by impaired defendants—the disposition of criminal 
charges when the impairment is not susceptible to successful treatment.35 
 
amended statute. See notes 217 and 229, infra, for text and discussion of the lack of criminal 
responsibility, or insanity, defense and affirmative defenses, generally, under Arkansas law. 
 29. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305(a)(2)(B) (Repl. 2013) (“The fitness-to-proceed examina-
tion and the criminal responsibility examination may be done at the same time only if the 
defendant simultaneously raises the issue of the defendant’s fitness to proceed and files no-
tice that he or she intends to rely upon the defense of mental disease or defect.”). 
 30. Id. § 5-2-302(a) (2001). 
 31. Id. § 5-2-313(a) (1987). 
 32. Id. §5-2-313(b). 
 33. Id. § 5-2-305(a)(2)(B) (Repl. 2013) (“The fitness-to-proceed examination and the 
criminal responsibility examination may be done at the same time only if the defendant sim-
ultaneously raises the issue of the defendant’s fitness to proceed and files notice that he or she 
intends to rely upon the defense of mental disease or defect.”). See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.1, 
supra note 16; see, e.g., Carmago v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 126-27, 55 S.W.3d 255, 261–62 
(2001) (rejecting speedy trial dismissal claim based on delay in resolving fitness issue, hold-
ing this delay is excludable period under Rule 28.3(a)); Scott v. State, 337 Ark. 320, 323–25, 
989 S.W.2d 891, 892–93 (1999); Brawley v. State, 306 Ark. 609, 816 S.W.2d 598 (1991) 
(discussed in Scott). 
 34. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, 439 S.W.3d 690. 
 35. Id. 
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The focus of this article is the Thomas court’s failure to address the 
proper remedy when the trial court finds that an impaired defendant cannot 
be restored to fitness to proceed within a reasonable period of time. 
II. THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACCUSED BE COMPETENT, OR FIT, TO 
STAND TRIAL 
A criminal defendant suffering from a mental disease or defect which 
renders him incapable of assisting his counsel in his defense, or unable to 
appreciate the proceedings in which he finds himself, cannot be tried, sen-
tenced, or convicted as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.36 When an accused lacks competence or fitness37 for trial, the 
trial court may direct state mental health authorities to attempt to restore 
competence so the criminal case may proceed.38 Section 5-2-310(a)(1)(A) of 
the Arkansas Criminal Code precludes continuation of the proceedings when 
a defendant is determined to be unfit for trial: 
If the court determines that a defendant lacks fitness to proceed, the pro-
ceeding against him or her shall be suspended and the court may commit 
the defendant to the custody of the Director of the Department of Health 
and Human Services for detention, care, and treatment until restoration 
of fitness to proceed.
39
 
Because significant numbers of individuals involved in the criminal 
justice system as defendants and inmates confined in prison suffer from 
 
 36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-302 (2001) (recognizing the constitutional due process pro-
tection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 37. Id. (using the word “fitness” rather than “competence” or “competency”). 
 38. Id. § 5-2-310(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2016); see supra note 22 (explaining the significance 
of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-310). 
 39. Id. § 5-2-310(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Under prior state law, the fitness decision 
was committed to a jury impaneled to determine whether the accused was “insane” prior to 
trial, permitting commitment for restoration of his mental state in order to then proceed with 
the trial, as the court explained in Forby v. Fulk, 214 Ark. 175, 178, 214 S.W.2d 920, 922 
(1948). The court denied the accused’s petition for writ of prohibition to bar trial on his guilt 
until a separate jury found him sane and fit to proceed to trial. Instead, it concluded that the 
process was controlled by Initiated Act No. 3 of 1936, which provided that the trial jury 
could consider the defendant’s sanity at the time of trial as a defense to the charge. It ex-
plained: 
 
The purpose of the act was not to deprive the jury selected and empaneled to de-
termine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, from also passing on the fact 
question as to defendant’s sanity at the time of trial or when the crime was com-
mitted, if made an issue. 
 
Id. at 181, 214 S.W.2d at 923. 
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mental disorders, the problems posed by mental impairment are substantial. 
Consider the finding reported by the Department of Justice: 
According to a report from the Council of State Governments Justice 
Center, funded in part by the Office of Justice Programs’ (OJP) National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ), 16.9 percent of the adults in a sample of local 
jails had a serious mental illness. That’s three to six times the rate of the 
general population. And while the serious mental illness rate was 14 per-
cent for men, it was 31 percent for women. If these rates were applied to 
13 million jail admissions reported in 2007, the study findings suggest 
that more than two million bookings of a person with a serious mental 
illness occur every year (emphasis added).
40
 
A. Restoration of Fitness, Generally 
Once a trial court has concluded that the criminal defendant suffers 
from an impairment sufficient to compromise their ability to comprehend 
the nature of the proceedings or assist counsel in the preparation and presen-
tation of the defense, the proceedings must typically be held in abeyance.41 
Suspension of the proceedings affords mental health professionals the op-
portunity to engage in therapeutic action designed to restore competence, or 
fitness, to proceed in the case.42 
In some cases, restoration may be accomplished through therapies that 
do not involve reliance on medication. Some temporary impairment may be 
addressed simply by the confinement of an incompetent individual charged 
with a crime in a hospital regimen. In such a hospital regimen, imposition of 
a schedule or contact with others serves to reorient the accused, to alleviate 
the accused’s ongoing mental illness, and/or to respond to an accused’s psy-
chotic episode. In contrast, impairment resulting from mental defect, wheth-
er that described by Subsections (ii) or (iii),43 would appear to be beyond 
 
 40. Addressing Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Dec. 1, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/addressing-
mental-illness-criminal-justice-system. 
 41. One alternative to proceeding with prosecution lies in the dismissal of charges, an 
option that prosecutors might elect as an option when the offenses charged are rather minor, 
or involve no injury to others or significant damage to property, or when proof of the offense 
charged might be particularly difficult in light of the evidence available to the prosecution. 
Otherwise, the proceedings will be stayed pending resolution of the attempt to restore the 
accused to fitness. However, the Criminal Code recognizes that certain matters, such as 
claims of insufficiency of the charging instrument, violation of the statute of limitations, prior 
jeopardy, or “any other ground that the court deems susceptible of fair determination” with-
out the personal participation of the defendant may be considered with defense counsel’s 
representation prior to trial. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-311. 
 42. Id. § 5-2-310 (Repl. 2016). 
 43. Id. § 5-3-301(5)(A)(ii), (iii). 
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restoration because it is typically not amenable by treatment with conven-
tional drug therapies. 
For many, perhaps most, mentally ill defendants, the restoration pro-
cess will necessarily involve treatment with psychoactive drugs. Psycho-
pharmacology is an important therapeutic tool available to mental health 
professionals in the treatment of mental illness, and significant litigation has 
focused on the respective interests of the prosecution and defendants who 
refuse voluntary administration of these medications.44 
The restoration process may raise issues relating to administration of 
psychoactive medications over the accused’s objections. Because the in-
competent accused has a liberty interest recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Washington v. Harper,45 the question of whether forcible medication of an 
individual accused, but not yet convicted of an offense, is appropriate is a 
matter not always easily answered. In Harper, the inmate had been convict-
ed and had consequently suffered a loss of liberty upon being incarcerated.46 
A different test for the involuntary administration of psychoactive medica-
tions applies when the individual is being evaluated and treated for restora-
tion of fitness to stand trial; however, because such individuals have not 
been convicted of the offense charged, they have not forfeited any liberty 
interest due to the fact of their conviction and consequent incarceration. 
In Riggins v. Nevada,47 the Supreme Court implicitly upheld the forced 
medication of an accused charged with capital murder. The Court found that 
forced medication of an accused person did not necessarily violate due pro-
cess and that his liberty interest could be overcome by an “essential” or 
“overriding” state interest.48 It reversed his conviction, however, because the 
state trial court’s medication order did not indicate that it had properly con-
sidered Riggins’ liberty interests in ordering the involuntary administration 
of psychoactive drugs, and had not taken into consideration whether less 
intrusive means might be available to restore his competence for trial.49 
 
 44. See e.g., note 58, infra, for cases addressing the issue of forced medication to render 
death row inmates competent for execution. 
 45. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (“The forcible injection of medica-
tion into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that per-
son’s liberty.”). There, the Court upheld the authority of state corrections officials to forcibly 
medicate a mentally ill inmate whose dangerous behavior threatened the security of the insti-
tution upon agreement of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and institutional official who were not 
immediately involved in the inmate’s treatment that introduction of psychoactive medication 
was in the inmate’s medical interest. 
 46. Id. at 222 (“The extent of a prisoner’s right under the Clause to avoid the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate’s confine-
ment.”). 
 47. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
 48. Id. at 134–138. 
 49. Id. 
2017] CRIMINAL LAW 169 
Finally, in Sell v. United States,50 the Supreme Court announced a four-
part test for assessing when involuntary medication with psychoactive drugs 
may be appropriate in the attempt to restore an incompetent accused to fit-
ness for trial.51 The test requires the trial court to consider: (1) whether “im-
portant governmental interests are at stake”;52 (2) whether “involuntary 
medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests”;53 (3) 
whether “involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests”;54 
and (4) whether “administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., 
in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”55 
Only when the trial court can draw positive conclusions from the record is 
forced medication over the accused’s objection permissible. In Sell, the 
Court remanded for a determination of whether the evidence supported a 
conclusion that the governmental interests were sufficiently great in light of 
both his lengthy history of mental illness, apparent lack of dangerousness, 
and the potential adverse consequences that administration of the drugs may 
pose for the accused’s ability to assist counsel in presentation of his defense 
at trial.56 
The involuntary administration of psychoactive drugs to restore a con-
victed capital defendant’s competence for execution represents another sig-
nificant question in the competence equation.57 This issue is unrelated to the 
problems posed by the decision in Thomas, but remains a significant unre-
solved constitutional question that reflects the very difficult problem of ad-
dressing profound mental illness within the criminal justice system.58 
 
 50. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 51. Id. at 180–181. 
 52. Id. at 180 (emphasis in original). 
 53. Id. at 181 (emphasis in original). 
 54. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 55. Id. (emphasis in original). In United States v. Curtis, 749 F.3d 732, 737–38 (8th Cir. 
2014), the Eighth Circuit remanded a medication order to the trial court to consider whether 
the medication was in the accused’s medical interests. 
 56. Sell, 539 U.S. at 184–86. 
 57. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986), the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment barred the execution of an incompetent mentally ill inmate in a plurality opinion. 
Justice Powell, concurring to provide the critical fifth vote, set the standard for competence 
for execution in terms of the inmate’s comprehension that he would be executed and the 
reason for the execution. Id. at 421. 
 58. The Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the involuntary medication of an 
impaired inmate to restore competence for execution can be justified under Eighth Amend-
ment and requirement for due process. Two state supreme courts have rejected forced medi-
cation as violative of their state constitutions’ protections, Louisiana, in State v. Perry, 610 
So.2d 746, 757 (La. 1992), and South Carolina, in Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 
1993). The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld involuntary medication of a mentally ill, psy-
chotic inmate in Singleton v. Norris, 338 Ark. 135, 138–39, 992 S.W.2d 768, 770 (1999), 
concluding that the motivation for the medication was medical treatment and not restoration 
of competence for execution and that the latter was collateral to the justified administration of 
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B. The Consequence of Failed Restoration Efforts: State v. Thomas 
When the attempt to restore the accused to a state of fitness or compe-
tence to proceed to trial is unsuccessful, the trial court is placed in the 
somewhat awkward position of determining what disposition of the proceed-
ings is appropriate in light of the due process requirement that the incompe-
tent defendant not be forced to endure trial. In cases where the disease or 
defect proves so substantial that restoration of competence within a reasona-
ble period of time is not likely, indefinite confinement for treatment 
amounts to a deprivation of due process, as the United States Supreme Court 
held in Jackson v. Indiana.59 At some point, dismissal of the pending crimi-
nal charges is required to permit recourse to other devices for treatment or 
long-term care of the mentally-impaired individual, such as civil commit-
ment in state or private mental health facilities, or release of the individual 
into the community if determined to no longer be violent or a danger to him-
self or others.60 
In State v. Thomas,61 the trial court ordered the prosecution against 
Thomas dismissed after uncontroverted testimony at the hearing on his mo-
tion to dismiss that Thomas could not be restored to the competency, or fit-
ness, necessary for the criminal case to proceed to trial.62 Under Arkansas 
law, a conclusion that an impaired defendant cannot be restored to fitness 
must be communicated to the trial court within the ten-month period of time 
authorized for mental health professionals to make the necessary decision 
that competence restoration was not possible.63 The State appealed the trial 
 
the medication and holding that the petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim of incompe-
tence for execution. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (deferring 
to state court’s reliance on Washington v. Harper in determining forced medication appropri-
ate due to petitioner’s dangerousness while confined and declining to order federal habeas 
relief). 
 59. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738–39 (1972). 
 60. Id. at 721. The Jackson Court noted that federal courts had routinely held: 
 
These decisions have imposed a ‘rule of reasonableness’ upon §§ 4244 and 4246. 
Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed thereunder can be held only 
for a ‘reasonable period of time’ necessary to determine whether there is a sub-
stantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable fu-
ture. If the chances are slight, or if the defendant does not in fact improve, then 
he must be released or granted a §§ 4247-4248 hearing. 
 
 61. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, 439 S.W.3d 690. 
 62. Id. at 1–3, 439 S.W.3d at 691–92. 
 63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310 (Repl. 2016) provides, in pertinent part 
 
(b)(1) Within a reasonable period of time, but in any case within ten (10) months 
of a commitment pursuant to Subsection (a) of this section, the department shall 
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court’s dismissal order and the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the prob-
lem of irreparable impairment resulting in lack of fitness to proceed.64 
Thomas had been found unfit, or incompetent, to be tried and after ex-
tensive examination by the forensic team at the Arkansas State Hospital 
(“ASH”), ASH concluded that he would never be restored to competence.65 
Following the hearing, the trial court ordered the second-degree battery and 
second-degree assault charges dismissed.66 Ironically, those charges arose 
from an incident occurring at the State Hospital while Thomas had been 
confined for fitness evaluation ordered in another criminal case.67 He at-
tacked the forensic psychiatrist conducting the evaluation.68 
The examining psychologist at ASH testified he “did not believe that 
Thomas could be restored to competency.”69 His testimony was supported 
by that of the defendant’s therapist at an inpatient mental-health facility, 
who explained that: 
Thomas was placed at Dayspring pursuant to a five-year civil commit-
ment entered in 2009, [and] that Thomas was unfit to stand trial because 
he could not effectively assist his attorney with his defense. He specifi-
cally noted that Thomas was unable to consistently describe the incident 




Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the special judge ordered the 
case against Thomas dismissed after counsel briefed and argued the circuit 
court’s authority to order dismissal under Section 5-2-310(c)(2).71 The State 
 
file with the committing court a written report indicating whether the defendant 
is fit to proceed, or, if not, whether: 
 
(A) The defendant’s mental disease or defect is of a nature preclud-
ing restoration of fitness to proceed; and 
 
(B) The defendant presents a danger to himself or herself or to the 
person or property of another. 
 
 64. The appeal in the case was brought by the State, attacking the decision of Special 
Judge William O. James, a highly-experienced criminal defense attorney, appointed to hear 
the matter at the trial court level. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 3, 439 S.W.3d at 692. The su-
preme court accepted the appeal based on its jurisdiction under Rule 3(b) of the Arkansas 
Rules of Appellate Procedure—Criminal, and its finding that the issue raised involved “the 
correct and uniform administration of the criminal law,” as required by Rule 3(d). Id. 
 65. Id. at 1, 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
 66. Id., 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
 67. Id., 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
 68. Id., 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
 69. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 2, 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
 70. Id. at 2, 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
 71. Id., 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
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gave notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the criminal appellate rules72 
authorizing appeals by the prosecution in criminal actions.73 
The Arkansas Supreme Court granted the State’s request for review,74 
finding that the issue met the standard for disposition under Rule 3(d), 
which provides that review is required to ensure “the correct and uniform 
administration of the criminal law.”75 On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court, holding that the applicable statute, Section 5-
2-310(c)(2),76 did not empower a circuit court to order dismissal of a crimi-
nal prosecution until the accused had been restored to fitness to proceed.77 
The court focused on Section 5-2-310(c), which provides: 
(c)(1) On the court’s own motion or upon application of the department, 
the prosecuting attorney, or the defendant, and after a hearing if a hear-
ing is requested, if the court determines that the defendant has regained 
fitness to proceed the criminal proceeding shall be resumed. 
(2) However, if the court is of the view that so much time has elapsed 
since the alleged commission of the offense in question that it would be 




Because the testimony unquestionably showed that Thomas had not—
and in the opinion of the testifying forensic experts—could not, be restored 
to fitness within a reasonable time, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s strict ap-
plication of Subsection (c)(2) proved questionable.79 The court recognized 
that the parties and trial judge had erroneously focused on this Subsection, 
explaining: “The plain language of subparagraph (c) involves only the situa-
 
 72. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 3. 
 73. The rule authorizes appellate review sought by the State from a disposition entered 
by the trial court in two different contexts. First, Subsection (a) authorizes interlocutory ap-
peals from trial court orders suppressing physical evidence seized pursuant to a search or the 
accused’s confession, Subsections (1) and (2), respectively, or holds evidence of a victim’s 
prior sexual conduct admissible pursuant to Evidence Rule 411(c). 
Second, the State may seek appellate review of a trial court ruling after disposition of the 
pending case when the circuit court’s decision implicates an interpretation of controlling law 
arguably undermining the uniform application of criminal law in the state’s courts, pursuant 
to section (b) of Rule 3. 
 74. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 3, 439 S.W.3d at 692 (“This court decides appeals 
brought by the State in criminal cases only when the issue is “narrow in scope” and involves 
the interpretation of law.”). 
 75. E.g., State v. Jones, 321 Ark. 451, 903 S.W.2d 170 (1995). The Arkansas Supreme 
Court granted appeal, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give the lesser-included 
offense instruction supported by the evidence to which the defense had objected. 
 76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310 (Repl. 2016). 
 77. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 4, 439 S.W.3d at 692. 
 78. Id. § 5-2-310 (Repl. 2016). 
 79. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 2, 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
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tion in which a criminal defendant has regained his or her fitness to stand 
trial.”80 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY-FLAWED DECISION IN THOMAS 
The problem posed by State v. Thomas lies in the court’s interpretation 
of Section 5-2-310(c)(2),81 which wholly failed to recognize the due process 
implications in cases in which criminal defendants suffer from mental im-
pairment, compromising their fitness for trial. The special judge, consider-
ing the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Peacock of ASH, properly found 
that Thomas could not be restored to competence, or fitness for trial,82 with-
in a reasonable period of time. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Jackson v. Indiana,83 the trial judge ordered the case against Thomas 
dismissed, opening the way for his involuntary civil commitment to treat his 
mental illness, without the continuing threat of criminal trial looming. 
A. The Error in Focusing on Subsection 310(c)(2) 
The trial court, the parties, and the Arkansas Supreme Court all misdi-
rected their attention to the text of Section 5-2-310(c), which expressly ad-
dresses situations in which the trial court is called upon to respond to the 
accused’s restoration to competence or fitness for purposes of standing trial. 
The court focused on Subsection (c), noting that this provision only applies 
in cases in which restoration has followed a finding of lack of fitness. In this 
sense, the court compounded the error which it recognized84 was committed 
by the trial court, failing to determine whether the lower court’s actions 
could justifiably have been salvaged. The Arkansas Supreme Court said: 
 
 80. Id. at 5, 439 S.W.3d at 693. 
 81. The state supreme court explained its approach to statutory interpretation: 
 
On appeal, we consider statutory interpretation de novo and give no deference to 
the circuit court’s interpretation. State v. Martin, 2012 Ark. 191, 2012 WL 
1548076. The first rule of statutory construction is to construe a statute just as it 
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Smith v. 
Simes, 2013 Ark. 477, 430 S.W.3d 690. In construing any statute, we place it be-
side other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning 
and effect to be derived from the whole. State v. Colvin, 2013 Ark. 203, 427 
S.W.3d 635. Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together and 
in harmony, if possible. Id. 
 
 82. Id., 439 S.W.3d at 693. 
 83. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 739 (1975). 
 84. Supra note 80; Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 5, 439 S.W.3d at 693. 
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Subparagraph (c)(1) establishes the due-process requirements for restart-
ing a criminal proceeding after a defendant has been found incompetent 
to stand trial. It is only after the circuit court has found that a defendant 
has “regained fitness” that criminal proceedings may be resumed.
85
 At 
that point the circuit court is empowered by subparagraph (c)(2) to abort 
the resumption of proceedings in the interest of justice.
86
 
Thus, the error committed by the trial court and the parties, all of 
whom looked to Subsection (c) for resolution, was aggravated by the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court’s limitation of its review of the trial court’s order dis-
missing the criminal prosecution. That order was specifically based on the 
finding that Thomas could not be restored to fitness to be tried within a rea-
sonable time. Subsection (c), however, only addresses the situation in which 
the accused has, in fact, been restored to fitness. 
The trial court concluded that Dr. Peacock87 was credible in reaching 
his expert opinion that Thomas could not be restored to fitness. Precisely 
because Thomas had not regained fitness and the uncontroverted expert tes-
timony established that he could not be “restored to competency,”88 the par-
ties and the trial court both relied on a wholly inapplicable statutory provi-
sion in reaching their respective conclusions about the proper remedy.89 
Subsection (2) of Section 310(c), however, does afford the trial court 
authority to order dismissal of pending charges if it concludes that the pas-
sage of time involved in the restoration of fitness has compromised the de-
fendant’s ability to mount his defense, compromising his right to fair trial. 
B. The Scope of Section 5-2-310(b)(2) 
Instead of looking to Subsection (c)(2) in assessing the correctness of 
the trial court’s order dismissing the proceedings in Thomas, the parties, trial 
court, and Arkansas Supreme Court should have shifted focus to the provi-
 
 85. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362 at 6, 439 S.W.3d at 693. 
 86. Id., 439 S.W.3d at 693. 
 87. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Arkansas for Medical Scienc-
es. Dr. Peacock is a “forensic psychologist.” The distinction between forensic psychiatrists 
and forensic psychologists has essentially been discounted in matters arising under the Ar-
kansas Criminal Code. E.g., Hubbard v. State, 306 Ark. 153, 156-57, 812 S.W.2d 107, 110 
(1991) (holding admission of clinical psychologist’s opinion and report substantially com-
plied with requirement for psychiatric evaluation in Section 5-2-305). See also ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-86-103(a)(2) (authorizing mental evaluation of criminal defendant by licensed 
psychologist who has “completed or is currently participating in a formal postdoctoral fel-
lowship program in forensic psychology” or “is approved by Department of Human Services 
to administer forensic examinations”). 
 88. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 2, 439 S.W.3d at 691. 
 89. Accord State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 288 (Ind. 2008). 
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sion actually addressing the factual situation before the trial court. That pro-
vision is Subsection (b), which provides: 
(b)(1) Within a reasonable period of time, but in any case within ten (10) 
months of a commitment pursuant to Subsection (a) of this Section, the 
department shall file with the committing court a written report indicat-
ing whether the defendant is fit to proceed, or, if not, whether: 
(A) The defendant’s mental disease or defect is of a nature 
precluding restoration of fitness to proceed; and 
(B) The defendant presents a danger to himself or herself or 
to the person or property of another. 
(2)(A) The court shall make a determination within one (1) 
year of a commitment pursuant to Subsection (a) of this Sec-
tion. 
(B) Pursuant to the report of the department or as a result of a 
hearing on the report, if the court determines that the defend-
ant is fit to proceed, prosecution in ordinary course may 
commence. 
(C) If the defendant lacks fitness to proceed but does not pre-
sent a danger to himself or herself or to the person or property 
of another, the court may release the defendant on conditions 
the court determines to be proper. 
(D) If the defendant lacks fitness to proceed and presents a 
danger to himself or herself or the person or property of an-




When the accused is found to lack fitness for trial or is incompetent, 
and restoration cannot be accomplished within a reasonable period of time, 
as determined within the one year period set by the General Assembly in 
Subsection (2)(A), the trial court’s options are set out in Subsections 
(b)(2)(C) and (b)(2)(D).91 Otherwise, if the accused’s competence or fitness, 
has been restored while in the custody of the state hospital, the trial court 
may proceed with the trial.92 
The statute authorizes the circuit court to act if the unfit or incompetent 
accused cannot be restored to fitness in the opinion of the Department of 
Human Services, based on its finding concerning the accused’s danger to 
 
 90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b) (Repl. 2016). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. § 5-2-310(c)(1). 
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himself or herself, other persons, or their property.93 When the evidence 
results in a finding that the accused does pose a danger, the trial court should 
order the Department to petition for the accused’s involuntary admission to 
the state hospital for evaluation and treatment.94 If the court finds that the 
accused poses no danger, then it is authorized to order the accused’s release 
on “conditions it finds to be proper.”95 
What the statute does not authorize is the dismissal ordered by the cir-
cuit court in Thomas,96 resulting in the question of statutory interpretation 
controlling the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision. The power to dismiss 
the prosecution based on the finding that continuing the case to trial would 
be “unjust”97 once an impaired defendant has been restored to fitness is 
simply not included in the language, which addresses those situations in 
which the unfit accused cannot be restored to competence for trial. 
The General Assembly’s choice of language in Section 5-2-310 creates 
the irrational situation in which the trial court may conclude that the trial of 
an impaired defendant restored to competence may be unjust, warranting 
dismissal, while the impaired defendant who cannot be restored to compe-
tence will be left in limbo, based on the strict construction of the language. 
Moreover, the statute offers no guidelines as to what circumstances may 
render the continued prosecution of the defendant who is restored to fitness 
unjust. The only prejudice that one might generally consider based on the 
need for the defendant to be held for an extended period for the restoration 
of fitness itself would be an inability to assist counsel in preparing the de-
fense during the period of confinement in the state hospital while the treat-
ment designed to restore him to competence takes place. It is also possible 
that the ability to investigate potential defensive theories would be compro-
mised by the delay in restoring the impaired defendant to fitness so that he 
could assist counsel, including the death or disappearance of necessary wit-
nesses or other loss of evidence important in developing or supporting a 
theory of defense. 
There is also ambiguity in the language delineating the period for resto-
ration of competence. The question arises because while the Department of 
Human Services must evaluate the incompetent accused’s mental disease or 
defect to determine if fitness is unlikely within ten months of the trial 
court’s order finding the accused not fit for trial, the statute does not ex-
pressly provide for continued confinement in ASH for a reasonable period 
of time to permit restoration.98 Instead, once the Department communicates 
 
 93. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(C)–(D). 
 94. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(D). 
 95. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(C). 
 96. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362 at 5, 439 S.W.3d 690, 693. 
 97. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(c)(2) (Repl. 2016). 
 98. Id. § 5-2-310(b). 
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the finding that restoration is unlikely, the disposition of the case must be 
made by the trial court within twelve months from the initial commitment 
for a fitness determination.99 This requirement suggests that additional time 
for restoration efforts is not authorized, consistent with the statutory lan-
guage arguably requiring disposition within one year of the referral, under 
Subsection (b)(2)(A), but not necessarily reasonable for the purpose of the 
restoration effort. A proper interpretation of the statute would specifically 
recognize that the trial court must be informed of the Department’s determi-
nation with respect to whether the impaired accused can be restored to fit-
ness within a reasonable period of time, or cannot be restored, within ten 
months. The actual restoration process will almost certainly require addi-
tional time beyond the one-year requirement for the trial court’s determina-
tion. 
The Court’s decision in Jackson, however, set no outside time limit for 
confinement of an incompetent accused for restoration.100 Pursuant to a deci-
sion to remand the accused for an additional period of hospitalization under 
Section 310(b)(2)(A), the trial court should monitor the progress of the res-
toration process at the state hospital to ensure that confinement of the im-
paired defendant continues to be warranted, based on whether the Depart-
ment’s assessment continues to reflect expert opinion that restoration of 
fitness remains a reasonable prognosis. If there is no evidence of progress, 
or the Department alters its initial opinion with respect to the likelihood that 
restoration is feasible, the trial court should take action to prevent indefinite 
confinement, ordering dismissal of the criminal charges and release or in-
voluntary civil commitment, as authorized by Section 5-2-310(b)(2)(C) or 
(b)(2)(D). 
 
 99. In Campbell v. State, 265 Ark. 77, 82, 576 S.W.2d 938, 942 (1979), the defendant 
appealed his conviction relying on an earlier version of Section 5-2-310, Ark. Stat. Ann. s 41-
607(2) (Repl. 1977). He petitioned for relief because he had been confined in the state hospi-
tal for restoration of competence for a period of five years prior to being tried and convicted 
on a first-degree murder charge. Id., 576 S.W.2d 938, 942. The court noted that “[t]he former 
section provides that any detention after one year from the date of admission be under normal 
civil commitment procedures.” Id., 576 S.W.2d 938, 942. In rejecting his claim for dismissal 
of the criminal case, the court observed the statute under which he was actually committed 
some three years prior to adoption of the one-year limitation in Section 41-607(2) did not 
limit the period of confinement for the purpose of restoration of competence to proceed. Id. at 
83, 576 S.W.2d 938, 942. Campbell raised a claim of reliance on Section 41-102(4), which 
provided that a defendant charged with an offense committed prior to the effective date of the 
Arkansas Criminal Code could rely “on any defense to the prosecution governed by the pro-
visions of the code.” He takes the position that his election made s 41-607(2) applicable.” Id. 
576 S.W.2d 938, 942. The court rejected this novel argument, however, holding as to Camp-
bell’s five-year confinement that “[b]y no stretch of the imagination c[ould] it be said that the 
provisions of this section are a defense to the prosecution of appellant.” Campbell v. State, 
265 Ark. 77, 83, 576 S.W.2d 938, 942 (1979). 
 100. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
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The Thomas court could have concluded that the language used by the 
General Assembly simply failed to define a set of options for Arkansas trial 
courts that make sense, based on the authority given to a trial court’s discre-
tion to order dismissal of the prosecution against the accused who has been 
restored to fitness to prevent an unjust disposition of the charges. For in-
stance, the trial court has discretion under Section 5-2-310(b)(2)(C) to order 
the release of an accused who cannot be restored to fitness, if the court finds 
that he does not present a danger to himself or to the “person or property of 
another.”101 But, while the trial court may order release on “conditions the 
court determines to be proper,”102 the General Assembly provided no direc-
tion with respect to the trial court’s exercise of discretion with respect to the 
pending criminal charges when restoration of fitness is found not to be pos-
sible. Instead, the statute provides that, if the trial court finds that the de-
fendant does present a danger, “the court shall order the department to peti-
tion for an involuntary admission.”103 The statute does not expressly address 
the court’s discretion to order dismissal of the pending criminal charges, 
however, if it finds that the defendant is not subject to restoration of fitness 
for trial, whether it orders his release or orders the department to petition for 
his involuntary admission to the state hospital. 
Moreover, the statute fails to define the range of conditions that might 
be imposed when the trial court finds that the unfit defendant does not pose 
a danger to himself or others and is released. It could, in theory, mean that 
the range of conditions that can be imposed could include dismissal of the 
pending charges in the trial court’s discretion. The express inclusion of the 
dismissal option with respect only to those defendants who have been re-
stored to fitness suggests that omission of this option with regard to defend-
ants who remain unfit was intended by the legislature. Another possibility is 
that the provision could be read as authorizing dismissal in cases that would 
otherwise proceed to trial, recognizing dismissal as an option for everyone 
other than those persons restored to fitness. The legislative intent could lie in 
recognition that those individuals who will continue to remain unfit and, 
consequently, beyond a determination of factual guilt, requires a different 
range of options because the accused will continue to suffer from the im-
 
 101. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(C) (Repl. 2016) authorizes the trial court to order 
the release of an impaired defendant who does not present a threat of danger: 
 
(C) If the defendant lacks fitness to proceed but does not present a danger to 
himself or herself or to the person or property of another, the court may release 
the defendant on conditions the court determines to be proper. 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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pairment of their cognitive processes resulting from the mental illness or 
defect that has rendered them incompetent, or unfit, for trial. 
What is clearly correct is that the resolution of the trial court’s authori-
ty to dismiss could not be predicated on power delegated to it under Section 
5-2-310(c)(2) because Thomas could not be restored to competence, based 
on the expert opinion of the testifying forensic experts. The lack of any di-
rective for the trial court once the Director reports within the ten-month 
timeframe that the impaired defendant cannot be restored to fitness within a 
reasonable period of time creates the uncertainty about unlimited jeopardy 
that was the focus of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson 
v. Indiana. Arguably, Subsections (b)(2)(C) and (b)(2)(D) could indicate 
that the General Assembly deliberately intended to leave those defendants 
who could not be restored to fitness for trial within a reasonable period of 
time in jeopardy indefinitely. If restoration was achieved at some point, their 
criminal cases could be restored to the active docket for trial. This approach, 
however, would result in indefinite jeopardy for impaired defendants not 
susceptible to restoration within a reasonable period of time. It could well 
mean that an impaired individual could be confined for life without ever 
having been found guilty of committing any offense at all. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF JACKSON V. INDIANA 
Section 5-2-310 of the Arkansas Criminal Code104 addresses issues that 
the Supreme Court considered in Jackson v. Indiana. Because the Supreme 
Court analyzed Jackson’s unlimited confinement until he might regain com-
petence as implicating issues of equal protection and due process protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5-2-310 must be considered in light 
of those federal constitutional protections. Unfortunately, Jackson’s broad 
pronouncements condemning the practice relied on by state officials in hold-
ing an impaired accused in jeopardy indefinitely were not accompanied by 
specific guidelines directing states for purposes of compliance with the con-
stitutional mandate the Court’s opinion presses. Nevertheless, consideration 
of the constitutional protection by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Thomas 
should have led the court to apply the state statute to comply with the consti-
tutional findings of the Jackson Court. 
A. Indefinite Commitment for Restoration and Due Process 
The problem with the alternative explanation of legislative intent, that 
the General Assembly actually intended to leave unrestored impaired de-
fendants without final disposition of their criminal cases, is absolutely con-
 
 104. Id. 
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trary to the Court’s reasoning in Jackson. In expressly condemning an un-
limited period of time in jeopardy for those impaired inmates who cannot be 
restored to competency within a reasonable period of time, the Court held 
that with respect to confinement for restoration: “[D]ue process requires that 
the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed.”105 
Thus, the indefinite commitment imposed upon Jackson violated due 
process because it did not bear a reasonable relation to the policy permitting 
an attempt to restore an incompetent defendant to competency when the 
prospects for restoration are “slim.”106 The Jackson Court held that indefi-
nite commitment without reasonable prospect for restoration of competence, 
thus, violates due process: “[W]e also hold that Indiana’s indefinite com-
mitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to 
stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
due process.”107 
B. The Unresolved Question of Remedy 
Even assuming that Jackson’s general conclusion that unlimited com-
mitment for restoration of competence fails on constitutional grounds,108 one 
might expect that the Court would have addressed the parameters of its poli-
 
 105. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 106. Id. at 732. (The Court noted that federal courts had consistently concluded that in-
definite commitment of defendants who could not be restored to competence would violate 
due process), e.g., United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372 (4th. Cir. 1969); United States v. 
Walker, 335 F.Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F.Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 
1970); United States v. Jackson, 306 F.Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Maurietta v. Ciccone, 305 
F.Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1969). See In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1970); United States 
v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1963); Martin v. Settle, 192 F.Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1961); 
Royal v. Settle, 192 F.Supp. 176 (W.D. Mo. 1959). 
 
Similarly, in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 735-736 (1972), the Court referenced two 
cases reaching the same conclusion that indefinite confinement of an unconvicted accused 
who cannot be restored to competence violates constitutional protections. In United States ex 
rel. Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F.Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court ordered the re-
lease of an 86-year-old defendant who had been committed for twenty years without being 
restored to competence to stand trial on murder and kidnapping charges, finding that his 
confinement violated both the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and due process. 
Likewise, in People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 263 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ill. 1970), the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that a profoundly deaf defendant should be released from custody unless 
procedures could be provided that would afford him “such opportunity as may be necessary 
should be allowed for communication to him of the testimony of the witnesses to insure him 
a full and fair exercise of his legal rights.” 
 
 107. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 731. 
 108. Id. 
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cy in formulating specific rules designed to protect impaired individuals, 
whom restoration of competency within a reasonable period of time simply 
would not be a viable option. In one sense, this might have been wise be-
cause the Court might not have anticipated the development of more effec-
tive psychoactive drugs providing relief from the symptoms of major psy-
chiatric and psychological disorders that has, in turn, offered greater hope 
for restoration of fitness in a reasonable period of time for many impaired 
defendants.109 
Jackson left unanswered two significant questions.110 First, the decision 
recognized the need to provide an option for restoration of competence for 
impaired individuals charged with criminal offenses.111 But, the Court failed 
to draw a line with respect to how long this process could constitutionally 
take, other than to hold that for those who cannot be restored, indefinite 
commitment, or confinement, was not a constitutionally acceptable prac-
tice.112 Instead, the Court specifically declined to adopt an arbitrary time 
frame, explaining: “In light of differing state facilities and procedures and a 
lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to at-
tempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits.”113 
Second, with respect to those individuals for whom restoration of com-
petence was not a realistic option—for whom prospects for restoration were 
“slim”—it did not offer a required remedy to address the constitutional con-
cern with the ultimate disposition of their criminal cases.114 
1. The Constitutionally-Acceptable Time Frame for Restoration 
The Jackson Court did not provide a more specific period of time dur-
ing which the impaired accused could be committed or confined for the pur-
pose of restoration of competence, or fitness, for trial.115 Instead, in squarely 
addressing the issue of indefinite commitment, the Court held: 
We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal 
offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed 
to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary 
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain 
that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not 
the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commit-
 
 109. See supra Part I.A. 
 110. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715 
 111. Id. at 735. 
 112. Id. at 731. 
 113. Id. at 738. 
 114. Id. at 715. 
 115. Id. 
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ment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other 
citizen, or release the defendant.
116
 
The opinion couches its due process concern in terms of “reasonable 
period,” “substantial probability,” and “foreseeable future.”117 None of these 
terms are sufficiently precise to provide definitive rules regarding the au-
thority of the state to detain the accused and deprive him of liberty, making 
it difficult for the state to vindicate its valid interest in resolving the issue of 
the accused’s guilt on the pending charges.118 
The imprecision of the holding in Jackson is evident in State v. Da-
vis,119 an Indiana Supreme Court decision rendered in 2008, where the im-
paired inmate had spent four years in confinement without being restored to 
competence for trial.120 She had been confined for a period of time longer 
than the maximum sentence of imprisonment that could have been imposed 
had she been convicted on the charge of criminal recklessness, based on her 
act of waving a knife in a bank after demanding that she be allowed to close 
her account.121 She apparently believed that her account was still active and 
grew agitated when told that it had been closed.122 
The Davis court did not rule that the four-year delay in proceedings 
while the defendant remained incompetent and could not be restored violat-
ed the requirement for a “reasonable period” of time for restoration, howev-
er.123 Instead, it held that it was unfair to hold the impaired defendant for a 
period far longer than the potential period of incarceration upon a convic-
tion.124 The decision provides little guidance in applying Jackson’s time 
limit, other than in circumstances in which the sentencing options upon con-
viction are relatively short.125 
a. The restoration time-frame period under Section 5-2-310 
A superficial reading of Arkansas law appears to address the first prob-
lem left open in Jackson126 by arguably authorizing restoration efforts for 
 
 116. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 2008). 
 119. State v. Davis, 898 N.E..2d 281 (Ind. 2008). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 289. 
 122. Id. at 283. 
 123. Id. at 287 (stating, “[t]here is no relevant precedent in this state of whether there is 
an inherent denial of due process in holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the 
head of one who will never have a chance to prove her innocence.”). 
 124. Id. at 289. 
 125. See Davis, 989 N.E.2d at 281. 
 126. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 735–736 (1972). 
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only a one-year period in Section 5-2-310(b)(2)(A).127 The determination 
that must be made by the trial court within one year, however, involves only 
the following findings set out in Subsections (b)(1)(A) and (B): 
(A) The defendant’s mental disease or defect is of a nature precluding 
restoration of fitness to proceed; and 
(B) The defendant presents a danger to himself or herself or to the person 
or property of another.
128
 
Two possible misinterpretations of the statutory scheme might flow 
from the language. First, one might conclude that the findings address only 
the process to be followed when ASH concludes that the impaired defendant 
cannot be restored to fitness and reports this conclusion to the trial court 
within the ten-month period provided by Subsection (b)(1). Subsection 
(b)(2) then requires the trial court to make a decision within a one-year peri-
od from the initial date of confinement for determination of restoration po-
tential. Thus, the state hospital determination is apparently not binding on 
the trial court,129 which, in theory, could reject that conclusion and find that 
the defendant’s impairment does not preclude restoration—a conclusion 
arguably subject to the abuse of discretion standard on review. And, if there 
were conflicting evidence on this point, the trial court’s discretionary deci-
sion would likely stand up on review. 
The first unanswered question posed by a determination by the trial 
court not consistent with the state hospital determination is, quite literally, 
what happens in that event? Does the statute contemplate further confine-
ment for purposes of restoration, or require some other action not expressly 
set out in Section 5-2-310? 
The second possible misinterpretation involves the one-year limitation 
for action by the trial court. The one-year period does not expressly limit the 
period of time during which the impaired defendant can be treated for pur-
poses of restoration. Rather, it merely requires that the trial court that or-
dered referral to the state hospital to restore competence, or to make the de-
termination as to whether the mental disease or defect is “of a nature pre-
cluding restoration.” Section 5-2-310(b)(2)(A) does not address the situation 
 
 127. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 265 Ark. 77, 82, 576 S.W.2d 938, 942 (1979) (holding 
under Ark. Stat. Ann. s 41-607, “that any detention after one year from the date of admission 
be under normal civil commitment procedures.”); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
310(b)(2)(A)—(B) (Repl. 2016). 
 128. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(A)–(B) (Repl. 2016). 
 129. In contrast to the Arkansas statute requiring the trial court to make the decision with 
respect to possibility of restoration, under Indiana law, the director of the state mental hospi-
tal, not the trial court, is vested with the discretion to make the final determination that the 
impaired defendant cannot be restored to competence, or fitness, to proceed to trial. State v. 
Coats, 3 N.E.3d 528, 534–35 (Ind. 2014) (construing Ind. Code § 35-36-3-3). 
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in which the Department of Human Services advises the circuit court that 
the forensics experts at the state hospital believe that the impaired defendant 
can, in fact, be restored to fitness to proceed in a reasonable period of time. 
If restoration of fitness is reasonably probable according to the expert 
testimony considered by the circuit court, and it makes that finding, then the 
only reasonable interpretation of legislative intent is that the impaired de-
fendant can be committed for a further period of time in order to permit 
ASH professionals to make that attempt. But Jackson only permits this to 
happen only for a “reasonable,” yet undefined period of time. The time 
frames for the department’s report and circuit court’s decision provided in 
the statute hardly define this time frame as one year from the initial finding 
that the defendant is not fit to stand trial, although Arkansas decisions have 
held precisely that. 
In Stover v. Hamilton,130 the Arkansas Supreme Court explained the 
one-year time frame as an effort to comply with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Jackson.131 However, Stover had been acquitted by the trial court by 
reason of insanity at the time of the offense,132 leading the Arkansas Su-
preme Court to also explain: 
We hold that when the court terminated all proceedings against the ap-
pellant by its order of acquittal he was no longer subject to the sanctions 
of any criminal statutes. He has been effectively removed from the cate-
gory of “unfit to proceed.” His status is as if he had never been charged 
with the crime upon which those proceedings were instituted. Therefore, 
confinement, after acquittal, should have been ordered pursuant to 
Ark.Stat.Ann. s 59-408. The trial court simply employed the wrong stat-
ute to do what it had the right to do under another statute.
133 
The trial court’s acquittal of Stover, a defendant found to be unfit to 
proceed to trial, based on his lack of capacity,134 or insanity, at the time of 
the offense was impermissible in light of Arkansas Criminal Code Section 
 
 130. Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980). 
 131. Id. at 316, 604 S.W.2d at 937. 
 132. Id., 604 S.W.2d at 937. 
 133. Id. at 315, 604 S.W.2d at 937. 
 134. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-2-312 (Repl. 2013) defines the insanity defense as “lack of 
capacity” and provides: 
 
(a)(1) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution that at the time the defendant 
engaged in the conduct charged he or she lacked capacity as a result of mental 
disease or defect to: 
(A) Conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law; or 
 
(B) Appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct. 
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5-2-302(b). This provision bars termination of the criminal proceedings by 
acquittal when the accused is not competent to make a decision with respect 
to pleading insanity as a defense to the charge. Subsection 302(b) provides: 
A court shall not enter a judgment of acquittal on the ground of mental 
disease or defect against a defendant who lacks the capacity to under-
stand a proceeding against him or her or to assist effectively in his or her 
own defense as a result of mental disease or defect.
135
 
Thus, Arkansas decisions predicating the one-year limitation on resto-
ration of competency on the fact that the impaired defendant has been ac-
quitted before the commitment to the state hospital for restoration arise in 
the context of improper use of the trial court’s acquittal authority.136 Section 
5-2-313(a), for instance, authorizes the trial court to acquit an accused based 
on mental illness or defect based on the reports of mental examinations by 
forensic experts, but limits the trial court’s power to order an acquittal fol-
lowing a hearing on competence to cases in which the “defendant currently 
has the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or her and to 
assist effectively in his or her own defense.”137 
The question of what limitation applies to the time frame for the at-
tempt to restore the impaired defendant to fitness is not resolved by either 
the decision in Jackson or Section 5-2-310.138 That the Arkansas statute 
leaves open the question of reasonableness is suggested by the decision in 
Mauppin v. State,139 a prosecution for capital murder resulting in imposition 
of a death sentence. Mauppin was initially found unfit for trial in December 
1985, after being evaluated by the ASH director.140 The circuit court then 
ordered him committed to ASH for a period not to exceed one year, based 
on Section 41-607,141 the statute then in effect.142 
In December 1986, ASH reported that Mauppin remained unfit for tri-
al, an assessment reaffirmed in February 1987.143 After Mauppin was arrest-
ed and returned to the Arkansas Department of Correction for a parole viola-
tion, the State requested a re-evaluation in January 1988, which was grant-
 
 135. Id. § 5-2-302(b) (2001). See also infra note 150 (discussion on impropriety of ac-
quitting defendant whose lack of fitness compromised his ability to assert defense of insani-
ty); Mannix v. State, 273 Ark. 492, 493–94, 821 S.W.2d 222, 222 (1981). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. § 5-2-313(a)(1) (1987). 
 138. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 721 (1972); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310. (Repl. 
2016). 
 139. Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992). 
 140. Id. at 235, 831 S.W.2d 104. 
 141. Id., 831 S.W.2d 104. 
 142. Id. at 241, 831 S.W.2d at 106. 
 143. Id. at 241–42, 831 S.W.2d at 106–07. 
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ed.144 He was not actually transported to ASH for the evaluation until nine 
months later, at which time ASH again concluded that Mauppin was not fit 
for trial.145 The ASH report, however, did not indicate the forensic expert’s 
conclusion as to whether Mauppin could be restored to fitness, or whether 
he posed a threat of danger to himself or others.146 
The State again moved for a fitness evaluation in March 1989.147 Fol-
lowing another commitment order by the trial court, ASH concluded that 
Mauppin had regained competence for trial. The court set his trial date for 
October 1990,148 just short of five years since Mauppin’s original commit-
ment for restoration of fitness. 
Mauppin then argued that the circuit court had lost jurisdiction of the 
case when he was originally detained for thirteen months on the trial court’s 
commitment order, from December 1985 until February 1987. In rejecting 
his claim for dismissal, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that his 
commitment not only involved his restoration to fitness, but also was possi-
bly necessitated by his need for medical treatment and recuperation because 
he had undergone brain surgery as a result of having shot himself in the 
head.149 
Alternatively, while expressly affirming the one-year limitation on 
commitment for restoration of fitness, (“the circuit court may not commit an 
accused for longer than one year for ‘restoration of fitness to proceed’),150 
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the extended period of confinement 
in the state hospital would not void a conviction based on Mauppin’s illegal 
 
 144. Id., 831 S.W.2d at 106–07. 
 145. Mauppin, at 242, 831 S.W.2d at 107. 
 146. Id., 831 S.W.2d at 107. 
 147. Id., 831 S.W.2d at 107. 
 148. Id. at 235, 831 S.W.2d 104. 
 149. Id. at 244–45, 831 S.W.2d at 108. In Chadwell v. State, 1985 WL 9527, *1 (Ark.), 
the Arkansas Supreme Court denied post-conviction relief, rejecting the petitioner’s argument 
that the trial court lost jurisdiction once it ordered him committed to the state hospital for 
restoration of competence. It held that under Ark. Stat. Ann. s 41-607(3) (Repl. 1977), com-
mitment for restoration “does not affect jurisdiction.” 
 150. Mauppin, 309 at 244, 831 S.W.2d at 108. The issue of the one-year limitation on 
commitment for restoration of an accused’s competence was addressed in other cases arising 
under Section 51-607, the predecessor to § 5-2-310; e.g., Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 
496, 625 S.W.2d 521, 522 (1981) (the court adhered to the one-year limitation on commit-
ment for restoration of the defendant’s competency). The trial court had acquitted him prior 
to the order for confinement, based upon his impaired mental state. Id., 625 S.W.2d at 522. 
The problem with the court’s decision, however, is that the defendant could not have been 
acquitted by reason of insanity unless he had previously been competent to make a decision 
whether to demand jury trial and assert a mental state defense because the constitutional 
requirement for competence bars trial of an incompetent defendant. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
2-302(b), supra note 135 and accompanying text, and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 170. 
See also Stover v. Hamilton, supra notes 130-133 and Mannix v. State, 273 Ark. 492, 493–
94, 821 S.W.2d 222, 222 (1981) (following Stover). 
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detention.151 But the Mauppin Court’s analysis went further in explaining 
that the subsequent order for re-evaluation reflected a common sense reading 
of the statute by the trial court: “Common sense . . . contemplates a re-
evaluation that later determines whether the defendant has regained fitness 
to proceed.”152 
The suggestion that “common sense” can dictate an extended effort at 
restoration of fitness runs contrary to the one-year rule that has governed the 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach to addressing the problem of lack of 
fitness for mentally impaired defendants.153 However, it recognizes the diffi-
culty in using arbitrarily-fixed limitations on mental treatment, which is 
often complicated by multiple and diverse symptoms, differing degrees of 
drug efficacy for individual patients, and necessity for gradual implementa-
tion of treatment options based on the diagnostic peculiarities presented by 
individual patients. In short, some impaired defendants may simply not be 
amenable to full restoration of fitness within the one-year framework, while 
a reasonable extended period for treatment would render them fit for trial. It 
would appear foolish to require an ultimate finding on prospects for restora-
tion within one year, when the forensic expert responsible for treating the 
impaired accused opines that a reasonable additional period of time would 
be sufficient to complete the therapy and restore the accused’s competence 
for trial. 
The Court’s pronouncements, however, have been tied to the statutory 
one-year limitation for the trial court’s determination of whether the defend-
ant’s impairment cannot be successfully reversed.154 Although this approach 
serves to provide a bright line boundary for commitment duration, it is a 
bright line that likely ignores the realities of mental health practice and re-
quires rationalization by Arkansas courts when the boundary is breached in 
order to permit reasonable restoration efforts to reach a more accurate de-
termination of whether they can succeed. 
b. The “dangerousness” determination 
The second question posed for the trial court necessitates only that it 
determine whether the impaired defendant “presents a danger to himself or 
herself or to the person or property of another.”155 An affirmative finding on 
that question would support involuntary commitment to the state hospital 
under the Arkansas statutes governing the hospitalization of mentally-
 
 151. Duncan v. State, 309 Ark. 244, 831 S.W.2d at 108. 
 152. Id. at 245, 831 S.W.2d at 108–09. 
 153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(A) (Repl. 2016). 
 154. Id. § 5-3-310(b)(2)(A); see supra note 150. 
 155. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(1)(B). 
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impaired individuals not charged with criminal offenses.156 The statutorily-
defined standard for involuntary civil commitment requires a showing that 
the proposed patient suffers from a mental impairment and presents a threat 
of danger to himself or others.157 
Historically, the formula of proof of impairment and potentially dan-
gerous has been consistently used for purposes of meeting constitutional 
requirements for depriving the impaired individual of his personal liberty.158 
The concern for infringement of liberty interests of those individuals not 
charged with offenses who are committed for mental health treatment has 
 
 156. Id. §§ 20-47-201 to 20-47-227. The involuntary commitment process is specifically 
set forth in Subsections 207-220. The trial court’s authority to order the Department of Hu-
man Services to seek involuntary commitment of an impaired defendant not amendable to 
restoration efforts is set forth in Section 5-2-310(b)(2)(D), based on its finding that the ac-
cused is a danger to himself or herself or the person or property of another. 
 157. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c) provides: 
 
(c) INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION CRITERIA. A person shall be eligible for 
involuntary admission if he or she is in such a mental condition as a result of 
mental illness, disease, or disorder that he or she poses a clear and present danger 
to himself or herself or others: 
(2) As used in this subsection, “a clear and present danger to himself 
or herself” is established by demonstrating that: 
 
(A) The person has inflicted serious bodily injury on 
himself or herself or has attempted suicide or serious 
self-injury, and there is a reasonable probability that the 
conduct will be repeated if admission is not ordered; 
 
(B) The person has threatened to inflict serious bodily 
injury on himself or herself, and there is a reasonable 
probability that the conduct will occur if admission is 
not ordered; or 
 
(C) The person’s recent behavior or behavior history 
demonstrates that he or she so lacks the capacity to care 
for his or her own welfare that there is a reasonable 
probability of death, serious bodily injury, or serious 
physical or mental debilitation if admission is not or-
dered; and 
 
(3) As used in this subsection, “a clear and present danger to others” 
is established by demonstrating that the person has inflicted, at-
tempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on an-
other, and there is a reasonable probability that the conduct will oc-
cur if admission is not ordered. 
 
 158. See, e.g., Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 370 (1956) (The Court focused 
only on the question of the propriety of commitment for a mentally disabled accused for 
purposes of restoration of competence.). 
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been foremost in the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing this process.159 
For instance, in Addington v. Texas,160 the Court found that the deprivation 
of liberty suffered by an involuntarily-committed individual is so substantial 
that the commitment decision must rest on “clear and convincing evidence,” 
a higher standard of proof than the preponderance standard applicable in 
most civil actions.161 
But, while dangerousness is a component of the formula for involun-
tary confinement for mental health treatment, evidence of dangerousness is 
not sufficient, without proof of continuing mental illness or defect, to war-
rant the loss of personal liberty, as the Court held in Foucha v. Louisiana.162 
The Foucha Court held that an insanity acquittee could not be indefinitely 
held based on forensic expert opinion that he remained dangerous where 
state hospital officials had unsuccessfully contested the defendant’s expert 
opinion that he was insane at the time of the offense at trial.163 Following his 
acquittal by reason of insanity and return to the state mental hospital for 
evaluation, experts at the state hospital continued to find that Foucha did not 
suffer from a mental illness causing insanity.164 Nevertheless, they did con-
clude that he would continue to constitute a threat to commit violence and 
sought to prevent his release.165 The Court held that the threat of violence 
alone could not justify his continuing confinement in the state mental facili-
ty.166 
Ironically, in Jones v. United States, the Court held that post-acquittal 
confinement of the insane defendant for a period well in excess of the poten-
tial term of imprisonment he faced had he been convicted did not violate 
constitutional protections.167 The majority reasoned that his acquittal based 
on insanity established that he had, in fact, committed a criminal offense, 
which demonstrated that he was both mentally ill and dangerous.168 The of-
fense upon which he had been charged and acquitted by reason of insanity 
 
 159. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–92 (1980); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 
504, 509 (1972) (Commitment to a mental hospital is a “massive curtailment of liberty.”); 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (The “indisputable . . . social consequences . . 
. of involuntary commitment . . . require[] due process protection.”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J. concurring). 
 160. Addington, supra note 159, at 420–421, 433. 
 161. The Addington Court established the requisite burden of proof upon the State to 
constitutionally commit an impaired individual involuntarily for mental evaluation and treat-
ment. Id. at 433. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983) (confirming Addington 
rule). 
 162. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85–86 (1992). 
 163. Id. at 83. 
 164. Id. at 86. 
 165. Id. at 74–75. 
 166. Id. at 75–78. 
 167. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368–369 (1983). 
 168. Id. at 364. 
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was essentially shoplifting—he had attempted to steal a jacket from a de-
partment store.169 
Neither Jones, nor Foucha, directly address the issue of competence for 
trial.170 Instead, these cases demonstrate the importance of the defendant’s 
dangerousness as a consideration when an issue of mental impairment is 
raised in the context of a prosecution or, more precisely, its aftermath fol-
lowing conviction.171 The question that should be asked is why the trial court 
should be required under Section 5-2-310(b)(1)(B) to make a finding as to 
the incompetent defendant’s dangerousness because dangerousness is not an 
element of the fitness equation under Section 5-2-302(a). The question of 
whether a defendant may be dangerous could be linked to an underlying 
mental state diagnosis, but it is not an issue with respect to the ability to 
understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist counsel in preparing 
and presenting a defense.172 
The impaired defendant’s dangerousness is a factor in the disposition 
of the case once the trial court finds the defendant is unfit to proceed to tri-
al.173 If, in fact, he cannot be restored to competence within the one-year 
period suggested by a misreading of Subsection 310(b) or within a reasona-
ble period of time, the question as to what disposition is appropriate is be-
fore the trial court.174 Because involuntary commitment to ASH requires 
both a showing of mental impairment and dangerousness—meaning actual 
or threatened dangerous behavior to self or another175—the obligation for the 
trial court to make a finding on this point could best be read as a threshold 
matter for involuntary civil commitment of the impaired accused, once a 
determination is made that restoration is not possible in the opinion of ASH 
forensic experts.176 
The restoration time frame and dangerousness issues that the trial court 
must consider under Section 5-2-310(b) should be considered in terms of the 
disposition of criminal actions when the individual charged suffers from a 
mental illness or defect compromising their fitness to proceed to resolution 
 
 169. Id. at 359. 
 170. See Jones, supra note 167, at 354; see also Foucha, supra note 162, at 71. 
 171. Id. 
 172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-302(a) (Repl. 2016). 
 173. Id. § 5-2-310(a)(1)(B) (Repl. 2016). 
 174. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(1)(B). 
 175. Id. § 20-47-207(c), supra, note 157, for text; also, Jackson, supra note 83, at 720–
722 (Involuntary Admission Criteria). 
 176. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(D). Subsection (D) provides: 
If the defendant lacks fitness to proceed and presents a danger to himself or her-
self or the person or property of another, the court shall order the department to 
petition for an involuntary admission. 
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of the case.177 Because some defendants suffer from impairment that will 
indefinitely, perhaps permanently, compromise the ability to proceed under 
the protections afforded by due process,178 the significance of Section 5-2-
310 lies in the criminal justice system’s need to identify those individuals 
who are impaired and then accommodate the requirement of due process in 
providing for reasonable disposition of the criminal charges. 
2. The Remedy for Non-Restorable Incompetence in Light of Jackson 
Subsections 310(b)(2)(C) and (D) draw no definitive line as to disposi-
tion options afforded the circuit court, perhaps reflecting the lack of defini-
tion in the Jackson opinion itself. Jackson left open the question of how 
long the impaired defendant could be confined or committed for purposes of 
restoring him or her to competence179 so that the proceedings could continue 
through resolution by trial or guilty plea or, in the rare case, by dismissal on 
motion of the prosecutor. 
In Jackson, the Court declined to decide whether Jackson was entitled 
to relief from his continued confinement for restoration of competency, even 
though the majority noted: “Jackson has now been confined for three and 
one-half years on a record that sufficiently establishes the lack of a substan-
tial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial.”180 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the issue of remedy was not “ripe” for 
disposition because, in part, the state court had not passed on the issue of 
whether Jackson’s criminal case should be dismissed based on the fact that 
restoration of his competence was improbable.181 
Jackson argued that dismissal of the pending charges was appropriate 
because the evidence demonstrated that his mental impairment had effec-
tively established a complete defense to the charges. The Court rejected his 
reliance on this claim in finding that the question of criminal responsibility 
for the offense was not resolved by proof of his incompetence to be tried, 
requiring remand to the Indiana courts for their application of state insanity 
law in the first instance.182 
The Court then noted that most claims relating to the continuing jeop-
ardy effectively resulting from unlimited commitment for restoration of 
competence integrated Sixth Amendment speedy trial and Fourteenth 
 
 177. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 739. 
 178. Id. at 731 (“Indiana’s indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on ac-
count of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process.”). 
 179. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S 715, 740 (1972). 
 180. Id. at 738–739. 
 181. Id. at 739–740. 
 182. Id. at 739; Id. at 739 n. 26. 
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Amendment due process concerns, and observed that Jackson had not raised 
these grounds in the state courts.183 Consequently, the case was remanded to 
the Indiana courts for initial consideration of Jackson’s arguments.184 Yet, 
the state courts did not provide the anticipated response after remand from 
the Supreme Court. 
In the aftermath of Jackson and the lack of definitive guidance on the 
issue of dismissal as the remedy for unrestorable lack of fitness, the Indiana 
Supreme Court confronted it in State v. Davis.185 The Davis court observed: 
“[N]early four decades after Jackson was decided we are squarely presented 
with the question the United States Supreme Court left unresolved.”186 It 
then framed the question presented and provided its answer: 
Today we examine the question of whether it is a violation of fundamen-
tal fairness to hold criminal charges over the head of an incompetent de-




The time frame in Davis was particularly significant because the ac-
cused had been committed to the mental hospital for restoration of compe-
tence for a substantially longer period of time than the maximum sentence 
that could have been imposed upon her conviction.188 Moreover, the court’s 
answer proved to be somewhat less than definite precisely because the of-
fense on which the defendant’s fitness was necessitated was, in fact, a rela-
tively minor offense. 
The Davis court initially looked to the reasoning in Jackson that ad-
dressed the problem of delay in the competency restoration process. This 
problem was reflected in the Indiana Supreme Court’s phrasing of the issue 
presented by Davis in contesting her continuing confinement in state mental 
facilities.189 The Davis court read Jackson to say that once the determination 
has been made that there was no reasonable probability that the impaired 
accused can be restored to competence, the State was obligated to either 
proceed with involuntary civil commitment under the process applicable to 
individuals generally, or to dismiss the pending criminal charges.190 
 
 183. Id. at 740. 
 184. Id. at 740–741. 
 185. State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ind. 2008). 
 186. Id. at 287. 
 187. Id. at 283. 
 188. Id. at 289–290, see supra notes 123-24. 
 189. Id. at 286–87 (citing Jackson, 406 U.S. at 730–731) (noting Jackson’s conclusion 
that indefinite commitment of incompetent defendant violated both due process and equal 
protection). 
 190. Id. at 286. 
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In fact, however, Jackson actually held that in the event the accused 
could not be restored to competence, “the State must either institute the cus-
tomary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit in-
definitely any other citizen, or release the defendant,” not mentioning in this 
formulation any requirement that the criminal charges be dismissed.191 The 
difference in the Davis court’s reading of Jackson and the exact language in 
Jackson itself is particularly important because Davis addresses the prospect 
that the impaired defendant’s competence cannot be restored within a rea-
sonable period of time from the perspective of the still-pending criminal 
prosecution. 
The problem not expressly addressed in Jackson, but explained by the 
Davis court, lies in the greater interest the State may have in proceeding to 
trial when the charge is more serious, such as murder, than when the ac-
cused is charged with a less serious offense.192 Jackson had been charged 
with commission of two strong-armed robberies involving amounts of four 
and five dollars in the purses of the two women he robbed.193 The State’s 
interest in prosecuting a robbery will likely fluctuate, depending upon the 
perpetrator’s actions in committing the offense—such as the degree or ex-
tent of physical force used or nature of threats made to the victim; the extent 
of the victim’s physical or psychic injuries; the character of the victim—
such as an elderly or physically or mentally impaired victim, or the fact that 
the victim was a child; or evidence of the perpetrator’s character or criminal 
history. 
The Davis court concluded that the appropriate remedy when the im-
paired accused cannot be restored to competence for purposes of proceeding 
with the prosecution to trial or other disposition is dismissal of the criminal 
charges, which could then be followed by involuntary civil commitment of 
the accused.194 Any remedy short of dismissal would subject the accused to 
 
 191. Jackson v. Indiana 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 192. Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 289–90. Similarly, the court noted a number of factors that 
might increase the State’s interest in prosecuting a case to conclusion other than the serious-
ness of the offense itself, typically when the evidence is necessary to establish a fact warrant-
ing enhanced punishment based on the specific nature of the offense, such as participation in 
a gang-related crime, use of a firearm in its commission, or subjecting the defendant to habit-
ual punishment. 
 193. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 717. While robbery is not an insignificant felony, it is commit-
ted when the perpetrator uses any force against an individual in the process of committing a 
theft of their property. In the circumstance of a purse snatching it typically does not involve 
the same degree of personal injury to the victim as other major felonies, although the psycho-
logical impact may be significant, and infliction of physical injury is not unlikely in many 
instances with varying degrees of severity.  
 194. Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 289. The Arkansas statute authorizes the trial court to order the 
Department of Human Services to petition for the involuntary commitment of an individual 
whose mental disease or defect precludes restoration to fitness and who is dangerous to him-
194 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
the indefinite jeopardy that Jackson expressly condemned as a “denial of 
due process inherent in holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over 
the head of one who will never have a chance to prove his innocence.”195 
The Davis decision itself suggests that particular remedy when compe-
tence cannot be restored might be applicable only on the facts before the 
court there because the period of confinement for restoration had exceeded 
the potential sentence to which the accused could have been imposed upon 
conviction for the fourth-degree felony on which she had been charged.196 In 
upholding the dismissal ordered by the trial court, the Indiana Supreme 
Court expressly ruled: 
Because Davis’ pretrial confinement has extended beyond the maximum 
period of any sentence the trial court can impose, and because the State 
has advanced no argument that its interests outweigh Davis’ substantial 
liberty interest, we conclude it is a violation of basic notions of funda-
mental fairness as embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to hold criminal charges over the head of Davis, an incom-




The problem suggested by the narrow holding of the court is clear: it is 
far easier to consider dismissal of less serious charges than more serious 
ones.198 Indeed, it was easier for the trial court to dismiss the charges against 
Davis when her confinement for restoration, of competence had already 
exceeded the statutory maximum to which she would have been exposed 
upon conviction.199 It was also noted that while confined for restoration, she 
was entitled under state law to receive good time credits awarded while she 
was incarcerated.200 
The Davis court’s approach reflects another problem. While the Indi-
ana Supreme Court explained that courts have “inherent authority to dismiss 
criminal charges where the prosecution of such charges would violate a de-
 
self or herself or to the person or property of another. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(D) 
(Repl. 2016). 
 195. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740. The Davis court noted the concurrence with this reasoning 
by the Kentucky court in Commonwealth v. Miles, 816 S.W.2d 657, 659–660 (Ky. Ct. 
App.1991) (agreeing with the “implication” of Jackson, “that it would be a denial of due 
process to maintain criminal charges indefinitely against a defendant who never has a chance, 
because of his incompetency, to establish his innocence through a trial”) while noting that the 
court there also found that the facts in the case did not warrant application of this principle. 
Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 287, n.5 (Ind. 2008). 
 196. Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 289–290. 
 197. Id. at 290. 
 198. Id. at 289–290. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 289. 
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fendant’s constitutional rights,”201 it also noted that most courts ordering 
dismissal in instances of unrestorable incompetence have done so based on 
statutory or “court rule” authority.202 Ironically, the Indiana court construed 
Section 5-2-310(c) of the Arkansas Criminal Code to give the trial court 
discretion to dismiss the pending criminal charges when the evidence sup-
ports its finding that the impaired defendant cannot be restored to fitness to 
proceed to trial.203 The court misread the statute, as the parties and trial court 
did in Thomas, because the statute actually only authorizes dismissal in cas-
es in which the impaired defendant has been restored to fitness. 
V. THE STATUTORY “GAP” 
Not only did the Thomas court rest its holding on the incorrect reliance 
by the trial court and parties on Section 5-2-310(c)(2), it expressly found 
that Section 5-2-310 did not authorize the trial court to dismiss the pending 
criminal charges, stating: “[N]owhere in this Section is a circuit court given 
the authority to dismiss charges against an unfit defendant.”204 Thus, in con-
 
 201. Id. at 285. 
 202. Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 287–88. The court cited the operative statutes in Missouri, MO. 
ANN. STAT § 552.020.11 (West 2002), and Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221 (West 
2007). The Missouri statute was amended effective in 2011 and the current section is 2; the 
statute provides for dismissal without prejudice to re-filing of charges in the event the im-
paired defendant regains competence. MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.020.11(6) (West 2002). The 
Montana statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(3)(a) (West 2007), provides: 
 
(3)(a) The committing court shall, within 90 days of commitment, review the de-
fendant’s fitness to proceed. If the court finds that the defendant is still unfit to 
proceed and that it does not appear that the defendant will become fit to proceed 
within the reasonably foreseeable future, the proceeding against the defendant 
must be dismissed, except as provided in subsection (4). 
 
Subsection (4) refers only to disposition of motions that can be determined without the ac-
cused’s participation, such as a plea of prior jeopardy. Tit. 46, ch. 14, § 221(4); This provi-
sion is comparable to ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-311 “Incapacitated defendants. Motions.” Sub-
section 311(1)(C) permits the litigation of a prior jeopardy claim even though the accused is 
unfit for trial, for example. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-311(1)(C); The Montana statute requires 
the determination of probable inability to restore competence within 90 days, in contrast to 
the 10-month period afforded ASH to report in Section 5-2-310 of the Arkansas Criminal 
Code. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(3)(a) (West 2007). 
 203. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(1) (Repl. 2016); In State v. Yarnall, 2004 MT 333, 
¶¶20-34,102 P.3d 34, 38-40, the trial court’s decision to extend the 90-day period to permit 
further effort at restoration of competence was upheld on appeal where evidence before the 
trial court supported its conclusion that there was a probability that competence could be 
restored within a reasonable period of time. Unlike the Missouri provision, the Montana Code 
does not indicate that the dismissal of the criminal charges be made without prejudice. MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 46-14-221(3)(a) (West 2007). 
 204. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362 at 5, 439 S.W.3d 690, 693. 
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trast to the Davis court’s recognition that Indiana trial courts are authorized 
to dismiss charges to prevent violations of due process,205 the Thomas court 
either failed to consider the consequences of its strict reading of the applica-
ble statute, or expressly accepted the State’s argument on appeal that the 
dismissal violated the Arkansas separation of powers doctrine.206 
A. The Model Penal Code’s Influence on the Arkansas Criminal Code   
The focus on the precise language used by the General Assembly could 
support an inference that the statutory language accurately reflected legisla-
tive intent in adopting Section 5-2-310.207 The Arkansas Criminal Code, 
which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1975,208 was influenced 
significantly by the Model Penal Code,209 published by the American Law 
Institute in 1962.210 That influence is reflected in Arkansas appellate deci-
 
 205. See supra note 202. 
 206. Thomas, 2014 Ark. at 3–4, 439 S.W.3d at 692. 
 207. See infra 208-224. 
 208. See Arkansas Code Revision Commission Preface, Vol. B (Michie, 1995) (“When 
the Arkansas General Assembly enacted the Arkansas Criminal Code of 1975, it considered 
the official commentary by the Criminal Code Revision Commission along with the text of 
the then-proposed Criminal Code. Since adoption of the Criminal Code in 1975, Frank New-
ell, one of the original drafters of the Arkansas Criminal Code, has prepared and published 
commentaries to the Criminal Code explaining changes made to the Criminal Code by the 
Arkansas General Assembly since its adoption and court decisions interpreting the Criminal 
Code. The commentaries by Frank Newell, although not official, have been included and may 
be helpful to practitioners in Arkansas.”). 
For an informative history of the developments in the Arkansas Criminal Code and Arkansas 
Mental Health Acts, see Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1367–70 (8th Cir. 1980) (Eighth 
Circuit declined to rule on merits of civil rights action that challenged “the state’s procedures 
for commitment and release of criminal defendants and to halt the practice of automatically 
confining all such inmates under the restrictive conditions in Rogers Hall” on abstention 
doctrine based on the fact that state courts had not previously been afforded opportunity to 
consider Section 1983 plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 1371). 
 209. See Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007) (explaining the influence of the Model 
Penal Code on state legislative action, including the adoption of the Arkansas Criminal Code 
by the Arkansas General Assembly in 197[6]). Note: there is a discrepancy in the actual date 
for adoption of the Code. The Eighth Circuit, in Coley, 635 F.2d at 1367 refers to the “1975 
Arkansas Criminal Code.” 
For a focused discussion of the influence of the Model Penal Code on issues relating to men-
tal state and substantive defenses based on impairment, see Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Offend-
ers: Is there Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk? 
57 ARK. L. REV. 447, 482–84 (2004). 
 210. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, https://www.ali.org/
publications/show/model-penal-code/ (statement regarding withdrawal of Section 210.6 from 
Model Penal Code relating to capital punishment based on conclusion to discontinue recogni-
tion of capital sentencing as acceptable punishment alternative because of “intractable institu-
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sions, often in opinions in which Model Penal Code provisions or language 
are compared or contrasted with parallel provisions in the Arkansas Crimi-
nal Code.211 In Cate v. State,212 for instance, the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
explained that much of the Arkansas Criminal Code had been developed 
based on the Model Penal Code.213 The Arkansas Supreme Court also relied 
on Model Penal Code policy analysis in support of its decision in Jegley v. 
Picado,214 striking down the state’s sodomy statute.215 
 
tional and structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering 
capital punishment.”). 
 211. E.g., Koonce v. State, 269 Ark. 96, 101–02 598 S.W.2d 741, 744 (1980) (relying on 
MPC analysis for discussion of limitations implicit in Arkansas code provision defining 
defense of necessity or choice of evils); Stultz v. State, 20 Ark. App. 90, 93, 724 S.W.2d 189, 
191 (1987) (relying on MPC analysis for limitations on use of defense of justification under 
Arkansas law); Parnell v. State, 323 Ark. 34, 38, 912 S.W.2d 422, 424 (1996) (comparing 
Arkansas provision on accomplice liability favorably with MPC provision); Lipscomb v. 
State, 271 Ark. 337, 340, 609 S.W.2d 15, 17–18 (1980) (relying on MPC insanity defense 
provision to explain Arkansas insanity defense statute as change from former law); Bankston 
v. State, 361 Ark. 123, 128–29, 205 S.W.3d 138, 142–43 (2005) (referencing MPC policy 
regarding “extreme emotional disturbance” theory of manslaughter based on earlier concept 
of “heat of passion” in justifying limited approach to use of manslaughter as defense to mur-
der charge under Arkansas law); Harshaw v. State, 344 Ark. 129, 134, 39 S.W.3d 753, 756 
(2001) (relying on MPC to support Arkansas imperfect self-defense theory of manslaughter 
based on actor’s error in forming belief use of force justified); Dougan v. State, 322 Ark. 384, 
390–92, 912 S.W.2d 400, 402–04 (1995) (relying on MPC analysis in rejecting vagueness 
challenge to Arkansas statute defining misdemeanor of abuse of corpse); McClish v. State, 
331 Ark. 295, 300, 962 S.W.2d 332, 336 (1998) (finding support for Arkansas sentencing 
policy governing trial court’s discretion in imposing probated sentence in MPC provisions 
and analysis); Marx v. State, 291 Ark. 325, 330–31, 724 S.W.2d 456, 459–60 (1987) (looking 
to MPC for guidance in limiting evidence admissible to show defendant’s mental state when 
claiming affirmative defense of duress in light of objective test for applying duress theory to 
defendant’s claim). 
Similarly, the Model Penal Code has also been argued in dissenting opinions challenging 
majority analysis of meaning or effect of Arkansas statutes. See, e.g., State v. Setzer, 302 
Ark. 593, 596–97, 791 S.W.2d 365, 367 (1990), (Hays, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of 
MPC view that carrying prohibited weapon constitutes strict liability offense not requiring 
proof of criminal intent); and Davidson v. State, 305 Ark. 592, 598, 810 S.W.2d 327, 330 
(1991), (Hays, J., dissenting) (arguing Arkansas fraudulent use of credit card provision com-
parable to MPC provision). 
 212. Cate v. State, 607 S.W.2d 63 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980). 
 213. Id. at 66–67. 
 214. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002). 
 215. Id. at 636, 80 S.W.3d at 352. The court explained: 
 
Several of our sister states, when striking down analogous sodomy statutes, have 
looked to the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code and Commentaries, 
which state in relevant part: 
 
The usual justification for laws against such conduct is that, even though it does 
not injure any identifiable victim, it contributes to moral deterioration of socie-
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The Model Penal Code had particularly significant influence on the de-
velopment of the Arkansas lack of capacity,216 or insanity, affirmative de-
fense.217 Not only is this evident with respect to the substantive defense, but 
with the development of procedure surrounding assertion of the defense,218 
pre-trial process,219 trial process,220 and post-trial consequences of successful 
reliance on the defense.221 The importance of the strong relationship between 
provisions of the Arkansas Criminal Code governing mental impairment of 
criminal defendants and comparable provisions of the Model Penal Code 
may afford some insight into the Thomas court’s refusal to uphold the trial 
court’s order, which dismissed the criminal charges based on the unlikeli-
hood that the defendant could be restored to fitness for purposes of proceed-
ing to trial.222 
 
ty. One need not endorse wholesale repeal of all “victimless” crimes in order to 
recognize that legislating penal sanctions solely to maintain widely held concepts 
of morality and aesthetics is a costly enterprise. It sacrifices personal liberty, not 
because the actor’s conduct results in harm to another citizen but only because it 
is inconsistent with the majoritarian notion of acceptable behavior. 
(Quoting MODEL PENAL CODE, Part II, 1980 Ed., pp. 362-63). 
 
 216. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Repl. 2013); Lipscomb v. State, 271 Ark. 337, 340, 609 
S.W.2d 15, 17–18 (1980) (affirming Arkansas Code’s reliance on Model Penal Code insanity 
defense in explaining change from prior law of “insane delusions.”); c.f. ALI Model Penal 
Code §§ 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility. 
 217. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-111(d)(1) (Repl. 2016) (an affirmative defense is a defensive 
theory designated in the Criminal Code or by statute as an “affirmative defense,” requiring 
the defendant to prove all elements of the defensive theory by a preponderance of the evi-
dence); Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 406, 246 S.W.3d 862, 867 (2007) (“A defendant bears 
the burden of proving his affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.”) (Quoting: Morgan v. State, 333 Ark. 294, 302, 971 S.W.2d 219 233 (1998)); see 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03(1) (insanity is an affirmative defense). 
 218. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-304(a) (requiring defendant to give notice of intent to 
rely on insanity defense, or assert lack of fitness to proceed); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 
4.03(a) (requiring defense to file written notice of intent to use insanity defense). 
 219. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305(c)(1) (requiring mental examination of defendant 
upon notice of intent to rely on mental state and procedures for conducting examination by 
forensic experts); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (same); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-309 
(determination of accused’s fitness to proceed). 
 220. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-306 (defendant’s right to call expert witnesses); Id. 
§ 5-2-307 (admissibility or exclusion of defendant’s statements during court-ordered psychi-
atric examination); Id. § 5-2-308 (admission of expert testimony); and see also MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 4.07(2)–(4) (experts) and §4.09 (limitation on use of defendant’s statements during 
examination). 
 221. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-313-316 (effect of acquittal and subsequent proceed-
ings, including hospitalization); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (same, generally). 
 222. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 5, 439 S.W.3d 690, 693. 
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B. Model Penal Code § 4.06 and Competence for Trial 
The Model Penal Code provision dealing with mental impairment of 
defendants rendering them unfit for trial is found in Section 4.06.223 Subsec-
tion (2) addresses the problem of restoration briefly: 
If the Court determines that the defendant lacks fitness to proceed, the 
proceeding against him shall be suspended, except as provided in Sub-
section (3) [Subsections (3) and (4)] of this Section, and the Court shall 
commit him to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene 
[Public Health or Correction] to be placed in an appropriate institution of 
the Department of Mental Hygiene [Public Health or Correction] for so 
long as such unfitness shall endure.
224
 
This part of Subsection (2) makes no reference to length of time per-
mitted for restoration and, in fact, provides for unlimited confinement pend-
ing restoration of fitness or competence. 
1. Alternative Provisions for § 4.06 
An alternative to Subsection (3) included in the Code affords the de-
fendant, or counsel, the option of petitioning the trial court within ninety 
days of the commitment order for restoration of competence to consider the 
existence of any defense to the offense charged not resting on proof of men-
tal state impairment. This alternative provides for an additional Subsection, 
(4), in the event the alternative provision is adopted, which provides for a 
hearing on the existence of the factual defense to the charge before the court, 
without a jury, and then directs: 
After the hearing, the Court may in an appropriate case quash the in-
dictment or other charge, or find it to be defective or insufficient, or de-
termine that it is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence, 
or otherwise terminate the proceedings on the evidence or the law. In any 
such case, unless all defects in the proceedings are promptly cured, the 
Court shall terminate the commitment ordered under Subsection (2) of 
this section and order the defendant to be discharged or, subject to the 
law governing the civil commitment of persons suffering from mental 
disease or defect, order the defendant to be committed to an appropriate 
institution of the Department of Mental Hygiene [Public Health].]
225
 
The alternative provisions included in Section 4.06 were not adopted or 
reflected in Section 5-2-310 of the Arkansas Criminal Code. Thus, under 
 
 223. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06. 
 224. Id. § 4.06(2) (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. § (4). 
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state law, the only authority afforded the circuit court to consider matters 
that could result in termination of jeopardy are those included in Section 5-
2-311. These include an attack on sufficiency of the charging instrument, 
violation of the statute of limitations, or prior jeopardy, as expressly recog-
nized in Subsections (1)(A), (B), and (C), respectively.226 Section 5-2-
311(2), however, affords the trial court discretion to rule on “[a]ny other 
ground that the court deems susceptible of fair determination prior to tri-
al.”227 Arguably, this might authorize consideration of meritorious defenses 
not grounded in claims of mental disease or defect, similar to the alternative 
Section (4) in Model Penal Code § 4.06. However, resolution on the ques-
tion of factual guilt by the trial court, sitting without a jury, would necessari-
ly compromise the prosecution’s right under Arkansas law to refuse to agree 
to the waiver of the defendant’s jury trial right.228 Ark. R. Crim. P. 31.1, 
provides: “No defendant in any criminal case may waive a trial by jury un-
less the waiver is approved by the court.” If the prosecutor does not object to 
the defendant’s waiver, the State’s right to demand jury trial is itself deemed 
waived, by implication.229 
Like Section 4.06(2) of the Model Penal Code, Section 5-2-310(b)(2), 
Subsections (C) and (D) do not include any definite provision for disposition 
of the pending criminal proceedings, when the circuit court does not find the 
impaired defendant fit to proceed within the one-year commitment order 
entered after the initial finding that the defendant is unfit to proceed to trial. 
More significantly, the MPC provision would expressly authorize indefinite 
commitment for those impaired defendants who cannot be restored to com-
petency. 
2. Jackson, MPC § 4.06 and the Arkansas Response 
The decision in Jackson clearly conflicts with the indefinite jeopardy 
circumstance resulting when an impaired accused is subjected to unlimited 
confinement because restoration efforts would prove unsuccessful.230 The 
 
 226. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-311(1) (Repl. 2016). 
 227. Id. § 5-2-311(2). 
 228. Id. § 16-89-108 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(a) In all criminal cases, except where a sentence of death may be imposed, trial 
by a jury may be waived by the defendant, provided the prosecuting attorney 
gives his or her assent to the waiver. The waiver and the assent thereto shall be 
made in open court and entered of record. In the event of waiver, the trial judge 
shall pass both upon the law and the facts. 
 
 229. Scates v. State, 244 Ark. 333, 424 S.W.2d 876 (1968). 
 230. See Justine A. Dunlap, What’s Competence Got to Do With It? The Right Not to Be 
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 495 (1997) (A thorough scholarly treat-
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commentary to Section 4.06(2) addressed this situation in the aftermath of 
the issuance of Jackson: 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), decided a decade after approval 
of the Model Code, indicates that a defendant deemed unfit for trial can-
not constitutionally be held indefinitely on the basis of pending charges 
and his own unfitness. Insofar as Subsection (2) permits indefinite com-
mitment without the necessity for the sort of finding that would be re-
quired for someone to be civilly committed, it does not meet the consti-




The explanatory note also addressed the trial court’s authority to dis-
miss pending criminal charges when the trial of a defendant who has re-
gained competence is determined to be unfair, specifically noting the lan-
guage in Section 4.06(2)232 that parallels the Section 5-2-310(c)(2) language 
incorrectly relied upon by the trial court and parties in Thomas. For whatev-
er reason, the drafters of the Arkansas Criminal Code adopted in 1975233 did 
not factor in Jackson when drafting Section 5-2-310(b). 
In Baird v. State,234 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the trial 
court’s order discharging the impaired defendant from custody following 
entry of a judgment of acquittal based upon evidence of her mental state.235 
The court, working within the structural framework provided by the Arkan-
sas Criminal Code, reversed the order releasing Baird, directing the trial 
court to commit her to the custody of the state hospital, ironically, the relief 
she had expressly sought on appeal.236 
 
ment of problems posed by the inability to restore some impaired defendants to fitness for 
trial and misuse of the insanity acquittal for incompetent defendants.). 
 231. EXPLANATORY NOTE TO MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06. Determination of Fitness to 
Proceed; Effect of Finding of Unfitness; Proceedings if Fitness Is Regained [Post-
Commitment Hearing]. (2001). 
 232. Id. The explanatory note initially reads: 
 
Subsection (2) provides that a defendant unfit to proceed is to be committed to a 
mental health facility so long as the unfitness endures, while the proceedings 
against him are suspended for that period. The proceedings against the defendant 
can be resumed if the court determines that fitness has been regained. The court 
may, however, dismiss the charge if it believes that it would be unjust to resume 
the criminal proceedings because so much time has lapsed since the original 
commitment. 
 
See supra note 78 and accompanying text for statutory text of Section 5-2-310(c)(2). 
 233. Supra note 209 (referencing Robinson and Dubber). 
 234. Baird v. State, 266 Ark. 250, 583 S.W.2d 60 (1979). 
 235. Id. at 251, 583 S.W.2d at 61. 
 236. Id. at 253, 583 S.W.2d at 62. 
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The decision in Baird illustrates three important points characterizing 
early decisions under the provisions of the 1975 criminal code: (1) the trial 
court ordered Baird released from custody after acquitting her based on 
mental disease or defect;237 (2) the court did not order a dismissal of the spe-
cific criminal charge in the case; and (3) the resolution ordered to address 
her mental impairment was commitment to the state hospital. This scenario 
would be repeated in subsequent decisions arising under Section 5-2-310. 
In Stover v. Hamilton,238 the majority explained the process approved in 
Baird as an effort to comply with Jackson, writing: 
The Commentary following Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-607 indicates the hold-
ing in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 
(1972), is to the effect that a person may not be held in confinement for a 
period in excess of one year on an incompetency commitment in a crimi-
nal proceeding. The Commentary indicates the Commission felt the state 
should not incarcerate a person, who has never been tried for or convict-
ed of a criminal offense, for a period in excess of one year. The Commis-
sion felt that confinement for longer periods should be by traditional civ-
il commitment. We think this is sound logic. We must necessarily read 
into Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-612 a limitation which prevents a person from 
being held indefinitely to the extent he is deprived of due process of law. 
The present law relating to involuntary civil commitment is 
Ark.Stat.Ann. § 59-1401 et seq.
239
 
Chief Justice Fogelman concurred with the majority’s disposition, but 
objected to its approval of the process in which commitment follows the 
acquittal of an accused not fit for trial by the trial court.240 Dissenting with 
respect to the majority’s reasoning, he argued that the trial court could not 
properly have acquitted the accused on the basis of mental state impairment: 
Appellant is not barred from questioning the court’s action in “acquit-
ting” him, if that action is detrimental to him, unless it can be said that he 
has either waived the right through his attorney’s action or he is estopped 
by it. But neither waiver nor estoppel should be applied if Stover did not 
have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings or the abil-




 237. Id. at 251, 583 S.W.2d at 60–61 (the defendant was initially taken into custody of the 
sheriff because there were other pending warrants for her apart from the charge on which she 
was acquitted). 
 238. Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (discussed in detail on pages 
130–133 of this article). 
 239. Id. at 316, 604 S.W.2d at 937 (emphasis added). 
 240. Id. at 317, 604 S.W.2d at 938 (Fogelman, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 241. Id. at 319 
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Justice Stroud, joined by Justice Hickman, also concurred in part and 
dissented in part.242 However, they took the position that there was no con-
flict between the predecessor provisions to Section 5-2-313, which author-
ized the entry of acquittal by reason of insanity, and Section 5-2-302(b), 
barring entry of a disposition unless the impaired accused has been restored 
to fitness. Instead, Justice Stroud explained: 
I find no conflict between this provision and Ark.Stat.Ann. s 41-603 
(Repl.1977) which prohibits a trial, conviction, or sentence so long as an 
accused lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or 
to assist effectively in his own defense. The two statutes are part of the 
same act and were adopted simultaneously. In such instances, we always 
try to give effect to both statutes rather than to declare one void. Fur-




Justice Stroud’s reasoning can only be viewed as flawed because an 
acquittal is a judgment on the merits of a criminal proceeding.244 It is not a 
“conviction or sentence,” as he argues, but is an alternative verdict that fol-
lows a trial.245 To argue that the process by which the trial court enters the 
judgment of “acquittal without a trial is simply not a trial” distorts the con-
cept of an acquittal. For instance, Section 5-2-312(c) of the Arkansas Crimi-
nal Code provides: “When a defendant is acquitted on a ground of mental 
disease or defect, the verdict and judgment shall state that the defendant was 
acquitted on a ground of mental disease or defect.”246 
Justice Stroud ignored the clear holding of Dusky barring the trial of an 
incompetent defendant247 when he attempted to rationalize the inconsistent 
Code provisions reflected not only in Section 5-2-302(b), but also by Sec-
tion 5-2-313(a). Chief Justice Fogelman correctly identified the problem, by 
stating: “No judgment, even of acquittal, could be entered without a resump-
tion of the criminal proceedings.”248 
 
 242. Id. at 321, 604 S.W.2d at 940. 
 243. Id., 604 S.W.2d at 940 (emphasis added). 
 244. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-125(b) (Repl. 2005) (“When the evidence is conclud-
ed, the court shall, on motion of either party, instruct the jury on the law applicable to the 
case. If the defense is the insanity of the defendant, the jury must be instructed to state that 
fact in their verdict if they acquit him or her on that ground.”). 
 245. When the defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, the verdict must specifically 
indicate that the basis for the acquittal is mental disease or defect, pursuant to Ark. Code 
Ann. § 5-2-312(c). 
 246. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312(c) (Repl. 2013) (when the defendant is acquitted by 
reason of insanity, the verdict must specifically indicate that the basis for the acquittal is 
mental disease or defect). 
 247. Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (pre-dating both the Model Penal Code 
published in 1962 and the 1975 Arkansas Criminal Code). 
 248. Stover, 270 Ark. at 319, 604 S.W.2d at 938-39.   
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The process authorized in Section 5-2-313(b), permitting the trial court 
to enter an insanity acquittal even when the impaired accused has not elect-
ed to rely on the affirmative defense while fit, follows the approach taken by 
Section 4.07 of the Model Penal Code.249 However, the Code affirms the 
Dusky principle: “No person who as a result of mental disease or defect 
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his 
own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an 
offense so long as such incapacity endures.”250 
The same internal inconsistency present in Model Penal Code Sections 
4.04 and 4.07(1) persists in Section 5-2-313, Subsections (a) and (b). Sub-
section (a) requires acquittal based on mental state only if the defendant is 
fit in terms of understanding the nature of the proceedings and assisting 
counsel, and there is evidence meeting the statutory definition of lack of 
criminal responsibility, under the amended statute, or insanity. Yet, 5-2-
313(b) expressly authorizes the trial court to acquit an accused based on 
evidence of lack of capacity, or insanity, at the time of the offense, when the 
accused has not asserted the affirmative defense. It does not expressly pro-
vide for entry of the acquittal if the accused is not fit for trial, but does not 
preclude the court from ordering acquittal based on the report of the mental 
examination, even if the defendant remains unfit. This Subsection provides: 
(b) If the defendant did not raise the issue of mental disease or defect as 
an affirmative defense pursuant to § 5-2-305, then the court is required to 
make a factual determination that the defendant committed the offense 
and that he or she was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the 
time of the commission of the offense.
251
 
Reliance on this provision resulted in the approach in Baird,252 Stov-
er,253 and later decisions254 in which the commitment for restoration of the 
 
 249. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(1) If the report filed pursuant to Section 4.05 finds that the defendant at the time 
of the criminal conduct charged suffered from a mental disease or defect that 
substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, and the 
Court, after a hearing if a hearing is requested by the prosecuting attorney or the 
defendant, is satisfied that such impairment was sufficient to exclude responsibil-
ity, the Court on motion of the defendant shall enter judgment of acquittal on the 
ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. 
 
 250. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 251. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305 (Repl. 2016). 
 252. Baird v. State, 266 Ark. 250, 251, 583 S.W.2d 60, 60 (1979). 
 253. Stover, 270 Ark. at 312, 604 S.W.2d at 935. 
 254. E.g., Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 497, 625 S.W.2d 521, 523 (1981); Mannix v. 
State, 273 Ark. 492, 493, 821 S.W.2d 222, 222 (1981) (following Stover). 
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defendant’s competence followed an acquittal on the pending charge based 
on mental state. The suggestion that this acquittal did not have the conse-
quences of a trial verdict made by the Stover court is simply wrong. There, 
the court explained: 
We hold that when the court terminated all proceedings against the ap-
pellant by its order of acquittal he was no longer subject to the sanctions 
of any criminal statutes. He has been effectively removed from the cate-
gory of “unfit to proceed.” His status is as if he had never been charged 
with the crime upon which those proceedings were instituted.
255
 
This statement was quickly repudiated by the supreme court in Schock 
v. Thomas,256 issued a year later, in 1981, when it explained: “[A]n acquittal 
due to an inability to assist in one’s defense does not carry an inference of 
exoneration and does not imply that no offense has occurred.”257 It clarified 
the significance of the insanity acquittal: 
A literal interpretation of the words, “it is as if no crime has been com-
mitted,” was not intended by Stover. Such a conclusion would give un-
due weight to appellant’s right to liberty at the expense of society’s right 
to be secure. To equate an acquittal because of mental illness with a pre-
sumptive right to identical treatment with those whose mental illness 




The clarification offered by the court in Schock is reflected in other 
contexts. For example, in Arkansas Department of Correction v. Bailey,
259
 
the court held that the acquittal of an accused based on mental disease or 
defect did not preclude his mandatory registration as a sex offender, observ-
ing: “[A]n acquittal entered on the basis of mental disease or defect is not 
the same as an acquittal occasioned by the failure of proof.”
260
 There, the 
court relied on Jones v. United States,
261
 noting that the United States Su-
 
 255. Stover, 270 Ark. at 315, 604 S.W.2d at 937 (emphasis added). 
 256. Schock, 274 Ark. 493, 625 S.W.2d 521. 
 257. Id. at 503, 625 S.W.2d at 526. 
 258. Id. at 503, 625 S.W.2d at 526. Conversely, Professor Dunlap points out that the 
insanity acquittal entails significant adverse consequences for the acquitted accused, includ-
ing loss of personal liberty because of continuing commitment in mental facilities and stigma 
from being found to be mentally ill, still a significant source of negative response in society. 
See Dunlap, supra note 230 at 512–14, esp. n.150 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492–
93 (1980) for the proposition that “being placed in a mental health facility is worse than 
being placed in a prison.”). 
 259. Arkansas Department of Corrections v. Bailey, 368 Ark. 518, 247 S.W.3d 851 
(2007). 
 260. Id. at 526, 247 S.W.3d at 856. 
 261. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. at 364 (1983). 
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preme Court had held that an insanity acquittal established two important 
facts—that the accused was factually guilty, and that the evidence estab-
lished that he suffered from mental illness at the time of the offense. The 
decision in Jones also upheld the post-acquittal commitment to a mental 
institution indefinitely, until such time as he is able to demonstrate that he 




Similarly, Sections 5-2-314 and 315 of the Arkansas Criminal Code 
provide that upon acquittal based on mental disease or defect, the trial court 
initially makes a determination following evaluation as to whether the ac-
quitted defendant continues to manifest symptoms of the underlying mental 
impairment,263 and whether the acquitted defendant constitutes a danger to 
inflict bodily injury on others or damage to property. If so, the court is to 
commit the acquittee to the state hospital for further confinement under its 
direction, with the acquittee forced to prove either that his mental impair-
ment has abated, or that he no longer poses a danger to others by clear and 
convincing evidence.264 While the entire range of post-acquittal confinement 
options is far more complex than described here, the fact is that the acquittal 
by reason of mental disease or defect entails further loss of liberty in many 
situations, rather than immediate discharge.265 
Upon acquittal based on mental disease or defect, the acquittee may pe-
tition for release but must meet the showing required by Section 5-2-
314(e)(1), which provides: 
A person found not guilty on the ground of mental disease or defect of 
an offense involving bodily injury to another person or serious damage 
to the property of another person or involving a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another 
person has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 
his or her release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
 
 262. Bailey, 368 Ark. at 527, 247 S.W.3d at 857-58 (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 370). 
 263. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-314(a)(1) and (a)(3) require determination of whether the 
acquittee remains mentally impaired and the offense charged either did or did not involve an 
act endangering others or property, respectively. If the acquitted defendant is found to remain 
mentally impaired and presents a danger to others or to property, the trial court is directed to 
commit the defendant to the state hospital under Subsection (b)(1) for further evaluation. If 
the trial court finds the defendant continues to manifest the mental impairment, but poses no 
threat of danger to others or property, the trial court is directed to order the acquitted defend-
ant’s release. 
 264. Id. § 5-2-314(e)(1) (Repl. 2016). 
 265. In fact, it is almost certain that successful use of the insanity defense in any felony 
involving assaultive behavior or threat of loss of property will result in post-acquittal con-
finement in ASH or other options under the direction of the Department of Human Services, 
such as conditional release under a regimen including significant limitations on acquitted 
defendant’s liberty. Id. § 5-2-315(c) (Repl. 2016). 
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another person or serious damage to property of another person due to a 
present mental disease or defect.
266
 
If unsuccessful, the acquittee may eventually be discharged from fur-
ther confinement in the Arkansas State Hospital if the Director determines 
that the acquittee has progressed and “no longer create a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another 
person.”267 Alternatively, the Director may apply to the trial court for an 
order for the acquittee’s “conditional release under a prescribed regimen of 
medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment,”268 exercising con-
tinuing supervision of the acquittee for five year, renewable periods.269 
In contrast, the individual who is involuntarily civilly committed is 
confined for an initial period of no more than 45 days,270 extended by maxi-
mum periods of 180 days,271 renewable only upon a showing by the State—
again, by clear and convincing evidence272—that the committed individual 
continues to suffer from the mental impairment and continues to be a threat 
to his own safety or that of others. The civilly committed individual, moreo-
ver, is afforded representation by counsel in all stages of the involuntary 
commitment process, including proceedings to continue the commitment for 
another maximum period of 180 days.273 
3. Misuse of the Insanity Acquittal for Competent Defendants: 
Hughes v. State 
The continued reliance on the insanity acquittal process under Section 
5-2-313(b) presents continuing questions of constitutional due process in 
authorizing the trial court to enter judgment when the defendant did not 
plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. In Hughes v. State,274 
the defendant was ordered acquitted based on mental disease or defect over 
his objection.275 The State had filed for mental evaluation of the defendant 
 
 266. Id. § 5-2-314(e)(1) (Repl. 2016). 
 267. Id. § 5-2-315(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2016). 
 268. Id. § 5-2-315(a)(1)(A). 
 269. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-315(c)(2)(B)(iv) (Repl. 2016). 
 270. Id. § 20-47-214(b)(3) (Repl. 2016). 
 271. Id. § 20-47-215(a) (Repl. 2016). 
 272. Id. § 20-47-215(c)(3). 
 273. Id. § 20-47-211(1) (Repl. 2016). 
 274. Hughes v. State, 2011 Ark. 147, at 2, 2011 WL 1319851, at *1. 
 275. Id. at 4–5, 2011 WL 1319851, at *2–*3. The supreme court noted: 
 
On April 21, 2010, appellant filed a motion in limine, a demand for a jury trial, 
and a motion for a determination that Ark. Code Ann. § 5–2–313 was unconstitu-
tional as applied to him. He sought to preclude evidence of his mental disease or 
defect, arguing that he waived this affirmative defense. Appellant also argued 
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based on concern that he lacked fitness to proceed.276 The defendant, who 
was found fit for trial, brought an appeal based on his objection to the trial 
court’s action in ordering an acquittal based on mental state over his objec-
tion.277 The psychiatric evaluation ordered by the trial court resulted in a 
finding that Hughes was fit to proceed to trial,278 but that he could not con-
form his behavior to the requirements of law at the time of the offense.279 
Contrary to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s implicit conclusion that the pros-
ecution could rely on the psychiatric examination requested because of con-
cern for the defendant’s fitness when it ordered an acquittal not urged by the 
defendant,280 Section 5-2-305 does not authorize either the State or the trial 
court, sua sponte, to rely on the affirmative defense.281 Subsection 
 
that to the extent Ark. Code Ann. § 5–2–313 does not require a trial by jury on 
the underlying offense when the defense of mental disease or defect is waived, 
the statute violated his rights under article 2, sections 7 and 23 of the Arkansas 
Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. By order entered on May 26, 2010, the trial court denied the motion 
in limine, the demand for a jury trial, and the request to find Ark. Code Ann. § 5–
2–313 unconstitutional. 
 
Id. at 2, 2011 WL 1319851, at *1. 
 276. “Any party or the court” [may raise] the issue of the defendant’s fitness to proceed.” 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305(a)(1)(B)(i) (Repl. 2016). 
 277. Hughes, 2011 Ark. 147, at 2 n.1, 2011 WL 1319851, at *1 n.1. 
 278. Id. at 4 n.1, 2011 WL 1319851, at *2 n.1. 
 279. Id., 2011 WL 1319851, at *2 n.1. (the finding that Hughes could not conform his 
behavior to the requirements of law as a result of mental disease or defect meets the test for 
insanity under Section 5-2-312(a)(1)(2)). 
 280. See Louis A. Laski, Comment: Compelled Acquittal by Reason of Mental Disease or 
Defect in Arkansas, 65 ARK. L. REV. 899, 908 n.60 (2012). The author quotes from MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 4.07, authorizing acquittal on motion of prosecution or defense based on fo-
rensic expert’s report mental evaluation, but not requiring defendant to be restored to compe-
tence and capable of making decision to plead not guilty based on mental impairment. Id. at 
907 n.60. The author argues that use of the acquittal when the defendant does not plead the 
affirmative defense is “procedurally permissible,” tracing the statutory history of Ark. Code 
Ann. § 5-2-313(b), while cautioning that Arkansas courts should refrain from using the com-
pelled-insanity acquittal process.” Id. at 899, 907–08. However, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 
provides that if: 
 
the Court, after a hearing if a hearing is requested by the prosecuting attorney or 
the defendant, is satisfied that such impairment was sufficient to exclude respon-
sibility, the Court on motion of the defendant shall enter judgment of acquittal on 
the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. 
 
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.07(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis added). This provision does 
not authorize a forced acquittal of a competent defendant not asserting reliance on the defense 
of insanity. Id. § 4.07(1) Only if the competent defendant moves for judgment of acquittal 
would the Model Penal Code provision authorize the acquittal. Id. § 4.07(1) 
 281. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2016). 
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(a)(1)(A)(1) authorizes the trial court to suspend the proceedings when the 
accused gives notice of intent to rely on a defense based on mental disease 
or defect.282 
Subsection (a)(1)(A)(ii) does authorize the prosecution to seek an ex-
amination for purposes of determining sanity at the time of the offense, but 
only if the defendant has filed notice of intent to rely on the insanity de-
fense.283 A strict reading of the statutory language leads only to the conclu-
sion that the prosecution may not benefit from a verdict based on a defense 
never asserted by the defendant, when the defendant is competent to make a 
decision about the proper—or preferred—course of action in the case.284 
Of course, the trial court’s authority to usurp the defendant’s right to 
determine whether to assert a mental state defense lies in Section 5-2-
313(b).285 As Hughes argued, this use of that provision effectively violated 
his right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, a right personal to the 
accused.286 Hughes sought to appeal from the acquittal ordered by the trial 
court, but the Arkansas Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction 
over appeal because right of appeal extended only to defendants convicted at 
trial.287 Hughes was acquitted by action of the trial court.288 
 
 282. Id. § 5-2-305(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 283. Id. § 5-2-305(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides: 
 
(ii) After the notice of intent to raise the defense of not guilty for reason of men-
tal disease or defect is filed, any party may petition the court for a criminal re-
sponsibility examination and opinion. 
 
 284. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983), (holding that due process 
not violated when insanity acquittee confined to mental hospital confined for period longer 
than the sentence that could have been imposed upon conviction); see supra notes 124–126 
and 280 and accompanying text. A competent defendant might elect not to pursue an insanity 
defense, particularly when the punishment range upon conviction for the offense is not par-
ticularly lengthy in order to avoid the potentially lengthier period of confinement in the state 
mental health system if the insanity defense were successful. 
 285. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305(b) (Repl. 2016). 
 286. Hughes v. State, 2011 Ark. 147, at 2, 2011 WL 1319851, at *1; see Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“The accused has the ultimate authority to make certain funda-
mental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his 
or her own behalf, or take an appeal.”); see also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3(a) (requiring that 
defendant personally enter a plea of guilty in open court except when the charge is a misde-
meanor punishable only by fine). 
 287. Hughes, 2011 Ark. at 1, 5, 2011 WL 1319851, at *1–2. 
 288. Id. at 4, 2011 WL 1319851, at *2. (finding that because Hughes was not convicted in 
circuit court, he had no remedy to attack his “acquittal” in a state post-conviction action 
brought under Rules 37.1(a)(1) and 37.2(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
For additional discussion of the litigation consequences of the insanity “acquittal” ordered 
over Hughes’ objection, see infra notes 299–320 and accompanying text. 
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The use of a “forced” insanity plea upon a fit defendant over his objec-
tion was addressed by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Overholser,289 a deci-
sion predating Jackson by ten years.290 There, the Court considered the pro-
priety of the defendant’s commitment to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital pursuant to 
a provision of the District of Columbia Code.291 This provision resulted in 
the entry of an acquittal by reason of insanity when the defendant, who was 
competent, had not relied on the defense and unsuccessfully sought to plead 
guilty to the pending charges of cashing worthless checks.292 While Lynch 
challenged the process by which he had been convicted on constitutional 
grounds, the Court ruled narrowly, holding that the commitment ordered by 
the trial court could only apply to a defendant pleading insanity under the 
controlling statute, and ordered his discharge.293 
In a situation comparable to the factual scenario in Lynch, the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s decision to forego 
reliance on insanity is binding on a trial court, provided that the trial court is 
convinced that the defendant is competent to make the decision, in Frendak 
v. United States.294 The court elaborated on the numerous adverse conse-
quences to the competent accused flowing from an insanity acquittal in ex-
plaining why deference to the competent defendant’s personal decision with 
respect to the choice of defenses is required.295 Subsequently, the United 
States Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Marble v. United 
States296 as the D.C. appellate court had in Frendak.297 
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a state may 
authorize acquittal by reason of insanity when the accused is either incom-
petent and unable to make a decision as to whether to assert the defense, or 
competent and expressly opposes the trial court’s imposition of an acquittal 
over his objection, as in Hughes. Jurisdictions appear to remain split over 
 
 289. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). 
 290. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 291. Lynch, 369 U.S. at 708–09 (considering D.C. Code § 24-301(d)). 
 292. Id. at 707. 
 293. Id. at 709–10. The Lynch Court, however, conceded that even a defendant not claim-
ing the defense of insanity could be acquitted on this ground based on evidence of his im-
pairment at the time of the offense. In that circumstance, however, the trial court would be 
required to proceed under the civil commitment statute if the defendant remained impaired 
following his acquittal. Id. at 718. 
 294. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979). 
 295. Id. at 380. 
 296. 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 297. Professor Dunlap noted that despite the attempt to lessen the consequences for the 
those adjudged mentally ill, there remained considerable distinction between those adjudged 
mentally ill in civil matters from those acquitted by reason of insanity at the time of her arti-
cle.  See note 230, supra, What’s Competence Got to Do With It?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. at 509. 
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this practice, with some seventeen states permitting trial courts to impose 
insanity acquittals, according to a 2002 study.298 
Chief Justice Hannah dissented in Hughes, arguing that the majority 
improperly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction: 
It is only after the State meets its burden of proving the charged crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt that acquittal based on insanity is considered. 
This is because insanity is not an element of the charged crime, but in-
stead is a defense, making the standard of proof for insanity distinct from 
that required for the charged crime. “If the state meets its traditional bur-
den of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant then bears the 
burden of establishing that he was insane at the time of the offense and, 
therefore, exempt from criminal responsibility.” . . .  
Before a criminal defendant can be acquitted as a consequence of a men-
tal defect, there must be a judicial determination that, based on proof be-




Chief Justice Hannah’s analysis is, again, consistent with the court’s 
holding in Gruzen v. State.300 There, the court affirmed that entry of a plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity does not relieve the prosecution of proving 
each element of the offense charged, including that the offense was commit-
ted by the defendant.301 
The majority’s disposition in Hughes reflects the same narrow exercise 
of its jurisdiction that characterized its decision in State v. Thomas.302 In-
stead of confronting the constitutional issues implicit in the forced acquittal 
 
 298. See Roger Miller, Hendricks v. Miller: Forcing an Insanity Defense on an Unwilling 
Defendant, 30 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 295, 296 (2002). The author observed: 
 
More than a third of jurisdictions that have an insanity defense permit its imposi-
tion against a defendant’s wishes. Our study6 revealed that neither state mental 
health forensic program directors nor state attorneys general were even familiar 
with the enabling statutes or case law, much less with their implementation in 
practice. Who can enter the defense varies considerably. Four jurisdictions re-
ported that the defense could be imposed only on competent defendants, five that 
it could be imposed only on incompetent defendants, and five that it could be 
imposed on either. Judges can impose insanity defenses in eight jurisdictions, de-
fense attorneys in 11 jurisdictions, and prosecutors in five. The director of an in-
stitution to which a defendant is committed can raise the defense in one jurisdic-
tion. 
 
 299. Hughes v. State, 2011 Ark. 147, at 5, 2011 WL 1319851, at *3 (Hannah, C.J., dis-
senting). 
 300. Gruzen v. State, 276 Ark. 149, 634 S.W.2d 92 (1982). 
 301. Id. at 153, 634 S.W.2d at 95. 
 302. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, 439 S.W.3d 690. 
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based on insanity on competent defendants not asserting reliance on the de-
fense, the court simply declined to rule on the merits, dismissing the appeal 
based on its strict interpretation of its own rule authorizing appeal only upon 
conviction.303 This disposition reflected a literal application of Rule 1 of the 
Arkansas Appellate Criminal Procedure defining the defendant’s right to 
appeal: 
(a) Right of Appeal. Any person convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony 
by virtue of trial in any circuit court of this state has the right to appeal 




The rule was thus adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court itself, pur-
suant to its authority under the Arkansas Constitution, which provides: 
There shall be a right of appeal to an appellate court from the Circuit 
Courts and other rights of appeal as may be provided by Supreme Court 
rule or by law.
305 
In other situations, the court has reinterpreted rules it previously adopt-
ed to address unanticipated problems in the exercise of its jurisdiction. For 
instance, Rule 1 of the Arkansas Appellate Criminal Procedure expressly 
precludes appeal from a conviction obtained on the defendant’s plea of 
guilty: “Except as provided by A.R.Cr.P. 24.3(b) [conditional plea of guilty 
reserving appellate review by defendant of adverse trial court rulings on 
motions to suppress evidence] there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere.”306 But, in Bradford v. State,307 the majority explained 
that the court had recognized two exceptions to this limitation,308 effectively 
expanding its discretion to review issues related to sentencing following 
conviction on a plea of guilty, over a pointed dissent.309 
The Hughes310 court’s refusal to announce an exception to the general 
rule governing standing of competent defendants acquitted by reason of in-
sanity over their objection effectively avoided the discussion of the constitu-
tional issues raised by the process.311 It declined to do so, even though its 
 
 303. Hughes, 2011 Ark. 147, at 4, 2011 WL 1319851, at *2.  
 304. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 1(a) (emphasis added). 
 305. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 11. 
 306. ARK. R. APP. P. CRIM. 1(a). 
 307. Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 94 S.W.3d 904 (2003). 
 308. Id. at 399, 94 S.W.3d at 907. In Bradford, the supreme court permitted an appeal 
where the trial court had sua sponte ordered a resentencing of the defendant, increasing his 
sentence from three 5-year terms to be served concurrently to consecutive service of the three 
5-year sentences for a total of 15 years. 
 309. Id. at 405, 94 S.W.3d at 910–11, (Glaze, J., dissenting). 
 310. Hughes v. State, 2011 Ark. 147, 2011 WL 1319851. 
 311. Id. at 4–5, 2011 WL 1319851, at *2. 
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interpretation would have involved the application of a rule that the court, 
itself, had promulgated, rather than construction of a statute, as in State v. 
Thomas.312 In both instances, however, the court’s action in avoiding consti-
tutional issues reflects a willingness to subordinate due process rights of 
criminal defendants to protection of its own jurisdiction.313 
The court’s decision in Hughes not only insulated the trial court’s rul-
ing from attack in the direct appeal process, but in theory has frustrated ef-
forts for similarly situated insanity acquittees from regaining freedom. For 
instance, the post-conviction process under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules 
of Criminal Procedure314 will not be available to him for review of the trial 
court’s action, because he was not “convicted” in circuit court,315 nor in cus-
tody pursuant to a conviction when filing for post-conviction relief.316 
The writ of habeas corpus under Arkansas law317 that permits challeng-
es to the authority of the trial court also appears to provide no recourse for 
individuals, like Hughes, who have been remanded to the custody of ASH as 
insanity acquittees.318 Although the writ arguably would address an illegal 
detention, as the Arkansas Supreme Court explained in Flowers v. Norris,319 
a leading case, the typical theory for relief involves facial invalidity of the 
judgment and sentence rendered by the circuit court. The court explained: 
It is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus will only be issued if the 
commitment was invalid on its face, or the sentencing court lacked juris-
diction. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief, a petitioner must plead ei-
ther the facial invalidity or the lack of jurisdiction and make a “showing, 
 
 312. 2014 Ark. 362, at * 439 S.W.3d at 693. For the court’s approach to statutory con-
struction, generally, see note 81, supra. 
 313. Hughes, 2011 Ark. at 4–5, 2011 WL 1319851, at *2. 
 314. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1, et seq. 
 315. E.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(a) refers to the “conviction in the original case.” 
 316. Coplen v. State, 298 Ark. 272, 273, 766 S.W.2d 612, 613 (1989). Scott v. State, 
2006 WL 302351, *1 (Ark. 2006); Bohannon v. State, 336 Ark. 367, 372, 985 S.W.2d 708, 
710 (1999). In Scott and Bohannon, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that to pursue relief 
pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure—the primary route for 
collateral attack on a conviction under Arkansas law—the petitioner must be incarcerated at 
the time of filing the petition. Scott, 2006 WL 302351 at *2; Bohanan, 336 Ark. at 370–72, 
985 S.W.2d at 709–11. The state court has expressly rejected reliance on the more expansive 
understanding and treatment of the “in custody” requirement applied by federal courts in 
post-conviction proceedings. Bohanan, 336 Ark. at 372, 985 S.W.2d at 710 (parolee not “in 
custody” for purposes of post-conviction litigation under Rule 37); Kemp v. State, 330 Ark. 
757, 758, 956 S.W.2d 860, 861 (1997) (defendant sentenced only to pay fine not eligible for 
post-conviction relief). 
 317. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–112–103 (1987). 
 318. Hughes v. State, 2011 Ark. 147, 2011 WL 1319851. 
 319. Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 760, 68 S.W.3d 289 (2002). 
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4. Frustration of Habeas Corpus Review for Insanity Acquittees: 
Cleveland v. Frazier 
The alternative ground for relief relating to the circuit court’s jurisdic-
tion in ordering an insanity acquittal for an unfit defendant would arguably 
be habeas corpus,321 affording insanity acquittees who were not fit at the 
time of the acquittal by the trial court a basis for challenging their acquittals. 
However, in Cleveland v. Frazier,322 relied on by the Flowers court in ex-
plaining the scope of habeas corpus under the statute, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court rejected a jurisdiction-based challenge where the petitioner argued 
that the order was invalid because the trial court made no factual finding 
determination, required by Section 5-2-313, that the “defendant committed 
the offense and that he or she was suffering from a mental disease or defect 
at the time of the commission of the offense.”323 The court found that Cleve-
land conceded the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction under Section 5-2-
314, in acquitting him and ordering him committed to the state hospital, 
focusing only on the lack of a determination that he committed the of-
fense.324 
The Cleveland court rejected the argument that the order committing 
Cleveland to the state hospital was invalid because it found no facial irregu-
larity in the trial court’s written order,325 explaining the petitioner’s position: 
“Mr. Cleveland urges the court to look beyond the face of the order, and to 
consider the record as a whole.”326 
In light of the argument before the court, in which Cleveland did not 
challenge the trial court’s authority to proceed with adjudication based on a 
finding of his incompetence for trial, the decision upholding the trial court’s 
action may well have been proper, in a technical sense.327 The court found 
that there was no reference to whether Cleveland or the State urged the trial 
 
 320. Id. at 763–64, 68 S.W.3d at 291. 
 321. The writ of habeas corpus is statutorily recognized for individuals challenging an 
illegal sentence, ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-112-103, and for individuals challenging the legality 
of their confinement in the Arkansas State Hospital. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-64-804. 
 322. Cleveland v. Frazier, 338 Ark. 581, 999 S.W.2d 188 (1999). 
 323. Id. at 587, 999 S.W.2d at 191 (interpreting Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-313). 
 324. Id. at 585, 999 S.W.2d at 191. The petitioner was represented before the trial court 
and Arkansas Supreme Court by the Legal Clinic at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock 
School of Law. Id. at 582, 999 S.W.2d at 189. 
 325. Id. at 587, 999 S.W.2d at 191–92. 
 326. Id., 999 S.W.2d at 192. 
 327. Cleveland, 338 Ark. at 588, 999 S.W.2d at 192. 
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court to acquit him based on mental disease or defect.328 The controlling 
statute required the trial court to make a factual determination that the evi-
dence was sufficient to show that an accused committed the offense only if 
he did not assert insanity as a defense.329 The omission of any finding on the 
face of the commitment order showing that Cleveland did not, himself, as-
sert an insanity defense was not facially invalid; the order was not facially 
invalid, according to the Arkansas Supreme Court, because the order did not 
show that Cleveland had not claimed insanity.330 Section 5-2-313(b) only 
requires the trial court to determine that the evidence would prove that the 
impaired accused actually committed the offense charged.331 Subsection (b) 
requires this affirmative finding only in cases in which the defendant has not 
moved for acquittal based on mental disease or defect.332 Because the basis 
for the statutory claim was that the commitment order did not include the 
finding required by Section 5-2-313, the court held that the order was not 
invalid on its face because the record did not show that Cleveland himself 
did not move for the acquittal.333 Subsection (b) requires this affirmative 
finding only in cases in which the defendant has not moved for acquittal 
based on mental disease or defect. The court relied on this language, distin-
guishing cases in which the accused pleads insanity from those in which the 
defense of insanity is not asserted by the defendant, finding that the lack of a 
reference as to which party urged the acquittal did not result in a fatally 
flawed judgment.334 
Arguably, a much stronger attack on the practice used by the circuit 
court in Lambert’s case could be pressed, based on the premise that a court 
lacks jurisdiction to enter an order finding the impaired defendant not guilty 
by reason of insanity, unless or until the impaired defendant is fit to proceed 
to trial in accordance with Section 5-2-302(b).335 The Flowers court recog-
nized an alternative basis for habeas relief than that based on examination of 
the commitment order on its face.336 As in Cleveland,337 the court explained 
that the habeas challenge could be based on the fact that “the sentencing 
court lacked jurisdiction.”338 However, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s stated 
basis for upholding the trial court order in Cleveland was less promising 
with respect to reliance on the lack of jurisdiction theory: 
 
 328. Id., 999 S.W.2d at 192. 
 329. Id. at 586, 999 S.W.2d at 191. 
 330. Id. at 587–88, 999 S.W.2d at 191. 
 331. Id., 999 S.W.2d at 191. 
 332. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-313(b) (1987). 
 333. Id. at 587–88, 999 S.W.2d at 192. 
 334. Id. at 587, 999 S.W.2d at 192. 
 335. See supra note 135 and accompanying text for text of statute. 
 336. Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 760, 763, 68 S.W.3d 289, 291 (2002). 
 337. Cleveland, 338 Ark. 581, 999 S.W.2d 188. 
 338. Flowers, 347 Ark. at 763, 68 S.W.3d at 291. 
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We, therefore, hold that this court will not go beyond the face of a crimi-
nal commitment order to determine its validity. We shall continue to ad-
here to the well-established principle that a writ of habeas corpus will is-
sue only if the criminal commitment order was invalid on its face.
339
 
This rather final statement regarding the alternative grounds for habeas 
relief would indicate that the court will not go behind the face of the order to 
determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed with “sentenc-
ing.”340 What is evident from the Cleveland opinion is that the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s review of the trial court record showed that Cleveland had 
been ordered to the state hospital for restoration of competence,341 indicating 
that he had initially been found unfit to proceed to trial. Subsequently, in its 
findings, the trial court noted: 
That based on the evaluation of the Department of Mental Health Ser-
vices the State of Arkansas agrees that it would be in the best interest of 
justice that the Defendant be acquitted.
342
 
By limiting its review to the examination of the commitment order and 
observing that the record was silent as to whether the defense requested the 
insanity acquittal, the Cleveland court considered its affirmance of the trial 
court’s action proper. It could have remanded to the trial court for compli-
ance with the strict requirement of Section 5-2-313(b),343 that it make the 
 
 339. Cleveland, 338 Ark. at 587, 999 S.W.2d at 192. 
 340. In Flowers, one issue regarding the authority of the sentencing court was explicit; 
the commitment order recited a sentence imposed by the court that exceeded the sentencing 
range under the statute. Flowers, 347 Ark. at 768, 68 S.W.3d at 293. The trial court imposed 
a sentence of 40 years for the Class A felony of attempted capital murder when the sentenc-
ing ranged authorized for this offense was capped at 30 years, requiring the court to modify 
the greater term to the 30-year maximum permitted under the statute. Id., 68 S.W.3d at 293. 
  The other issue regarded the imposition of sentences for both the attempted capital 
felony murder and the underlying felony offense upon which it was based, aggravated rob-
bery. The court held that two convictions and sentences could not be imposed for both an 
attempted felony murder and the underlying felony supporting the felony murder charge, 
requiring that these offenses be merged because the General Assembly had not authorized 
imposition of separate convictions and sentences for an attempt to commit a felony murder. 
Id. at 765–66, 68 S.W.3d at 292–93, construing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(d). 
 341. Cleveland, 338 Ark. at 583, 999 S.W.2d at 189. 
 342. Id. at 584, 999 S.W.2d at 190. 
 343. The Flowers court noted the general rule that criminal statutes are to be strictly 
construed, with any doubts as to meaning to be resolved in favor of the defendant. Flowers, 
347 Ark. at 765, 68 S.W.3d at 292. This approach comports with the general doctrine of 
lenity, or the resolution of doubt as to the meaning of a statute in favor of the defendant. 
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266–67 (1997); accord Sansevero v. State, 345 Ark. 
307, 45 S.W.3d 840 (2001); Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633, 19 S.W.3d 16 (2000). The question 
of whether the defendant moved for acquittal does not involve interpretation of Section 5-2-
313(b); the statute is clear in its wording, if violative of due process. The principle of lenity, 
however, arguably would dictate remand to the trial court to ensure compliance with the 
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finding required for entry of the acquittal on the basis of mental disease or 
defect that Cleveland was factually guilty of the robbery with which he had 
been charged. 
The court elected to proceed from the premise that the record was silent 
as to the motion for acquittal, despite evidence of Cleveland’s impairment 
and the apparently unsuccessful efforts of the state hospital staff to restore 
him to fitness.344 As in Hughes, the court’s action in Cleveland reflected a 
lack of regard for federal due process protections for mentally impaired 
criminal defendants,345 and the statutory requirement imposed by Section 5-
2-302(b). The Thomas decision reflects a continuing posture in which indi-
vidual rights are disregarded, or subordinated, to expedience. 
The situation faced by an accused acquitted based on mental disease or 
defect also may result in a complex procedural morass that may effectively 
result in continuing—perhaps lifetime—confinement in the state mental 
health system, particularly for indigent acquittees lacking the resources to 
contest their acquittals. This situation would theoretically apply regardless 
of whether the competent defendant objected to the trial court’s action in 
acquitting him, as in Hughes’s case, or whether the trial court orders acquit-
tal by reason of mental disease or defect when the accused is not fit to make 
any decision regarding the exercise of his jury trial right or as to what de-
fense, including insanity, he could assert. 
VI. “COMMON SENSE” AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s suggestion in Mauppin that “common 
sense”346 might well dictate a result not contemplated by a strict reading of 
the Section governing restoration of fitness is worth considering in review-
ing its more recent decision in Thomas. The trial court’s order dismissing 
pending charges against Thomas was not authorized by Section 310(c)(2), as 
 
requirements of this section where the record is ambiguous on the question of which party 
moved for the insanity acquittal. 
 344. See Cleveland, 338 Ark. 581, 999 S.W.2d 188. 
 345. Id., 999 S.W.2d 188. Whether federal habeas relief would be available for acquitted 
defendants who will remain in the custody of ASH and Department of Human Services is not 
clear. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the federal habeas remedy for petitioners claiming viola-
tions of federally-protected constitutional rights convicted in state court proceedings, it is 
possible that the “custody” requirement for those petitioners would be met by insanity acquit-
tees under state law. This is arguably because they remain in custody if their criminal charges 
have involved acts of violence or dangerous behavior until such time as they are able to prove 
their eligibility for release pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-314(e)(1). See Felker v. Turpin, 
518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996) (holding procedural limitations imposed on actions brought pursu-
ant to Section 2254 do “not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to entertain original habeas 
petitions.”). 
 346. Mauppin, 309 Ark. 235, 245, 831 S.W.2d 104, 108–09 (1992). 
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the supreme court found on the State’s appeal from the order. But, the trial 
court’s action clearly did embrace the constitutional problem of due process 
addressed by the Jackson Court when it held that confining an impaired de-
fendant indefinitely “solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial 
does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due pro-
cess.”347 Because there was no evidence that Thomas could be restored to 
fitness within a reasonable period of time, if ever, the trial court’s dismissal 
served to prevent the due process violation that Jackson explained is inher-
ent in indefinite confinement for purposes of restoration. However, on re-
mand from the Arkansas Supreme Court, the trial court acquitted Thomas 
based on mental disease or defect.348 
A. The “Common Sense” of the Trial Court’s Dismissal Order 
[N]owhere in this Section [5-2-310(c)(2)] is a circuit court given the au-
thority to dismiss charges against an unfit defendant.
349
 
The Thomas court rejected the trial court’s order dismissing the charges 
pending against an impaired accused who could not be expected to regain 
fitness to proceed with trial based on its narrow reading of Section 5-2-
310(c)(2). The fact that Subsection (c)(2) expressly authorizes dismissal 
only if the impaired defendant has regained competence for trial cannot be 
disputed. 
The Indiana Supreme Court, in Davis, recognized the ““inherent au-
thority to dismiss criminal charges where the prosecution of such charges 
would violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.”
 350 The Thomas court’s 
approach appears far more restricted, perhaps to the point of admitting of no 
“inherent authority” at all, with an Arkansas trial court’s power totally re-
stricted by legislative delegation. But such a limited approach would almost 
certainly conflict with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s protection of its own 
authority to regulate practice in the state court system, as evidenced by its 
stated view of the “separation of powers doctrine” emanating from the Ar-
kansas constitution.351 
 
 347. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972). 
 348. State v. Thomas, No. 60-CR-11-1505, Judgment of Acquittal by Reason of Mental 
Disease/Defect, PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT/7TH DIVISION 
(June 8, 2015) https://caseinfo.aoc.arkansas.gov/cconnect/PROD/public/ck_public_qry_
doct.cp_dktrpt_frames?backto=P&case_id=60CR-11-1505&begin_date=&end_date=. 
 349. Thomas, 214 Ark. 362, at 5, 439 S.W.3d at 693. 
 350. State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. 2008). 
 351. See Section IV.B, infra, which follows next, and accompanying notes, discussing the 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s explanation of limitations on powers of the legislative, executive 
and judicial branches of state government pursuant to Ark. Const. art. 4, §§ 1, and 2. 
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Still, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address the trial court’s ac-
tion in terms of Jackson v. Indiana, or the gap in legislatively-prescribed 
authority for dealing with the unrestorable, unfit criminal defendant. The 
failure to do so, limiting its review to the text of Section 5-2-310’s provi-
sions, rejects “common sense” in arriving at its decision to reverse the dis-
missal ordered by the trial court. 
In assessing the application of “common sense” to the circumstances 
presented in Thomas, one could readily conclude, as the trial court did, that 
in light of the uncontroverted expert opinion offered at the hearing on the 
motion to dismiss, there was not a substantial probability that Thomas could 
be restored to fitness within a reasonable period of time. But, the evidence 
also warranted the trial court ordering the Department of Human Services to 
petition for his involuntary commitment to ASH, as provided in Subsection 
310(b)(2)(D), a process that would be consistent with Jackson, provided that 
the commitment does not include a state of continuing jeopardy for Thomas. 
Moreover, the constitutional quandary created by Thomas in failing to 
squarely address the problem of indefinite jeopardy for impaired defendants 
who cannot be restored to fitness is illustrated by the underlying facts of the 
pending criminal charges. Thomas was charged with the offenses of battery 
in the second-degree,352 a Class D felony,353 and assault in the second-
degree,354 a Class B misdemeanor.355 As in the Jackson and Davis cases, the 
offenses with which Thomas was charged were lower grade felonies, with 
statutory penalties that carried potential imprisonment upon conviction like-
ly shorter in duration, particularly in practice, than the time required for a 
successful restoration of competence for them to proceed to trial. 
In the Arkansas cases in which extended confinement of impaired de-
fendants was upheld, Darrell Davis, Rickey Dale Newman, and Gary 
Mauppin, the defendants initially found unfit for trial were charged with 
capital murder, the highest degree of offense in the Criminal Code.356 In 
these cases, delay in trying the cases was attributable to the length of time 
 
 352. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-202 (Repl. 2016). 
 353. Id. § 5-13-202(b). A Class D felony carries a potential maximum sentence of six 
years, with no statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment. Id. § 5-1-401(a)(5) (Repl. 
2016). 
 354. Id. §5-13-206 (Repl. 2016). A Class B misdemeanor carries a maximum punishment 
of confinement in jail for a period not to exceed 90 days. Id. § 5-1-401(b)(2). 
 355. Id. § 5-13-206(b). 
 356. Moreover, under Arkansas law, as is common, there is no statute of limitations for 
murder offenses. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(a)(1)(A), (B), and (C), (no limitations for capi-
tal murder, first degree murder or second-degree murder, respectively). Consequently, the 
delay in proceeding to trial occasioned by the time involved in the restoration of fitness to 
procced to trial does not, in itself, suggest any particular prejudice to these defendants in the 
delay itself, as the requirement for speedy trial would be excused during any period in which 
a defendant’s impairment would prevent him from being tried more expeditiously. 
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required for restoration of the defendants’ competence for trial, not implicat-
ing the problem posed in Thomas of unrestorable fitness. But, the problem 
of restoration is a common factor in the eventual disposition of the criminal 
charges. The situations presented in these cases demonstrate the need for 
flexibility in the criminal justice system’s response to dealing with mental 
illness or defect that impairs an individual’s ability to comprehend the na-
ture of the proceedings, or to assist counsel in presenting a defense to the 
charges. 
The need for flexibility in response is illustrated by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Riggins v. Nevada357 and Sell v. United States,358 ad-
dressing the problem of restoration of competence of the impaired accused 
with psychoactive drugs designed to repair mental state necessary for resto-
ration. While the Riggins Court recognized the appropriateness of forced 
medication for the purpose of restoring competence for trial on the capital 
charge in that case,359 the decision in Sell sets the parameters for use of psy-
choactive drugs to restore competence when the defendant objects to their 
administration.360 The critical factor in the four-part test set by the Sell Court 
requires consideration of the importance of the State interest in prosecuting 
the accused through trial in order to ascertain guilt,361 or culpability in the 
commission of the offense.362 
 
 357. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying 
text. 
 358. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). See supra notes 50–56 and accompany-
ing text. 
 359. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134–35. 
 360. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–82. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
 361. Id. at 180 (requiring trial court to determine whether “important governmental inter-
ests are at stake”). Although a defendant may be acquitted by reason of insanity, the acquittal 
does not establish that the defendant did not commit the offense charged, or that the evidence 
produced by the prosecution was insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the 
offense. The prosecution retains the burden of proving that the defendant committed the 
offense charged; the insanity defense may then be asserted to excuse criminal liability for the 
commission of the offense based on impaired mental state at the time of the crime. Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), see supra 
notes 162–166 and accompanying text; see also Ark. Dept. of Correction v. Bailey, 368 Ark. 
518, 526, 247 S.W.3d 851, 857 (2007) (citing Jones and Foucha). 
 362. Even when an accused is acquitted on the basis of insanity, the basis for the acquittal 
itself indicates that the evidence adduced at trial, or the defendant’s admission in the event 
the acquittal results from entry of a guilty plea, the entry of the plea will establish the neces-
sary basis for a legal conclusion that the accused, in fact, committed the offense. See supra 
note 4. The trial court is authorized by Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-313(c) to acquit an accused 
based on the expert evaluations that the accused lacked capacity, or was insane, at the time of 
the offense, providing that if the accused did not plead not guilty by reason of insanity, the 
court must make a “factual determination that the defendant committed the offense.” It is, 
however, doubtful that the trial court should be able to essentially rely on the affirmative 
defense of lack of capacity, or insanity, when a fit, or competent, defendant does not assert 
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The Sell factors relate directly to the restoration process, specifically as 
they address the forced administration of psychotropic medications on the 
unwilling, impaired defendant. A similar approach serves the overall prob-
lem of addressing restoration, including the problem posed by impairment 
that cannot be successfully redressed. Consequently, the time frame for res-
toration efforts can rationally fluctuate based upon the severity of the of-
fense charged, because the State’s interests in final determination that the 
accused actually committed the offense is arguably greater than with respect 
to a lesser charge. 
The extended periods of time devoted to restoration in Darrell Davis, 
Rickey Dale Newman, Gary Mauppin, and Ronald Jack Campbell363 reflect 
the seriousness of the charges in each case, capital murder. In contrast, the 
one-year rule for restoration relied upon in Stover v. Hamilton,364 Schock v. 
Thomas,365 and Mannix v. State,366 all involved less serious charges where 
defendants were acquitted on the pending charges on the basis of insanity 
before being committed to the state hospital. However, the trial court’s entry 
of an acquittal based on mental impairment of an accused who is not compe-
tent to make the decision as to whether to plead not guilty by reason of men-
tal disease or defect is inconsistent with Section 4.06(2) of the Model Penal 
Code.367 
1. The Trial Court’s “Inherent” Authority to Dismiss the Criminal 
Charges 
The Thomas court’s observation that Section 5-2-310 does not author-
ize dismissal of criminal charges for an unfit defendant might suggest 
agreement with the State’s separation of powers argument. However, in fo-
 
the defense. But, the entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity does not relieve the 
prosecution of proving each element of the offense charged, including that the offense was 
committed by the defendant. Gruzen v. State, 276 Ark. 149 153, 634 S.W.2d 95 (1982). 
 363. See supra notes 356. 
 364. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text. 
 365. Schock was acquitted on the basis of insanity contemporaneously with being found 
unable to assist counsel in his defense and then committed to the state hospital for restoration 
of competence. See Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. at 496, 625 S.W.2d at 522 (1981); see also 
supra notes 135, 150, and 254. 
 366. The defendant had been acquitted on the murder charge based lack of capacity at the 
time of the offense, and then committed to the state hospital for restoration of competence. 
The trial court’s action in proceeding to enter a judgment on the defendant’s guilt before her 
restoration to fitness to enter a plea likely violated her right to due process. See Mannix v. 
State, 273 Ark. 492, 493, 624 S.W.2d 222, 222 (1981); see also supra notes 135, 150, and 
254. 
 367. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (requiring suspension of pro-
ceedings when the accused is found to be incompetent and resumed only when the defendant 
regains competence). 
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cusing its holding only on the incorrect reliance on Subsection (c)(2) as the 
basis for the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal charges against an ac-
cused who has not been restored to competence, the Thomas court avoided 
the State’s argument that the dismissal order under review violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine under Arkansas law.368 
At the same time, the court’s holding on this limited ground of statuto-
ry construction leaves open the failure of the General Assembly to address 
the constitutional problem of indefinite jeopardy for impaired defendants 
who cannot be restored to fitness for purposes of trial. What is clear is that 
Thomas arose in a factual context implicating federal and state constitutional 
authority, as well as proper exercise of judicial discretion in light of the leg-
islative failure to contemplate, or address, the problem of unrestorable im-
pairment. 
The Thomas court’s specific reference to the lack of statutory authority 
for a trial court to order dismissal of pending criminal charges when the 
impaired accused cannot be restored to fitness within a reasonable amount 
of time reflects the narrowest reading of Section 5-2-310 as an alternative 
basis for decision. This approach to statutory construction leaves unan-
swered the underlying constitutional question as to how the Jackson Court’s 
concern for indefinite jeopardy should be addressed by the reviewing court 
in a case squarely resting on Section 5-2-310(b)(1)(A), the situation posed 
by the impaired defendant who cannot be restored to fitness to proceed to 
trial. 
Regardless of any potential limitations under the state constitution for 
the trial court’s exercise of “inherent authority” to dismiss criminal charges 
generally, there remains the constitutional principle that state courts are 
bound to enforce federal constitutional protections.369 
In Williams v. State,370 the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed this re-
sponsibility for the state’s courts: 
There can be no question that this court, as well as the trial courts of this 
state, is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court con-
cerning rights and prohibitions under the provisions of the United States 
Constitution and, there is no question that the United States Supreme 
Court has spoken clearly, and more than once, on the question of racial 




 368. See Schock v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, 439 S.W.3d 690, 692; see also supra note 
206. 
 369. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.8 (1983) (resolving questions 
arising under federal constitutional protections “state courts are required to apply federal 
constitutional standards”). 
 370. Williams v. State, 254 Ark. 799, 496 S.W.2d 395 (1973). 
 371. Id., 496 S.W.2d at 395. 
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In fact, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the authority of the 
state’s courts to enforce various protections afforded by both federal and 
state constitutional provisions, in addition to protecting judicial authority 
from encroachment by the legislative and executive branches. For instance, 
the supreme court promulgated the state speedy trial rules372 that provide for 
dismissal with prejudice by the circuit court as the remedy for violation373 of 
the time limits imposed under the rules.374 In so doing, the court assumed 
authority for enforcement of the speedy trial requirement that both protects 
the individual defendant’s rights and serves the public’s interest in formal 
solution of criminal charges, to the state’s trial courts without relying on any 
grant of authority by the legislature. 
Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the right to inter-
locutory appeal when the trial court rejects a colorable claim of prior, or 
double jeopardy, in Edwards v. State.375 The Edwards court rejected the ac-
cused’s creative claim376 that his involuntary civil commitment estopped a 
subsequent criminal prosecution based upon the same crime upon which his 
commitment had been based. These acts involved the abduction of and ter-
roristic threats directed toward his attorney.377 In so doing, it relied on the 
decision in Abney v. United States,378 in which the Court found that the pro-
tection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be frustrated if the 
accused pleading prior jeopardy were required to endure trial and preserve 
his claim for review on appeal in the event of conviction.379 As in the case of 
a speedy trial violation, a double jeopardy violation requires a remedy that 
does not require the aggrieved defendant to proceed to trial that would oth-
erwise have been prohibited in order to vindicate his claim.380 
 
 372. See Weaver v. State, 313 Ark. 55, 58–59. 852 S.W.2d 130, 132 (1993). The court 
referred to the history of Arkansas Speedy Trial Rule tracing it to American Bar Association 
Standards Relating to Speedy Trial issued in 197; the commentary to the Standards written by 
Professor Wayne R. LaFave; and the decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) in 
which the Supreme Court applied a four-part test for assessing when delay in trial would 
result in a violation of the speedy trial protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment). 
 373. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 30.1(a) (authorizing dismissal with prejudice—absolute discharge--
for failure to bring accused to trial within specific time limits). In Strunk v. United States, the 
unanimous Court explained that any remedy short of dismissal with prejudice for a violation 
of the accused’s right to speedy trial would fail to promote the policies of the constitutional 
protection. 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973) (citing Barker v. Wingo). 
 374. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.1(b) (requiring defendant to be brought to trial within 12 
(twelve) months of arrest or service of summons, excepting periods of time deemed “exclud-
able” under Rule 28.3). 
 375. Edwards v. State, 328 Ark. 394, 398, 943 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1997). 
 376. Id. at 401, 943 S.W.2d at 603. 
 377. Id. at 397–98, 943 S.W.2d at 600–601. 
 378. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661–662 (1977). 
 379. Id. at 660–61. 
 380. Id. at 659. 
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The court’s recognition of the authority of Arkansas trial courts to or-
der dismissal to enforce federal constitutional protections, and parallel state 
constitutional and statutory protections of individual rights, demonstrates an 
approach similar in concept to the position taken by the Indiana Supreme 
Court in Davis. This general reservation of judicial authority was affirmed 
by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Williams,381 but missing from the court’s 
analysis in State v. Thomas, where the disposition reflects total deference to 
legislative authority.382 
2. The State’s Separation of Powers Claim 
The argument avoided by the Thomas court,383 the State’s claim that the 
trial court’s dismissal of the charges pending against the impaired defendant 
violated the separation of powers doctrine, has been vigorously argued in 
Arkansas cases.384 The protection of the powers of the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of state government can be traced to the Arkansas 
Constitution.385 Perhaps ironically, resolution of separation of powers issues 
is traditionally the subject of litigation for determination by one branch of 
government, the judiciary. 
 
 381. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-302(b) (1975) (amended 2001); Cleveland, 338 Ark. at 587, 
999 S.W.2d at 191. 
 382. State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind. 2008). 
 383. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, at 5–6, 439 S.W.3d at 692–93. 
 384. See, e.g., Courtney A. Nelson, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. 
Parham, The Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in 
Arkansas, 59 ARK. L. REV. 781, 782 (2006) (evaluating legislative adoption of two-year 
statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions); Stephanie Khouri, The Arkansas Su-
preme Court Declares the Nonparty-Fault Provision and the Medical Costs Provision of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 Unconstitutional, Annual Survey of Case Law; Tort Law, 32 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 427, 428 (2010) (reviewing supreme court’s action in holding 
provision limiting recovery for medical expenses incurred by injured employee against third-
parties in Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 6, 348 S.W.3d 135, at 
140 and referencing court’s explanation of its authority: “The court noted that the Arkansas 
Constitution recognizes the importance of separation of powers among the different branches, 
noting specifically that amendment 80, section 3 ‘instructs that the Arkansas Supreme Court 
“shall prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all courts.”‘”). 
 385. ARK. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1, 2: 
 
§ 1. The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate body of 
magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one, those which are execu-
tive, to another, and those which are judicial, to another. 
 
§ 2. No person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall 
exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances here-
inafter expressly directed or permitted. 
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With respect to the issue of control over litigation in the state’s courts, 
the state courts have been particularly protective of the authority claimed by 
the judiciary. This surfaced in litigation involving the adoption of eviden-
tiary rules for practice in the courts. In Ricarte v. State,386 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court held that the adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence by the 
General Assembly was invalid, and in voiding the legislature’s evidence 
code, supplanted it by promulgating its own Rules of Evidence.387 
The State’s separation of powers theory could likely be traced to poten-
tial conflict between the executive and judicial branches over the authority 
of trial courts to order dismissal of pending criminal prosecutions.388 In State 
v. Murphy,389 the trial court dismissed an enhancement allegation sua sponte, 
reading the statute authorizing extended punishment as permissive, rather 
than mandatory.390 The court explained the limitation on the judiciary im-
posed by the state constitution: 
 
 386. Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986). 
 387. Id. at 104–05; 717 S.W.2d at 489–90. The court explained that the authority to 
promulgate rules of evidence for practice in the state’s courts was “inherent,” referring to 
Ark. Stat. Ann. s 22–242 (Supp. 1985), which provided: “The Supreme Court of the state of 
Arkansas shall have the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, practice, and 
procedure with respect to any or all proceedings in criminal cases,” in support of its conclu-
sion. Subsequent attempts by the General Assembly to adopt evidentiary rules arguably in-
truding on the authority of the judicial branch were addressed in State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 
7, 800 S.W.2d 402, 404 (1990) where the court considered the scope of the pa-
tient/psychotherapist patient privilege in preserving patient confidences in cases involving 
child abuse, while permitting questioning eliciting the fact that an accused had sought thera-
peutic counseling for sexual abuse. Id. at 8, 800 S.W.2d at 404. In limiting the scope of ad-
missible evidence to exclude the content of confidential communications, the court recog-
nized the balancing process essential to accommodate important public policy concerns in the 
interpretation or application of court-promulgated evidentiary rules, noting: 
 
In Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990), and St. Clair v. State, 
301 Ark. 223, 783 S.W.2d 835 (1990) we reaffirmed our inherent rule-making 
power as identified in Ricarte, supra; however, we went on to say that we share 
this power with the General Assembly and that we will defer to its authority 
where legislation involving matters of public policy conflicts with court rules. 
 
Id. at 7, 800 S.W.3d at 404. 
 388. In Hobbs v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 293, at 1, 412 S.W.3d 844, 847, which involved a 
challenge to the delegation of authority to the Arkansas Department of Correction in develop-
ing the protocol for execution of capital defendants sentenced to death, the court explained, 
simply, the separation of powers among the legislative, judicial and executive branches of 
Arkansas state government, noting: “The executive branch has the power and responsibility 
to enforce the laws as enacted and interpreted by the other two branches.” Id. at 9, 412 
S.W.3d at 851. 
 389. State v. Murphy, 315 Ark. 68, 864 S.W.2d 842 (1993). 
 390. Id. at 70–71, 864 S.W.2d at 843. 
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Our state constitution reserves the duty of charging an accused to the 
prosecutor or to the grand jury. Ark. Const. amend. 21, § 1. This court 
has preserved the separation of powers between the executive branch and 
the judicial branch by holding that when the trial court amends an infor-
mation over the state’s objection, the trial court has encroached upon the 




Thus, the specific issue raised in Murphy involved the decision regard-
ing charging of criminal offenses which is committed to the prosecutor and 
not subject to exercise of discretion by the trial court.392 The court did not 
address the authority of the trial court to order dismissal of charges general-
ly, but rather, narrowly held that the trial court “usurped” the prosecutor’s 
authority in interfering with the charging process committed to the prosecu-
tion in violation of the separation of powers.393  
Similarly, in State v. Hill,394 the Arkansas Supreme Court granted the 
State’s petition for writ of certiorari395 to consider whether the trial court 
exceeded the scope of its authority in reducing the offense alleged in the 
charging instrument from a felony, theft of property,396 to a misdemeanor, 
theft of a trade secret.397 The supreme court granted the State’s petition, af-
firming that the authority to charge a criminal offense lies with the prosecu-
tion398 and further, that the amendment of a pending charge by the trial court 
invades the province of the constitutional duty of the prosecutor and violates 
the separation of powers doctrine.399 The State’s separation of powers argu-
ment would likely fail with regard to the trial court’s general authority under 
Section 5-2-310, precisely because the General Assembly did authorize ex-
ercise of the power to dismiss with respect to those defendants who have 
been restored to fitness in Subsection (c)(2).400 
The Thomas court clearly read Subsection (c)(2) to authorize dismissal 
by the trial court when an impaired defendant had been restored to fitness, 
based on the broad ground that “it would be unjust to resume the criminal 
proceeding.”401 While the statute specifies that the triggering factor in as-
sessing whether continuation of the proceedings is the passage of time—”so 
 
 391. Id. at 72, 864 S.W.2d at 844. 
 392. Id., 864 S.W.2d at 844. 
 393. Id., 864 S.W.2d at 844. 
 394. State v. Hill, 306 Ark. 375, 811 S.W.2d 323 (1991). 
 395. The court explained that the writ of certiorari lies when the trial court exercises 
power that it is not authorized to do. Id. at 376, 811 S.W.2d at 323. 
 396. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–36–103 (1987). 
 397. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–36–107 (1987). 
 398. Id., citing State v. Brooks, 301 Ark. 257, 783 S.W.2d at 368 (1990). 
 399. Hill, 306 Ark. at 376, 811 S.W.2d at 323. 
 400. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(c)(2) (Repl. 2016). 
 401. Thomas v. State, 2014 Ark. 362, at 5, 439 S.W.3d at 693 (2014). 
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much time has elapsed since the alleged commission of the offense”402—
there is no requirement that the trial court make evidentiary findings identi-
fying the specific circumstances, or facts, warranting the trial court’s finding 
that continuation of the proceedings would be unjust. 
The injustice that compromises the right to fair trial may flow from the 
lost opportunity to investigate a case in timely fashion, faded memories, or 
the disappearance of witnesses necessary to present an effective defense. 
Injustice also results from the emotional trauma of delay for the individual 
who remains in jeopardy until criminal charges are finally resolved. While 
this delay may serve the strategic interests of some defendants, the majority 
of them will encounter the unsettling life experience caused by uncertainty 
as to their eventual fate. This personal consequence of jeopardy was aptly 
described by Justice Hugo Black in explaining the protection afforded by the 
double jeopardy principle in Green v. United States:403 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources 
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing 
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found guilty.
404
 
Although one might posit, cynically, that some impaired defendants 
would be less likely to suffer the emotional experience described by Justice 
Black and later referenced by the Court in Abney v. United States,405 the 
impaired defendant who cannot be restored to fitness also suffers a curtail-
ment of liberty406 and the consequences of confinement in a mental institu-
tion, often under medication.407 
A reasonable inference from the legislature’s specific grant of authority 
to dismiss if proceeding to trial would be unjust for a previously impaired 
defendant, who has been restored to fitness, would be that the trial court is 
authorized to address the unrestorable defendant’s situation in a way that 
addresses the concerns of justice. In fact, Section 5-2-310(a)(1)(B) expressly 
authorizes the trial court to release an impaired defendant who is not dan-
gerous on “conditions the court deems necessary.”408 Standing alone, the 
 
 402. Id. § 5-2-310(c)(2) (Repl. 2016). 
 403. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
 404. Id. at 187–88. 
 405. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 406. See supra note 159; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
 407. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (describing the consequences of psy-
chiatric medication). 
 408. ARK. CODE ANN. §5-2-310(a)(1) (Repl. 2016) provides: 
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proper inference to be drawn from this specific language could be that the 
General Assembly did not intend to afford the trial court any authority to 
dismiss pending charges in the event restoration of competence is not possi-
ble or efforts have failed. However, in light of the express power to dismiss 
charges when required by concerns for fairness when a defendant has been 
restored to fitness, such a limited grant of authority in dealing with those 
impaired defendants who cannot be restored to fitness is simply not con-
sistent in terms of legislative intent. 
The reasonableness of the inference that the trial court’s exercise of 
discretion to dismiss pending charges in order to comply with Jackson’s 
requirement that the impaired defendant not be subjected to unending jeop-
ardy is not based solely on the authority expressly granted by Section 5-2-
310(c)(2). Subsection 5-2-311 of the Criminal Code authorizes the trial 
court to consider a number of issues that may be resolved in the defendant’s 
favor, even when the accused himself is not fit for trial. The statute pro-
vides: 
The fact that the defendant lacks fitness to proceed does not preclude 
through counsel and without the personal participation of the defendant 
any motion upon: 
(1) A ground that the: 
(A) Indictment is insufficient; 
(B) Statute of limitations has run; or 
(C) Prosecution is barred by a former prosecution; 
or 
(2) Any other ground that the court deems susceptible of fair 
determination prior to trial.
409
 
A determination that the indictment is insufficient under Subsection 
(1)(A) would not entail a dismissal with jeopardy because the State could re-
indict or charge the offense by information following dismissal for a matter 
of form. However, the dismissal that would follow a finding that the statute 
of limitations had run, under Subsection (1)(B), or that the prosecution is 
barred by prior prosecution, under Subsection (1)(C) would be with preju-
 
 
(B) However, if the court is satisfied that the defendant may be released without 
danger to himself or herself or to the person or property of another, the court may 
order the defendant’s release and the release shall continue at the discretion of 
the court on conditions the court determines necessary. 
 
 409. Id. § 5-2-311 (Repl. 2016). 
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dice and bar further proceedings. The catch-all provision, Subsection (2), 
entails a broad grant of authority to Arkansas trial courts to resolve any out-
standing issue that the trial court “deems susceptible to fair resolution prior 
to trial.” 
The broad grant of authority to the trial court in Section 5-2-311(2) 
would clearly encompass the issue raised by a finding that an impaired de-
fendant cannot be restored to fitness for trial. Moreover, there is no limita-
tion on the trial court’s authority to order dismissal of charges for unrestored 
and unrestorable impaired criminal defendants when supported by the evi-
dence in either Section 5-2-310(a)(1)(B) or Section 5-2-311(2) of the Crimi-
nal Code. Based on the Court’s holding in Jackson, dismissal was the proper 
action to have been taken by the trial court in State v. Thomas. 
3. Application of the “Right for Any Reason” Rule 
The Thomas court’s disposition, vacating the dismissal order entered 
by the trial court, rested on the narrow view of statutory construction in 
which the reliance by the court and parties on the wrong statutory provision 
controlled the court’s view of the trial court’s exercise of discretion.410 Reli-
ance on an incorrect statute, rule, or basis for a trial court’s exercise of dis-
cretion is not an unknown problem in Arkansas law. A commonly recog-
nized response to the problem is the application of the “right for any reason” 
rule,411 as explained by the Georgia Supreme Court in the review of a civil 
case, City of Gainesville v. Dodd,412 where the court wrote: 
Under the “right for any reason” rule, an appellate court will affirm a 
judgment if it is correct for any reason, even if that reason is different 




 410. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362 (2014). 
 411. See, e.g., Thomas G. Saylor, Right for Any Reason: An Unsettled Doctrine at the 
Supreme Court Level and An Anecdotal Experience with Former Chief Justice Cappy, 47 
Duq. L. Rev. 489 (2009) (noting common use of doctrine by appellate courts, at 491 n.5); 
Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of judicial proceedings the 
rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower 
court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”). Community Redevelopment 
Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 921 (Cal. 1975), (en banc) (citing Davey v. Southern Pa-
cific Co., 48 Pac. 117, 118 (Cal. 1897)) (“No rule of decision is better or more firmly estab-
lished by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a 
ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given 
for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sus-
tained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclu-
sion.”). 
 412. City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 573 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. 2002). 
 413. Id. at 370. The court declined to apply the “right for any reason” rule to uphold the 
trial court’s decision in Dodd, however, finding that this default rationale for decision does 
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Some appellate courts also apply this rule in criminal cases. For exam-
ple, the New Mexico Supreme Court applied the rule in State v. Ruiz,414 but 
cautioned that the court should not use the rule when the parties had not 
argued the correct ground for the decision to the trial court thus making ap-
plication of the rule unfair to the appellant.415 In Thomas, there was no un-
fairness to the appellant, the State; however, the factual basis for the “right” 
disposition—dismissal of the criminal charge—had been established by ex-
pert testimony during the hearing in the trial court.416 
Arkansas courts have adopted and relied on the “right for any reason” 
rule. In Chisum v. State,417 a decision often cited for application of this 
rule,418 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the trial court’s ruling ad-
mitting testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule.419 A witness reviewed 
a prior statement she had given regarding the circumstances surrounding a 
killing, which resulted in the defendant’s conviction for manslaughter.420 
The State offered testimony concerning her statements through other wit-
nesses under the recorded recollection exception, and the trial court admitted 
the evidence on this theory.421 On appeal, the court held the trial court incor-
rectly relied on this theory.422 However, the Arkansas Supreme Court also 
found that the witness’s statement was admissible on a different theory, im-
peachment evidence under Evidence Rule 613.423 The court declined to find 
 
not apply when the trial court’s disposition is based on an “erroneous legal theory.” Id. at 
370–73. It cautioned against a mechanistic application of this rule: 
 
[T]his case illustrates one of the major dangers of blind, rote application of the 
“right-for-any reason” rule without the appellate court’s discretion; automatic 
application of the rule would have resulted in a decision on the merits of the ar-
guments advanced by the City, but without those arguments being properly 
briefed by all parties on appeal. 
 
Id. at 373. 
 414. State v. Ruiz, 150 P.3d 1003, 1011 (N.M. 2006). 
 415. See also State v. Franks, 889 P.2d 209, 212 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (“Although we 
may affirm a district court ruling on a ground not relied upon by the district court . . . we will 
not do so if reliance on the new ground would be unfair to the appellant.”); see Naranjo v. 
Paul, 803 P.2d 254, 259 (N.M. Ct. App.1990). 
 416. See Thomas v. State, 2014 Ark. 362, 439 S.W.3d 690 (2014). 
 417. Chisum v. State, 273 Ark. 1, 616 S.W.2d 728 (1981). 
 418. E.g., Warren v. State, 314 Ark. 192, 198, 862 S.W.2d 222, 225 (1993) (upholding 
trial court’s discretion in limiting cross-examination to matters not inquired into on direct 
examination). 
 419. Id. 
 420. See Chisum, 273 Ark. 1, 616 S.W.2d 728. 
 421. Id. at 6, 616 S.W.2d at 730 (referencing Uniform Evidence Rule 803(5) (now Ark. 
R. Evid. 803(5))). 
 422. Id., 616 S.W.2d at 731–32. 
 423. Id. at 6-7, 616 S.W.2d at 731–32. 
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reversible error in the trial court’s erroneous basis for admitting the state-
ment, instead explaining: “[W]e will not reverse a trial judge’s ruling, even 
though he gave the wrong reason, if the ruling was right.”424 
Chisum remains sound authority for application of the “right for any 
reason” rule in Arkansas criminal appellate decisions, and is often cited in 
subsequent cases.425 
In Thomas, the appellate court’s basis for reversing the trial court rest-
ed on the misidentification of the authority to dismiss the pending criminal 
charges based on an incorrect statutory provision. But, because the trial 
court’s dismissal order was consistent with the Jackson requirement that the 
impaired defendant who cannot be restored to fitness must be relieved of the 
burden of indefinite jeopardy, the court could have readily upheld the dis-
missal order as necessary to protect the constitutional rights of the impaired 
defendant. This approach would have been consistent with the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s affirmation of the duty of Arkansas courts in Williams v. 
State426 to enforce federal constitutional protections, but the Thomas court 
declined to exercise this option. 
B. Statutory Construction Designed to Implement Legislative Intent 
The goal of an appellate court reviewing legislation is two-fold: (1) to 
construe the statute to reach an understanding of its scope consistent with 
constitutional values; and (2) to give effect to the legislative intent implicit 
in the language of the statute and the purpose of the statute. In a thorough 
and straightforward explanation of the duties of the reviewing court, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court, in Hobbs v. Jones,427 wrote: 
 
 424. Id. at 6, 616 S.W.2d at 731. 
 425. E.g., Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 422, 64 S.W.3d 728, 737 (2002) (“Although the 
judge based her decision on the “fighting words” doctrine, we can still affirm her decision 
because she reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason.”); Harris v. State, 339 Ark. 
35, 40, 2 S.W.3d 768, 770 (1999) (“[W]e will not reverse a trial judge who uses the wrong 
reason but reaches the right result.”); McDaniel v. State, 291 Ark. 596, 599, 726 S.W.2d 679, 
681 (1987) (incorrect reference to evidence Rule 803 did not require reversal where im-
peachment evidence admissible under Rule 613); McGee v. State, 280 Ark. 347, 352, 658 
S.W.2d 376, 379 (1983) (improper theory of admissibility of defendant’s non-Mirandized 
statement did not require reversal where it was admissible to rebut alibi defense); Renfrow v. 
State, Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1990 WL 27396, *1 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (trial court’s impo-
sition of consecutive sentence proper under incorrect statute did not require relief where 
proper basis afforded by another statute); and Bitner v. State, Not Reported in S.W.2d, 1990 
WL 4852, *1 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (trial court’s incorrect reference to basis for evidentiary 
ruling not reversible if supported by another ground). 
 426. Williams v. State, 354 Ark. at 801, 496 S.W.2d at 397; see supra notes 370–71 and 
accompanying text. 
 427. Hobbs v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 293, 412 S.W.3d 844 (2012). 
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Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the burden of proving other-
wise is on the challenger of the statute. If it is possible to construe a stat-
ute as constitutional, we must do so. Because statutes are presumed to be 
framed in accordance with the Constitution, they should not be held in-
valid for repugnance thereto unless such conflict is clear and unmistaka-
ble. Moreover, when interpreting statutes, we make a de novo review, as 
it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Thus, although we are 
not bound by the trial court’s interpretation, in the absence of a showing 
that the trial court erred, its interpretation will be accepted as correct on 
appeal. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the in-
tent of the legislature. Where the language of a statute is plain and un-
ambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of 
the language used. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it 
just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted 
meaning in common language. We construe the statute so that no word is 
left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to 
every word in the statute, if possible.
428
 
1. The Thomas Court’s Failure to Apply a “Common Sense” Con-
struction Protocol 
The court’s opinion in Thomas hardly reflects any attempt to reconcile 
the lack of direction in Section 5-2-310(b)(2)(A). In the case, the trial court 
must consider disposition when the expert opinion supports a finding that 
the impaired accused cannot be restored to fitness within the constitutional 
requirements for due process under Jackson. The Thomas court failed to 
construe this lack of direction regarding authority of the trial court to order 
dismissal of the pending criminal charges as inherent in its authority to en-
force federal constitutional protections, as implied in the grant of legislative 
authority to order dismiss to avoid an unjust continued prosecution pursuant 
to Subsection 310(c)(2), or within the scope of authority for disposition of 
issues not requiring fitness, pursuant to Section 5-2-311(2). 
In short, the Thomas court failed to address the lack of express authori-
ty for dismissal of pending criminal charges when inability to restore the 
impaired accused to fitness leaves the accused, the prosecution, and the trial 
court in limbo with respect to the accused’s future. Thomas, like Hughes, 
reflects a virtual inability to respond creatively to this significant problem 
posed by mental disease and defect that compromises the constitutional in-
tegrity of the State’s criminal justice system. Instead, the court took the 
course of least initiative. 
The need to affirmatively engage in meaningful appellate review de-
signed to address flaws in legislative language is imperative when: (1) a 
 
 428. Id. at 8–9, 412 S.W.3d at 850–51 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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statutory scheme fails to provide for resolution of problems inherent in the 
work of the judicial system in operation; or (2) when the statutory scheme, 
as designed, fails to address constitutional considerations arising after its 
adoption that are themselves designed to promote and ensure due process for 
the individual in that system. Courts confronting statutory schemes that are 
flawed or suffer from language inconsistencies that result in constitutional 
deprivations or threaten the success of the statutory scheme involved, must 
be prepared to correct the errors judicially until such time as the legislature 
takes up the problems identified by the courts in the course of judicial re-
view. In Lynch v. Overholser, the Court observed: 
The decisions of this Court have repeatedly warned against the dangers 
of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare 
words of a statute, for ‘literalness may strangle meaning,’
429
 
The observation is illustrated by the approach taken in Thomas. 
2. The United States Supreme Court’s Approach to Obamacare  
An example of the United States Supreme Court itself struggling with 
flaws in the language or direction of a statutory scheme, and resolving the 
problems created by flawed legislation, is illustrated by the majority’s re-
sponse to a serious challenge raised by legislative inconsistency in King v. 
Burwell.430 There, in what might have been a rather unexpected stroke, Chief 
Justice Roberts saved a key provision of the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act431 (often referred to as “Obamacare”) from one line of political 
attack by construing poorly drafted language to give effect to Congressional 
intent designed to address a “long history of failed health insurance re-
form.”432 Rather than applying a more literal reading of the language to 
reach the contrary result that would have undermined the perception of fair-
ness in the major health policy-based legislative initiative of President 
Obama’s Administration,433 the Court’s resort to its admittedly limited au-
 
 429. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) (citations omitted); Id. at 720 (Clark, 
J., dissenting) (arguing against the assertive posture taken by the majority) (“Eighty-seven 
years ago, Chief Justice Waite in speaking of the function of this Court said ‘Our province is 
to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be . . . If the law is wrong, it ought to 
be changed; but the power for that is not with us.’”). 
 430. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 431. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 432. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 433. Id. at 2494 (“It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this man-
ner.”). 
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thority to interpret statutory language434 served to advance the legislative 
goal in addressing that long history. 
The issue before the Court involved the construction given an essential 
provision of the Act by the Internal Revenue Service, relating to the author-
ized creation of insurance “exchanges” by the states or the federal govern-
ment that would afford subscribers a means of obtaining insurance coverage 
mandated by statute.435 The precise question was directed to an IRS ruling 
that subscribers to an exchange created by a state would only qualify for the 
tax credits available for subscribers to an exchange maintained by a state 
government, but not by the federal government.436 The IRS rule, as con-
strued, described the Virginia exchange as a “federal exchange,” thus requir-
ing the plaintiffs to purchase insurance through an exchange which would 
not permit them to obtain the benefit of the tax credit.437 
Chief Justice Roberts noted the problem in the wording of the statute 
upon which the IRS had relied in issuing its interpretation denying credits to 
subscribers of exchanges maintained by the federal government, but re-
solved the problem in favor of a construction, avoiding the discrepancy im-
plicit in the IRS rule.438 His opinion, for the majority, rejected the argument 
that the IRS rule was entitled to deference because Congress intended to 
delegate authority to interpret the application of the statute to an agency of 
the federal government, while accepting that deference to agency interpreta-
tion is generally a controlling principle for judicial review.439 He wrote: 
“In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before 
concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” 
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s key re-
forms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting 
the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those cred-
its are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “eco-
nomic and political significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; 
had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely 




 434. Id. at 2492 (“[O]ur preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not abso-
lute.”) (citing Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004)). 
 435. Id. at 2487. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. at 2488 (“The IRS Rule therefore requires petitioners to either buy health insur-
ance they do not want, or make a payment to the IRS.”). 
 438. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 439. Id. at 2485. 
 440. Id. at 2488–89 (citing FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company, 520 U.S. 
120, 159 (2000)). 
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The majority’s decision to seek a rational understanding of Congres-
sional intent and to harmonize that intent with imprecise language it has 
used in the statute ultimately served to avoid a troubling flaw in the newly-
adopted legislative response to significant health care problems facing the 
nation. 
The Court’s disposition in King v. Burwell reflects the cautious use of 
its authority to accommodate flawed statutory language and the clear legis-
lative goal intended in the statutory scheme to achieve a rationale result in 
the administration of the law. Regrettably, appellate courts faced with the 
necessity for construing language or wording used by the legislature do not 
always exercise the option of finding a rational accommodation for drafting 
failures. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The dilemma created by the Court’s decision in Jackson v. Indiana 
arises from the difficulty in addressing the temporally indeterminate circum-
stances surrounding the diagnosis and treatment of mental impairment and 
the legal system’s need to address issues in the contexts of procedural rules 
that are, at least initially, dictated by fixed time frames. Jackson recognizes 
the threat to due process by unlimited restriction on personal liberty attribut-
able to unresolved mental illness or defect when the individual suffering 
from the impairment is charged with a criminal offense. But in recognizing 
the threat, the Court declined to provide a specific set of rules, or fixed 
timeframe, that would govern how trial courts should navigate the uncertain-
ty in determining when an accused’s mental impairment has ceased to com-
promise their fitness, or competence, to proceed to trial or disposition of the 
case by plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or other procedural option. 
When an accused does manifest symptoms consistent with impairment, 
it is clear that the duty of the trial court, and counsel, requires expert evalua-
tion to determine whether the impairment prevents the accused from under-
standing the proceedings or ability to assist counsel in their own defense. 
Once the evaluation results in a finding that the accused’s fitness is suffi-
ciently impaired to preclude further proceedings in the trial court, the court 
may direct that additional measures be undertaken to restore the accused to 
fitness for trial. Part of that directive will necessarily require the forensic 
expert to reach an opinion as to whether there is a reasonable prospect that 
restoration efforts can succeed. 
The difficulty of diagnosing some mental disorders, as well as the dif-
ficulty in many cases in reaching a successful therapy for addressing the 
disorder once diagnosed, does not fit within the competency and restoration 
of competency frameworks dictated by due process. Compounding the eval-
uation process in some cases are factors that may bear on the outcome of 
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restoration, particularly when the offense charged involves very serious of-
fenses or those that have generated particular notoriety or publicity, which 
may itself reflect aberrant behavior that may be attributable to the mental 
state of the perpetrator. 
These concerns are reflected in a recent story441 reported by the Arkan-
sas Democrat-Gazette involving Gary Eugene Holmes, charged with first 
degree murder and terroristic act in what the police described as a “road 
rage” killing of a three-year old child. The story reports that doctors at the 
Arkansas State Hospital have had difficulty in performing a mental exami-
nation on Holmes because of his refusal to cooperate during an examination, 
comprising forensic experts’ ability to reach a diagnosis with respect to pos-
sible mental illness that could be leaving him unfit to proceed with trial. The 
article noted that in successive mental evaluations in January and Septem-
ber, 2015, Holmes was diagnosed initially with “schizophrenia, post-
traumatic stress disorder and suffering from an earlier head injury,” but sub-
sequently with “depressive disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and the 
effects of the head injury.”442 Holmes underwent counseling for his various 
diagnoses through 2016 after being placed on probation in October 2015 
following his plea of guilty to domestic battery and terroristic threatening 
when threatening to kill his girlfriend in 2014.443 
Concerned about the “complexities” of diagnosis and “seriousness of 
his charges,” the lead ASH forensic psychologist petitioned the trial court to 
order Holmes committed for a further period of evaluation as an ASH inpa-
tient.444 Because he was evasive in responding to many questions posed dur-
ing the evaluation conducted for the purpose of assessing his competence, 
there was, of course, the possibility that apart from any of the numerous 
impairments reflected in previous diagnoses, his non-compliance might also 
demonstrate malingering, or faking, in an effort to avoid trial on the first 
degree charges arising from the killing of the child. 
The Democrat-Gazette report reflects the often difficult problems faced 
by forensic experts attempting to determine whether a criminal defendant 
lacks fitness to proceed to trial as a result of a statutorily-recognized mental 
disease or defect, or is resorting to feigned symptoms of impairment out of 
fear of trial or as a deliberate effort to use mental impairment to avoid con-
viction and punishment, particularly when the offenses charged are serious 
and threaten significantly long terms of imprisonment, or death. 
 
 441. John Lynch, Kid-Slaying Suspect Put in Hospital, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, 
May 9, 2017, at sec. B, pp. 1, 8. 
 442. Id. at 8. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. 
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The situation involving Gary Holmes, much like other murder defend-
ants manifesting symptoms that could indicate presence of a mental disorder 
compromising their ability to comprehend the trial process or assist counsel 
in presenting a defense, suggests three reforms that could serve to advance 
compliance with the constitutional requirement of Jackson v. Indiana. 
Of course, the most obvious change that could be taken to address the 
specific constitutional holding of Jackson would lie in legislative action to 
engraft onto the existing Section 5-2-310(b)(2)(D)445 language authorizing 
the trial court to order dismissal of pending criminal charges when the ac-
cused cannot be restored to fitness as a result of the nature of their mental 
illness or defect, and then order the filing of a petition for involuntary com-
mitment of the accused to the department. The revised statutory section 
might simply read: 
(D) If the defendant lacks fitness to proceed and presents a danger to 
himself or herself or the person or property of another, the court shall 
order the pending criminal charge(s) to be dismissed and direct the de-
partment to petition for an involuntary admission. 
While the trial court’s inherent authority to dismiss pending criminal 
charges for the impaired defendant who cannot be restored to competence 
should be sufficient to have warranted a different decision in Thomas, 
amendment of subsection (b)(2)(D) would expressly address the problem of 
the missing language. 
Second, when restoration efforts will take a significant period of time 
before a final conclusion can be drawn by forensic experts with respect to 
the possibility of restoration of fitness, the extended period of confinement 
in the state hospital for diagnosis and treatment should require regular re-
porting by ASH officials concerning progress that may have been made in 
restoring the impaired defendant to competence for trial. This approach 
would reflect, in a sense, the requirement that an extended involuntary civil 
commitment be limited to 180-day periods.446 In the civil commitment con-
 
 445. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(D) (Repl. 2016). 
 446. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-47-215. Additional involuntary admission period. This 
provision of the involuntary civil commitment statute provides for additional periods of hos-
pitalization, as follows: 
 
(a) GENERALLY. (1) Additional one hundred eighty-day involuntary admission 
orders may be requested if, in the opinion of the treatment staff, a person invol-
untarily admitted continues to meet the criteria for involuntary admission. 
 
(2) Additional one hundred eighty-day involuntary admission peri-
ods may be requested by the treatment staff of the hospital or receiv-
ing facility or program when it is its opinion that the person needs 
continued treatment and supervision without which the person poses 
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text, the burden falls to the State to justify further confinement expressly 
meeting the test for the initial involuntary commitment.447 
A third “reform,” designed to clarify operation of existing trial provi-
sions that govern the operation of the Arkansas speedy trial right, would 
address the effect of a trial court dismissal of pending charges when the im-
paired accused cannot be restored to competence for trial. The current rules 
address the situation in two ways. Rule 28.3(a) excludes any period of time 
during which the accused is being evaluated for fitness for trial448 from the 
one-year time frame for bringing a case to trial.449 Rule 28.2 specifically 
addresses situations in which pending criminal charges are dismissed on 
motion of the defendant, providing that the speedy trial obligation to try the 
defendant within one year commences when previously dismissed charges 
are reinstated.450 Although not necessary, the rule governing commencement 
of speedy trial time limits could be clarified with language expressly includ-
ing dismissals ordered based on a determination that the accused could not 
be restored to fitness, but subsequent events demonstrate recovery rendering 
the accused competent to proceed with trial. In such event, of course, the 
trial court would presumably still be authorized to dismiss the reinstated 
charges under Section 5-2-310(c)(2) in the interest of justice.451 
What is clear is that the process typically used in Arkansas cases, par-
ticular those involving less severe offenses, of simply resolving impairment 
 
a likelihood of danger to himself or herself or to others as defined in 
§ 20-47-207 if discharged. 
 
(3) The treatment staff of the hospital or of the receiving facility or 
program may request additional involuntary admission orders as 
they are deemed necessary. 
 
 447. E.g., Black v. State, 52 Ark. App. 140, 915 S.W.2d 300. 302 (1996) (vacating com-
mitment order extending involuntary committee’s confinement for additional 180-day period 
based only on testimony that additional period of hospitalization would benefit petitioner). 
 448. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.3. The exclusion is phrased as follows, in pertinent part: 
 
(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defend-
ant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on the competency 
of the defendant and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial, 
hearings on pretrial motions, interlocutory appeals, and trials of other charges 
against the defendant. . . . 
 
 449. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.1(b). 
 450. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.2(b). 
 451. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(c)(2) (Repl. 2016) provides: 
(2) However, if the court is of the view that so much time has elapsed since the 
alleged commission of the offense in question that it would be unjust to resume 
the criminal proceeding, the court may dismiss the charge. 
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questions by ordering acquittal based on mental defect, fails to meet the 
constitutional requirement of Jackson v. Virginia. The reason is that the ac-
quittal not only indicates that there has been sufficient evidence adduced to 
show that the insanity acquitee committed the offense, but also results in 
significant impairment in terms of loss of liberty. An involuntary civil 
commitment cannot be extended without proof that the requirements for the 
initial commitment continue with the State carrying the burden of proof to 
extend the committee’s confinement.452 But an insanity acquitee must carry 
the burden of proving that continued confinement is no longer authorized by 
law by clear and convincing evidence. The statute controlling an acquitee’s 
burden in challenging continued confinement provides: 
(e)(1) A person found not guilty on the ground of mental disease or de-
fect of an offense involving bodily injury to another person or serious 
damage to the property of another person or involving a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of 
another person has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evi-
dence that his or her release would not create a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another person or serious damage to property of another person 
due to a present mental disease or defect. 
(2) With respect to any other offense, the person has the burden of proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence.
453
 
The oft-used tactic of finding the unrestorable, impaired defendant not 
guilty by reason of mental defect will result in at least some criminal de-
fendants being held in a permanent state of confinement, effectively result-
ing in the warehousing of the mentally-impaired contrary to the Jackson 
Court’s finding with respect to constitutional requirements of due process. 
Arguably, the practice of using the insanity acquittal as an expedient 
means of addressing the problems posed by mentally impaired defendants 
who cannot be restored to competence, or fitness, for trial will be addressed 
by the General Assembly’s repeal of Section 5-2-305 to truly separate the 
mental evaluation for competence to proceed to trial from the evaluation that 
focuses on the accused’s sanity at the time of the offense. Section 5-2-327 of 
the revised statute specifically addresses the evaluation of the accused for 
fitness to proceed to trial.454 Its predecessor, Section 5-2-305, had been 
amended to achieve the result of differentiating the two exams explicitly, 
 
 452. See Black, supra note 447. 
 453. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-314(e) (Repl. 2016). 
 454. Id. § 5-2-327, as adopted by Act 472, 91st General Assemb., Reg. Session 2017. 
SECTION 14. Arkansas Code Title 5, Chapter 2, Subchapter 3, is amended 14 
to add an additional section to read as follows: 15 § 5-2-327. Examination of defendant — 
Fitness to proceed. 
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but did so with the exception of authorizing a request that the two examina-
tions be conducted simultaneously.455 Section 5-2-328, as adopted in Act 
972, authorizes the trial court to order a forensic examination for the pur-
pose of determining the accused’s insanity, or for determining whether the 
accused lacked criminal responsibility, as re-defined in Section 5-2-312456 
and referenced in Section 5-2-304(a).457 
It is not clear why the Thomas court demonstrated such reluctance to 
look beyond the error made by the trial court and parties when framing its 
arguments in terms of Section 5-2-310(c)(2). This section was clearly inap-
plicable to the trial court’s action in dismissing the pending charges on find-
ing that Thomas could not be restored to fitness for trial, based on uncontro-
verted expert testimony regarding his mental impairment. What is clear is 
that Section 5-2-310(b) provides the threshold framework, although incom-
plete, for dealing with the unrestorable and impaired accused in the prosecu-
tion process. Once expert evaluation establishes that the impaired defendant 
cannot be restored to competence, or fitness, within a reasonable period of 
time, the statute should follow Jackson’s due process formula. The statute 
authorizes the accused’s release, under appropriate conditions, provided he 
does not constitute a threat to himself or others.458 If the accused does pre-
sent a danger based on the forensic evaluation, the trial court is directed to 
“order the department to petition for an involuntary admission.”459 The only 
element of authority for the trial court missing from the statute involves the 
correct action for the trial court to take with respect to the pending criminal 
 
 455. Id. § 5-2-327, now repealed by Act 472, provided: 
 
(2)(A) The fitness-to-proceed examination, and the criminal responsibility exam-
ination and request for an opinion on the defendant’s criminal responsibility, are 
two distinctly different examinations. 
 
(B) The fitness-to-proceed examination and the criminal responsibility examina-
tion may be done at the same time only if the defendant simultaneously raises the 
issue of the defendant’s fitness to proceed and files notice that he or she intends 
to rely upon the defense of mental disease or defect. 
(C) In all other cases the process is bifurcated. 
 
 456. Id. § 5-2-312(a) (Repl. 2016). 
 457. Id. § 5-2-304(a), as amended by Act 472, provides: 
 
When a defendant intends to raise mental disease or defect lack of criminal re-
sponsibility as a defense in a prosecution or put in issue his or her fitness to pro-
ceed, the defendant shall notify the prosecutor and the court at the earliest practi-
cable time. (emphasis added). 
 
 458. Id. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(C) (2007). 
 459. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(D) (2007). (The statutory language is mandatory in 
that the trial court shall order the department to take action committing the defendant civilly). 
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charges. Dismissal is the proper action in this circumstance, consistent with 
Jackson. 
The lengthy delays characterizing the Darrell Davis and Ricky Dale 
Newman cases discussed in the introduction to this article raise an important 
question about how dismissal of pending charges for the impaired defend-
ant460 would affect prospects for prosecution if, after lengthy hospitalization 
in a mental hospital, the accused is ultimately restored to fitness. Although 
the expert psychiatric opinion that restoration is precluded by the nature of 
the impairment triggers action under Section 5-2-310(b)(2) of the Criminal 
Code, it is clear from the Arkansas decisions in capital cases that lengthy 
hospitalization may eventually result in recovery of competence. The initial 
opinion as to restoration serves to facilitate proper disposition in these cases, 
but should not be taken as beyond revision, depending upon circumstances 
involving individual defendants. 
The speedy trial guarantee, both grounded in the Sixth Amendment 
protection and Arkansas Speedy Trial Rule, may complicate the process in 
some cases in which the most serious offenses, capital and first-degree mur-
ders, have been charged. But the Arkansas rule, which requires trial within 
12 months of arrest or charging, already provides that the period of time 
spent while a defendant is unfit to proceed is excluded from that fixed peri-
od of time. Rule 28.2 already excepts application of the rule under specific 
circumstances, such as dismissal on motion of the defendant, or reversal and 
remand for new trial after appeal.461 It could be amended to provide that 
when an impaired individual is hospitalized because of continuing threat of 
danger, a dismissal of the pending charge would not bar reinstatement of the 
former charge in the event the defendant is thereafter restored to fitness. At 
that point, the trial court would be authorized to consider, pursuant to Sec-
tion 5-2-310(c)(2), whether it would be unjust to proceed further on the 
criminal charges. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court should not hesitate to assert its authority 
to bring trial courts into compliance with the holding in Jackson v. Indiana, 
without relying on the insanity acquittal of an unfit defendant to dispose of 
the case. The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette reported in January 2017: 
James Earl Lambert has been jailed since his May 2015 arrest at west 
Little Rock apartment, where his cousin lived, by police investigating 
complaints by neighbors about a man with a gun in the area. Police re-
ports show Lambert lived in an apartment across the street. 
 
 460. See supra notes 13 & 14. 
 461. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 28.2. §§ (b) and (e), respectively. 
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He was charged with attempted first-degree murder, criminal use of pro-
hibited weapons, possession of a defaced firearm and terroristic threaten-
ing, felony charges that carry up to 48 years in prison. 
But a state doctor and one hired by the defense have since diagnosed 
Lambert with schizophrenia, and court records show that prosecutors and 
defense attorneys agreed that Lambert is not competent to stand trial. 
Based on their recommendation, Pulaski County Circuit Judge Leon 
Johnson found Lambert innocent by reason of mental disease Wednes-
day. 
The judge also ruled that Lambert continues to present a danger to the 
community, a finding that transfers custody of Lambert to the state De-
partment of Human Services.
462
 
This disposition, while agreed upon by the parties and trial judge, 
served to remove the pending criminal charges from the active docket,463 but 
it cannot be reconciled with the unambiguous language of the Arkansas 
Criminal Code, which provides: 
A court shall not enter a judgment of acquittal on the ground of mental 
disease or defect against a defendant who lacks the capacity to under-
stand a proceeding against him or her or to assist effectively in his or her 
own defense as a result of mental disease or defect.
464
 
Lambert apparently has no remedy under Arkansas law for the viola-
tion of his right to due process. Not only can the trial court’s insanity acquit-
tal in Lambert’s case not be squared with the express prohibition in Section 
5-2-302(b) of the Arkansas Criminal Code, precluding trial of an incompe-
tent defendant, neither can the observation in the Democrat-Gazette news-
paper article that “Lambert can be kept in state custody indefinitely”465 be 
squared with the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson. 
There remains, of course, at least one unexplored alternative to the con-
tinuing due process considerations addressed by the Jackson Court. The 
United Sates Supreme Court could overrule Jackson based on a conclusion 
that public safety considerations simply outweigh the Jackson Court’s due 
process concerns, rejecting the lower court’s analysis in Frendak.466 In that 
event, the Court’s rationale might reflect a view that the imposition of an 
 
 462. John Lynch, Mental Disease of Gun Suspect Exonerates Him; Man Placed in DHS 
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 463. State v. James Earl Lambert, No. 60CR-15-1937, Pulaski Co. [Ark.] Circuit Court 
(Jan. 11, 2017) (Acquittal based on mental defect). 
 464. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-302(b) (2001). 
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 466. Supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text. 
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insanity acquittal to prevent release of an offender into the community 
would be justified, particularly if the mental disease or defect contributing to 
an offense involved injury to another cannot be successfully addressed by 
mental health professionals attempting to restore the impaired defendant to 
fitness to proceed to trial.467 
 
 467. The Court has also upheld confinement of convicted sex offenders who continue to 
pose a threat to other potential victims because of continuing influence of the disorder under-
lying the commission of the offense upon which they have been convicted and discharged the 
sentence imposed. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370-71 (1997) (Kansas 
statutory scheme for continuing confinement of convicted sex offender for treatment for 
“abnormality” following completion of sentence does not violate due process or ex post facto 
protections afforded by Constitution). 
